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Pavlos Trichakis 
 
Abstract 
This Thesis presents an investigation on the technical impacts caused by the steady-
state operation of Small-Scale Embedded Generators (SSEGs) and also introduces the 
Small Scale Energy Zone (SSEZ) concept which aims to remove the technical barriers 
associated with SSEGs through intelligent coordination of large numbers of customer-
owned SSEGs, energy storage units and controllable loads. This approach represents a 
move away from the conventional passive, “fit-and-forget” philosophy under which 
the majority of Low Voltage (LV) distribution networks are currently operated and 
towards a higher degree of network operational management. 
 
The employment of a distributed management and control approach for an SSEZ, 
realised through the Multi Agent Systems (MAS) technology, is proposed due to the 
advantages that can potentially be realised in the areas of: (i) scalability and openness, 
(ii) reliability and resilience and (iii) communications efficiency. A FIPA-compliant 
MAS-based control approach is designed, developed and evaluated based on the 
specific SSEZ control requirements. The MAS is composed of three types of agents: 
direct control agents, indirect control agents and utility agents, exchanging 
information through the employment of a common ontology. In addition, a relational 
database management system is also designed and developed in order to be coupled 
with the developed MAS for data management purposes. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
The following Chapter examines the context of this research and its relevance to the 
challenges and opportunities facing future electrical distribution networks, in 
particular at the Low Voltage (LV) sections. It will show that there is considerable 
potential to increase the penetration of Small Scale Embedded Generation (SSEG) in 
UK LV distribution networks, in light of the current position of the UK’s energy 
supply, as well as in order to meet the Government’s ambitious environmental targets. 
This is due to the substantial investment in new power generation capacity that will be 
required over the next two decades in order to replace existing power stations and in 
order to meet the projected increasing electricity demand figures [1].  
 
According to the Updated Energy and Carbon Emissions Projections [2], electricity 
generation is anticipated to increase at approximately 5% between 2010 (362 TWh) 
and 2020 (381 TWh), while total final energy consumption is anticipated to increase 
by about 4% (144.1 Mtoe and 150.1 Mtoe respectively). In addition, it has been 
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reported that around 20GW of existing power stations may have to close by 2020 [3] 
as a direct result of the decommissioning of approximately 7GW of existing nuclear 
power stations, as well as due to the EU Large Combustion Plant Directive [4] which 
may result in the shut-down of approximately 8.5GW of coal-fired and 2.5GW of oil-
fired power stations by the end of 2015.  
 
A diverse energy portfolio is likely to be required in order to reduce the level of 
dependency on foreign energy imports and thus reduce the risk of high and volatile 
prices while increasing security of supply. The recent Energy White Paper [1] has 
signalled that Small Scale Embedded Generators (SSEGs) connected on public LV 
distribution networks can provide an important contribution to meeting part of the 
UK’s electrical and thermal energy needs. According to a recent study [5], the amount 
of SSEG installations in the UK could reach as high as 21GW by 2050. 
 
However, a key factor for the financial and technical viability of large-scale SSEG 
installations is that their integration should be accomplished without costly 
modification to the electrical distribution system. Hence, existing LV distribution 
networks need to be operated and/or modified in such a way that the benefits offered 
by SSEGs can be realised without significant costs for customers and Distribution 
Network Operators (DNOs). Traditionally, the focus with regards SSEG integration 
has been on minimising their negative impacts to system operation, however a number 
of researchers [9-16] have recently attempted to shift focus towards maximising the 
potential technical, economical and environmental benefits gained from these units. 
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Before the penetration of SSEGs on existing LV distribution networks is increased 
and reaches anticipated future projections [5-7], it will be necessary to increase the 
SSEG volumes that may be accommodated on these networks. Three common 
solutions are currently employed by DNOs in order to achieve this: (i) through 
network reinforcement; (ii) by altering static network settings, such as distribution 
transformer tap positions; or (iii) through the use of some form of Active Network 
Management (ANM). ANM is being encouraged by a number of researchers [9-16] 
and the Department of Trade and Industry in particular has recognised the need to 
“encourage distribution companies to actively manage electrical distribution 
networks” [15]. This is because ANM schemes may allow a higher degree of network 
operational management to be achieved, which may be required due to the increasing 
share of DG and SSEG in total electrical energy production. 
 
The research described in this Thesis proposes and evaluates an ANM system for LV 
distribution networks which aims at dynamically and intelligently managing 
controllable customer-owned power systems entities (SSEGs, distributed energy 
storage units and controllable loads) such that they can contribute to system operation. 
By doing so, it is anticipated that the technical LV distribution network constraints 
associated with high levels of SSEGs may be overcome. In addition, by grouping 
these entities into a Small Scale Energy Zone (SSEZ), improved economic and 
environmental benefits may be realised by increasing the value of SSEGs in the 
energy market through meeting a set of operational goals. 
 
Having established the background behind the research area under investigation, this 
Chapter discusses the SSEZ concept, focusing on the potential challenges and benefits 
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that may be presented by employing this particular LV distribution network paradigm. 
Finally, the main research objectives and the outline of the Thesis are summarised.  
 
 
 
    1.1.   BACKGROUND 
 
The conventional structure of electrical power systems until now has dictated that 
electrical energy is predominantly generated in large, centralised power stations such 
as coal, nuclear and Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) plants. In the UK, these 
stations supply three-phase AC (alternating current) power into a ‘National Grid’ of 
transmission lines which interconnect generators, switching stations and demand 
centres. Transmission of electrical energy is hence the bulk, often long-distance, 
movement of electricity at high voltages (400kV and 275kV in the UK) from 
generating stations to distribution companies and to a small number of large industrial 
customers. It has been reported that the UK’s National Grid handled approximately 
350TWh of energy in 2007, through more than 7,000 km of transmission lines [1]. 
 
Electrical energy distribution refers to the provision of electricity to the majority of 
customers through lower voltage, more localised networks (from 132kV down to 
230/400V). It is the final stage in the delivery of electrical energy to consumers after 
generation and transmission and is generally considered to include: (i) medium-
voltage (1kV < V < 50 kV) electrical power lines; (ii) electrical substations and pole-
mounted power distribution transformers; (iii) low-voltage (less than 1kV) 
distribution wiring; (iv) protection devices; and (v) electricity meters. Because this 
part of the system is closest to the majority of customers, its performance and 
reliability directly impact the service quality that these customers are receiving.  
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The majority of existing electrical distribution networks were designed and operated 
based on planned centralised generation, as shown in Figure 1.1. Their role was 
restricted to unidirectional power flows from large generating stations progressively 
down the voltage levels until the transferred electrical energy reached the point of 
utilisation. The emergence of this hierarchical structure was based on technical 
constraints and geographical and economical considerations, where the main focus 
was on reliability and quality of supply [8]. Any discrepancies in the system energy 
balance were immediately dealt with by controlling the electrical power output of the 
connected generators and these generators also provided most of the ancillary services 
required by the Transmission System Operators (TSOs). Moreover, interconnected 
high-voltage transmission networks allow generator reserve requirements to be 
minimised, the most cost-effective generators to be dispatched at all times and bulk 
electrical power to be transferred over large distances with relatively low losses [8].  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Conventional structure of electrical power systems. 
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In recent years, however, fears over global warming, high oil prices, the decline of 
indigenous energy supplies and increasing Governmental support have led to a 
continuous increase in electrical energy generated by generators based on Renewable 
Energy Sources (RES). Furthermore, the deregulation of the electricity industry in 
some countries has also played a key role in increasing competition and opening the 
market to newcomers, and thus allowing more privately owned generators to be 
connected to public electrical MV or LV distribution networks.  
 
In order to meet the Government’s environmental targets for 2020 and 2050 [1], a 
20% and a 60% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions compared to 1990 levels have 
been set for the UK respectively. To ensure that “energy, the environment and 
economic growth are properly and sustainably integrated [1]”, the Government’s 
policy on renewable energy is that by 2020, 20 per cent of the UK electrical energy 
should be generated using RES [4].  
 
The anticipated increase in electricity generated by RES will require the introduction 
of Distributed Generation (DG) at various locations on the UK electrical distribution 
system, i.e. the connection of large numbers of generators of different types and sizes. 
These may employ a number of different technologies and fuels using synchronous or 
non-synchronous electrical generators. Most distributed generators are powered either 
by RES such as wind, solar and hydro, or by combined heat and power (CHP) units 
using conventional fuels with higher overall energy efficiency than electricity only 
cycles. Other drivers encouraging DG have been listed in [8] with particular emphasis 
on commercial considerations, such as (i) ease of finding sites for smaller generators; 
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(ii) shorter construction times and lower capital costs; and (iii) generation is located 
closer to demand, which may reduce transmission costs. 
 
In addition to the DG embedded in MV distribution networks at 132kV and below, 
SSEGs installed at end users’ premises at LV levels are gaining significant 
momentum due to potential advantages regarding reliability, energy efficiency and 
power quality. According to the recent Energy White Paper [1], current SSEG 
technologies include small-scale wind turbines, photovoltaic arrays and domestic 
CHP systems among other small-scale power generating units. According to two 
recent studies [6-7], SSEGs are seen as an important part of the additional DG that is 
required to meet the UK Government’s environmental targets. The first study has 
indicated that installed SSEG capacity in the UK could grow to as much as 8GW by 
2015 [6], while the second has suggested that SSEG technologies could supply 
between 30 to 40 per cent of the UK's electricity demands by 2050 and help to reduce 
household carbon emissions by 15% per annum [7].  
 
These projections are in line with increased Governmental support for SSEGs through 
the Low Carbon Buildings Program [17] which provides grants for the installation of 
SSEG technologies. Moreover, the UK Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change announced in October 2008 that the UK would implement a feed-in tariff by 
2010 for small-scale, low-carbon electricity production with an electrical capacity of 
5MW or less, in addition to its current renewable energy quota scheme [18]. 
 
The share of DG in some countries such as Denmark, Germany and Spain is already 
significant (in some cases even around 40% [8]), strongly affecting the operation of 
 8
the entire electricity network. This is because the current technical planning and 
operating framework within which electrical distribution networks are managed was 
not conceived with DGs or SSEGs in mind. Distribution networks were designed and 
operated based on planned centralised generation and on the assumption that the 
electrical current always flows from the substations to the end of network feeders. 
However, the anticipated growth of DGs and SSEGs may reverse the power flows 
within electrical distribution networks as shown in Figure 1.2. This may result in 
serious technical impacts relating to power quality, distribution system efficiency and 
potential equipment overloads that will be explained in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Structure of electrical power systems with DG and SSEG present. 
 
 
Furthermore, the proliferation of intermittent generation (such as generators powered 
by RES) introduces a higher degree of uncertainty and thus presents challenging 
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issues regarding power system operation and control. Compared to large centralised 
generation power plants, DG and SSEG units generally have a lower capacity factor, 
i.e. a higher ratio of peak to average generation. This is either due to the intermittent 
nature of their primary energy source or due to operational and economical constraints 
such as the heat-bound limitations of CHP plants. 
 
If the potential benefits of employing zero or low carbon generators are to be realised, 
their growth must be accompanied by a phased decommissioning of large centralised 
plants without resulting in a reduction in security of supply. This will be a challenging 
task as it will involve replacing large flexible fossil fuelled generators with a large 
number of small, often less controllable, power generation sources each of whom may 
have an individual commercial contract for supply. Hence, sufficient reserve margins 
will be required in order to dynamically manage the balance between generation and 
demand, with Demand Side Management (DSM) [19-21] and electrical Energy 
Storage Management (ESM) [22-23] schemes also likely to be employed. 
 
The research described in this Thesis focuses on the integration and growth of SSEGs, 
which is consumer-driven and not centrally planned, according to the “fit-and-inform” 
policy specified in Engineering Recommendation G83/1 [24]. Traditionally in the 
UK, DNOs have viewed SSEGs as unpredictable negative loads producing electrical 
energy on a localised level and with no standard guidelines on their contribution to 
system operation. This is done in accordance with Engineering Recommendation P2/5 
[25], which is a standard concerned with security of supply in electrical distribution 
networks. As a result, SSEGs have no option for active communication with the grid 
operator (DNOs) or the electricity market and are required to instantaneously 
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disconnect in the event of technical problems arising at the electrical distribution 
system. 
 
The existing passive or “fit-and-forget” control approach stemming from Engineering 
Recommendation P2/5 [25] has resulted in the employment of central control systems 
which rarely extend down to the LV network level due to the vast number of elements 
that would need to be controlled. For future high SSEG penetration scenarios, this 
passive control approach would severely limit the SSEG capacity that may be 
accommodated as will be shown through simulation results in Chapters 4 and 8. 
 
Recently, Engineering Recommendation P2/5 has been replaced by P2/6 [26] which 
aims to allow DNOs to take account of medium- to large-scale DG when designing 
their networks in order to utilise this generation as an alternative to network 
reinforcement and meet the required performance standards. According to the latest 
report regarding P2/6, however, SSEGs “would continue to be treated as negative 
load, and would not be considered to be providing any local system security” [27].  
 
The research in this Thesis is concerned with a shift from the current passive 
operating philosophy of LV networks towards a more active approach, as 
demonstrated by the SSEZ concept [28-33]. By doing so, it is anticipated that the 
technical LV distribution network constraints associated with high levels of SSEGs 
may be overcome, as well as the value of SSEGs in the energy market may be 
increased through meeting a set of operational goals. The SSEZ concept is discussed 
below in greater detail, focusing on the potential challenges and benefits that may be 
presented by employing this electrical LV distribution network paradigm. 
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    1.2.   SMALL SCALE ENERGY ZONES 
 
The value of SSEGs in modern electricity markets [28] may depend on a number of 
factors including: (i) the revenue streams that can be achieved through the sale of 
electricity; (ii) the degree to which SSEGs can reduce the electrical energy purchased 
from the electric utility; (iii) the degree to which SSEGs can participate in ancillary 
services markets; (iv) the environmental impact that can be achieved and the degree to 
which SSEGs can displace fossil fuel based generation plants; and (v) the ability of 
SSEGs to contribute to the deferral or avoidance of network reinforcement.  
 
In the current UK electricity market, significant limitations exist regarding the ability 
of individual SSEGs to participate [28-29]. The current market allows for late 
forecasting of generation output (one hour in advance) but it is expensive to collate 
this information from large numbers of SSEGs on an ongoing basis. Moreover, their 
volumes of exported electrical energy are often too small to justify the transaction cost 
to capture them and small generators have no direct commercial relationship with the 
National Grid; the information is exchanged via the DNO. Research at Durham 
University [28-33], however, has suggested that if SSEGs are aggregated and their 
electrical power outputs are combined, they will be able to trade larger amounts of 
electrical energy as a group of generators. This could result in SSEG owners being 
able to negotiate improved contractual terms with supply companies, thereby 
increasing revenue streams and improving the value of SSEGs in the energy market.  
 
Moreover, intelligent coordination of large numbers of SSEGs coupled with DSM and 
ESM schemes may allow the overall zone to be viewed by DNOs as predictable and 
controllable load or generation, depending on the electrical power balance within that 
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block. Improved predictability and controllability means that these zones may assist 
DNOs with network operational tasks, such as voltage control, while also providing 
increased confidence for the phased decommissioning of large centralised power 
plants. This may therefore translate into significant environmental benefits through 
zero or low carbon power generation. Research described in [34] has examined how 
the output from a number of small wind turbines may be aggregated to form a more 
consistent electrical power output. In addition, research described in [35] has 
demonstrated that the concept of “load diversity” guarantees that the maximum 
electrical power demand of a group of customers is always less than the sum of 
customer-specific peak electrical power demand. Load diversity may be expressed 
mathematically as the “coincidence factor” (Figure 1.3) or the ratio of the maximum 
coincident total electrical power demand for a group of customers to the sum of the 
peak electrical power demand of each customer in that group. It has been shown that 
as the number of customers on the LV distribution network increases, the coincidence 
factor is reduced significantly at first (for 1-15 customers) but less significantly for 
higher number of customers. 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Coincidence factor curve for a typical LV distribution network [32] 
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Based on these two concepts, an SSEZ contains a mixture of customer-owned SSEGs, 
Energy Storage Units (ESUs) and controllable loads and appears to the upstream 
electrical distribution network as a controllable entity, as shown in Figure 1.4. It is 
assumed that all customer-owned power system entities include communication and 
control interfaces and are addressable by other components using an available 
common long-range communications medium, such as the Internet or wireless 
networks. Accurate and safe communications between the customer-owned power 
system entities, measurement devices installed on the electrical distribution system, 
and utility control centres would be essential if the SSEZ is to satisfy its specific 
control requirements, as will be described in Chapter 5.   
 
 
Figure 1.4: A Small Scale Energy Zone. 
 
 
The SSEZ is a concept similar and complementary to MicroGrids [35-41], but while 
research on MicroGrids predominantly focuses on alternative future network designs, 
SSEZs exclusively consider the addition of SSEGs to existing (“legacy”) LV 
distribution networks. It is anticipated that an SSEZ could exist within a small, dense 
group of proximate geographic sites, such as for example residential estates or 
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commercial districts. The customer-owned power system entities comprising the 
SSEZ would be distributed across the LV distribution network supplying them, with 
the aim being to coordinate and manage their actions during on-grid system operation 
(Figure 1.5). Due to the “fit-and-inform” policy [24] governing SSEG growth, 
however, DNOs will have limited control over selecting the phase of connection and 
therefore unbalanced system operation must also be considered.  
 
The SSEZ concept presents a number of challenges to the existing distribution control 
and protection equipment that are installed in public distribution networks. An SSEZ 
must be operated within existing voltage and frequency statutory limits as defined by 
[42] for UK and [43] for EU LV distribution networks, while at the same time 
ensuring that equipment ratings are not exceeded for the distribution transformer(s) 
and the network lines supplying the SSEZ. Protection equipment will be required at 
the connection point of each SSEG, ESU, and controllable load, as well as the Point 
of Common Coupling (PCC) with the distribution network if islanding is considered.  
 
 
Figure 1.5: A Small Scale Energy Zone within a typical LV network – no control. 
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The research described in this Thesis considers normal operating conditions, i.e. no 
faults present, and that the SSEZ is always operating in parallel with the upstream 
distribution network. Thus, the system is treated as an “infinite bus” whose voltage 
and frequency can not be altered by an individual SSEG, ESU or customer load 
(Figure 1.6). The adopted control system aims to ensure that the SSEZ operates within 
the existing network protection settings. A key aim of the control system is that, even 
with high levels of SSEG penetration, the generation, load and energy storage within 
the SSEZ are controlled such that protection devices do not operate and thus customer 
interruptions are minimised as are generator trips, thus increasing their energy yield.  
 
 
Figure 1.6: An SSEG connected to an infinite bus. 
 
 
Central to the SSEZ concept are the control and communication architectures to be 
adopted. These comprise of hardware and software components for receiving and 
exchanging measurement data and control signals within the SSEZ. The hardware 
components include the controllable customer-owned power system entities (SSEGs, 
ESUs and loads), communication and measurement devices, as well as process 
computers or control units for real-time management and control. The software 
components may include several programs and protocols for supporting and managing 
system information within the SSEZ, adopted using an open and standard 
configuration that is accessible to all customers in the system. In addition, a unified 
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Relational DataBase Management System (RDBMS) may exist for data management 
purposes as will be explained in Chapter 6. 
 
Despite years of ongoing research, development and demonstration projects [39-40], 
it remains unclear what the appropriate architecture for distributed automation 
systems at the LV feeder level should be. A number of researchers [31, 37, 44-46] 
propose a distributed management and control hierarchy, in which each piece of 
feeder equipment has its own intelligence and communicates with other components 
while still functioning somewhat autonomously. Other researchers [47-49] argue for 
more centralised management and control schemes where feeder-level devices have 
little autonomy, with a system central point responsible for decision-making.  
 
The research described in this Thesis proposes the employment of a distributed 
management and control approach, realised through the Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) 
technology, due to potential benefits that may be realised in three key areas: (i) 
scalability and openness; (ii) resilience and reliability; and (iii) communication 
efficiency. These areas will be shown in Chapter 5 to be particularly important when 
considering future high SSEG penetration scenarios. MAS are based on distributed 
artificial intelligence computing, where the main aim is to split a complex problem, 
such as the control of an SSEZ, into several subtasks and distribute the management 
of these tasks to intelligent agents. This way, each agent may have only a limited view 
of the system but the overall MAS can perform system wide control through 
autonomous and cooperative actions of the agents. General MAS theory and the 
reasons that make this technology particularly attractive for this control problem are 
described in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
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The concept of an SSEZ or a MicroGrid has been extended by a number of 
researchers [30, 50-53] to the concept of a Virtual Power Station (VPS) or Virtual 
Power Plant (VPP), which is the highest level of aggregation with regards SSEG. The 
rationale behind VPS is that while individual SSEGs can displace electrical energy 
produced by centralised generation, they cannot displace this capacity. A VPS may 
consist of a number of SSEZs each with different mixes of generation, load and 
storage. The value assigned to a VPS by a DNO or a supply company is largely 
determined by its capacity and controllability, with large VPSs having the potential to 
improve the value of SSEGs in the energy market even further compared to single 
SSEZs. The most common architecture for a VPS found in the literature is shown in 
Figure 1.7, which is based on a central dispatching unit that sends control signals 
based on secure and efficient power system operation (“local network”), as well as the 
interaction of VPS with the electricity market (“electricity market”). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.7: Architecture of a centralised Virtual Power Station [50].  
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    1.3.   RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The main objectives of the research described in this Thesis are the following: 
1. To evaluate the technical impacts caused by the steady-state operation of SSEGs 
and to quantify allowable SSEG penetration limits on suitable case study LV 
distribution networks. 
2. To develop a methodology for predicting allowable SSEG volumes on any case 
study LV distribution network quickly and easily and without the need for 
developing detailed computer-based models. The methodology should be drawn 
from an analysis of the key electrical characteristics that determine the response of 
LV distribution networks to the addition of high SSEG volumes. 
3. To identify the key control requirements of an SSEZ, focusing on: (i) overcoming 
the LV distribution network constraints associated with high SSEG penetrations; 
and (ii) on meeting a set of operational goals that allow the SSEZ to provide the 
local DNO with predictable and controllable demand or generation depending on 
the electrical power balance within the zone. 
4. To select and design a suitable management and control approach for an SSEZ 
based on its specific control requirements. This approach must be based on 
responsive control, whereby control actions are based on reacting timely and 
appropriately to changes occurring in the SSEZ environment. The proposed 
approach must then be implemented using software development tools and 
evaluated on a case study SSEZ using a suitable power systems simulation 
package. The aim is to evaluate its performance based on the specific SSEZ 
control requirements and to identify the main strengths and weaknesses offered by 
the proposed approach. 
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    1.4.   THESIS OUTLINE 
 
The Thesis starts with two Chapters that contain background information on the 
research area under investigation. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the existing 
approaches for the management and control of electrical distribution networks. It 
includes a survey of ongoing research, development and demonstration projects with 
regards ANM, focusing mainly on the LV customer levels. In addition, Chapter 3 
provides an introduction to the theory behind MAS technology and some of its 
potential application to power engineering. 
 
Chapter 4 is concerned with the technical impacts associated with the steady-state 
operation of SSEGs on public LV distribution networks. It presents simulation results 
from PSCAD/EMTDC™ that aim to quantify allowable SSEG penetration limits on 
three different LV distribution networks: (i) one generic urban UK LV distribution 
network; (ii) one existing urban UK LV distribution network; and (iii) one generic 
sub-urban European LV distribution network. The following LV distribution network 
constraints are considered: (i) customer voltage rise/drop; (ii) voltage regulation; (iii) 
voltage unbalance; (iv) cable and transformer thermal limits; and (v) network losses. 
On the basis of these simulation results, a methodology for SSEG impact analysis of 
LV distribution networks is proposed that may be used to predict the LV distribution 
network response to the addition of high SSEG volumes.  
 
Chapter 5 describes the specific control requirements of the SSEZ concept, namely: 
(i) to ensure secure system operation by complying with existing statutory regulations 
and equipment thermal ratings; and (ii) to meet a set of operational goals associated 
with providing the local DNO with predictable and controllable demand or 
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generation, depending on the electrical power balance within the zone. It proposes the 
employment of a distributed control approach, realised through the MAS technology, 
over a centralised approach due to the distinct advantages that may be offered in a 
number of key areas that will be explained. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 examine the design and development of the proposed MAS and 
RDBMS which are designed specifically for meeting the SSEZ control requirements. 
The design and software implementation of the developed types of agents and 
databases are explained in detail, along with a description of the three operating states 
of system agents: (i) normal; (ii) alert; and (iii) emergency state. Moreover, the 
reasoning and communication capabilities of system agents are detailed, with 
particular emphasis on rule-based agent decision-making and the design and 
development of a common ontology used by agents to exchange information. 
 
Chapter 8 presents the evaluation of the developed control approach on a case study 
SSEZ, focusing on its suitability to meet the specific SSEZ control requirements, 
along with the potential improvements that may be realised in three key areas: (i) 
scalability and openness; (ii) resilience and reliability; and (iii) communication 
efficiency. These areas are shown to be particularly important when considering 
future high SSEG penetration scenarios. In addition to research work performed using 
simulation tools, an initial experimental investigation of the proposed MAS-based 
control approach is also presented. Finally, Chapter 9 summarises the research 
described in this Thesis and indicates a number of potential areas for further work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Distribution Networks Control 
 
 
 
 
 
In the UK, there are fourteen electricity regions and in each area a local DNO is 
responsible for maintaining customer voltages inside the range fixed by national 
standards [39]. In order to minimise associated costs with system equipment, 
electrical distribution networks were designed to use most, if not all, of the allowable 
voltage bandwidth. Customer quality of supply has traditionally been ensured by 
planning a degree of redundancy and by some centralised ability to switch connection 
points, although this usually takes place at a relatively low response rate [54]. Voltage 
profiles in the network are assessed at the planning stage and transformer tap changers 
(usually with line-drop compensation) are used to accommodate variation in system 
demand [54-55].  
 
The current policy and regulatory framework of the electricity industry has evolved 
without much consideration of its impact on the growth of SSEGs, which are still seen 
as unpredictable negative loads in accordance with Engineering Recommendations 
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P2/5 [25] and P2/6 [26]. Thus, significant technical, commercial as well as policy and 
regulatory changes will be required in order to achieve the Government’s targeted 
growth in SSEG. This Chapter presents an overview of the existing control 
approaches employed by DNOs for the control of electrical distribution networks, as 
well as the possible technical changes that could facilitate the integration of SSEGs 
onto existing LV networks. It is, however, outside the scopes of this Thesis to provide 
a summary of the commercial and policy and regulatory changes that would be 
required in order for SSEGs to reach their anticipated high projections [4-6]. An 
overview of these may be found in [69-70]. 
 
 
 
    2.1.   EXISTING CONTROL APPROACH 
 
The existing approach in electric utility computer control systems is the employment 
of three automation technologies: (i) Energy Management Systems (EMS); (ii) 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems; and (iii) Substation 
Automation Systems (SAS). These have been installed in control centres in order to 
improve overall system reliability and performance and ensure the effective operation 
of system equipment. A hierarchical structure is employed, with EMS sitting on the 
top level, SCADA on the middle and the individual SAS of each distribution 
substation at the lowest level. 
 
SCADA systems employed by DNOs focus on supervising and controlling power 
plants and HV and MV transmission and distribution networks. They provide 
information to the EMS on distribution system status, such as substation switch status, 
substation voltages and line MW, MVAr and current flows, while also allowing for 
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remote switching of circuits and other equipment. In order to achieve that, SCADA 
systems collect measurement data from network substations and power plants via a 
number of Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and after performing state estimation, load 
flow and economic dispatch calculations, they send set-points to the connected power 
plants or to the RTUs for execution by the SAS. SCADA systems are being 
increasingly used for the control of electrical distribution networks with high DG 
penetrations, but not down to the LV, 230/400V, end. The operation of a typical 
SCADA system is shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: A Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system. 
 
 
In contrast to MV and HV electrical networks, at the LV customer level very little 
command, control and data acquisition is typically carried out besides some notable 
exceptions such as feeder-level capacitor banks controlled by radio signals, or remote 
meter-reading technologies and Smart-Meters [56]. In the UK for example, despite the 
significant extension of electrical distribution networks in order to accommodate the 
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increasing demand that has taken place in the past 50 years, the operation and control 
of LV networks has remained “largely unchanged” [11] and is still based on the 
passive, “fit-and-forget” philosophy of Engineering Recommendation P2/5 [25]. 
 
Computerised control systems, typically operating over power line carriers, telephone-
lease lines, fiber optics or radio-based techniques, allow the connected medium- to 
large-scale DG (>1MW) to operate as dispatchable sources in order to generate power 
according to system needs [15-16]. For SSEGs and smaller-scale DGs, however, a 
mechanism for capturing and coordinating large numbers of these units currently does 
not exist. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that the widespread use of newer technologies 
such as the Internet or wireless cellular and packet switching data networks could play 
a part in improving the control and communication capabilities of future LV 
distribution networks [35-36]. These technologies may either be incorporated into 
new buildings or retrofitted onto existing ones. 
 
Before the penetration of SSEGs on existing LV distribution networks is increased 
and reaches anticipated future projections [5-7], it will be necessary to increase the 
SSEG volumes that may be accommodated on these networks. Three common 
solutions are employed by DNOs in order to achieve this: (i) through network 
reinforcement; (ii) by altering static network settings, such as distribution transformer 
tap positions; or (iii) through the use of some form of Active Network Management 
(ANM). The first two approaches are also known as “passive”, while the latter is 
termed “active”. Both approaches are briefly discussed below, highlighting their main 
advantages and disadvantages. 
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    2.2.   PASSIVE NETWORKS 
 
The passive operating philosophy of distribution networks has traditionally led to the 
over-sizing of distribution network components during the design stage in order to 
accommodate load growth [56]. In cases where secure system operation could not be 
maintained with existing network capacities due to increased power flows in the 
system, network reinforcement measures have commonly been employed by DNOs. 
An example of network reinforcement is re-conductoring a circuit with cables with 
higher cross-sectional area. The reduced resistance along that circuit will increase the 
amount of load that may be accommodated before the supplied voltage drops below 
statutory limits.  
 
Similarly, network reinforcement could significantly increase allowable SSEG 
penetration limits by mitigating component thermal issues, power quality issues such 
as voltage regulation and customer voltage rise, and by reducing network load losses. 
Although the initial capital expenditure requirements for network reinforcement may 
in some cases be high, such approaches add incrementality to the network and their 
interaction with the distribution system is understood and predictable. Hence, 
potential benefits include robustness and uncomplicated, hence low cost, distribution 
network operation [57].  
 
Current UK regulatory design practices [58] for LV distribution networks are based 
on worst case operational conditions, such as maximum loading conditions, and do 
not take into account any network contribution from SSEGs. This may cause a 
conflict between the interests of the local DNO and the customers trying to connect 
their SSEG units. On the one hand, DNOs must design and operate their networks in 
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order to ensure high power quality and that security of supply is provided. However, 
on the other hand, customers may prefer the network design and SSEG connection 
scheme which minimises connection costs, even if this may adversely result in poorer 
security of the overall system.  
 
Since the growth of SSEGs is consumer-driven and not centrally planned, it is 
difficult for DNOs to provide an accurate cost comparison between network 
reinforcement and ANM solutions. In order to overcome the technical challenges 
associated with the connection and operation of SSEGs, the capital expenditure of 
upgrading LV distribution equipment may in some cases be less costly than applying 
active control techniques. However, if SSEGs are to realise their full potential, other 
issues such as contribution to system operation through the provision of ancillary 
services, and efficient energy market participation need to be taken into account, 
which may not be realised by employing passive, network reinforcement practices.  
 
Hence, although network reinforcement practices were considered adequate in the 
past to accommodate increasing load growth, LV distribution networks in the future 
are likely to move away from the conventional passive control approach and towards 
a higher degree of network operational management [11]. ANM is being encouraged 
by a number of researchers [9-16] and is discussed in the following Section. 
 
 
 
    2.3.   ACTIVE NETWORKS 
 
ANM schemes require the employment of intelligent metering, control and 
communication systems, where the aim is to improve network performance during 
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normal and emergency system operation (Figure 2.2). Research [12-13] suggests that 
this can be achieved through integrated control of (i) real and reactive power demand 
and generation; (ii) On Load Tap Changers (OLTC) of distribution transformers; (iii) 
network configuration equipment, such as line reclosers, voltage regulators, switches, 
capacitor banks etc; (iv) islanding technologies; and (v) protection systems.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Example of an active transmission and distribution system [14]. 
 
 
The integration of ANM techniques on distribution networks is anticipated to take 
place in three stages: the first stage involves the automation of distribution 
substations, where automation and communication equipment are in many cases 
already installed. The second stage is the automation of network feeders and DG at 
the MV levels of distribution systems. Finally, the last stage involves the integration 
of LV customer systems, such as SSEGs, ESUs and customer DSM schemes. ANM 
schemes are seen by many researchers [9-16] as having the potential to maximise 
DG/SSEG penetrations while minimising related network reinforcement costs. 
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In order to realise such networks, R&D in several electrical power and distribution 
automation technologies is required. These technologies may include [59]: 
1. A supervisory control system with automated reasoning and data interpretation 
capabilities that monitors electrical distribution networks in real-time and takes 
control decisions based on the control requirements of the overall system. 
Depending on system communications and the location(s) where control decisions 
are made, a number of hierarchical structures could be employed for the 
supervisory control system ranging from centralised [47-49] to fully distributed 
[44-46]. 
2. Sensors and metering devices at critical points throughout the network for the 
real-time acquisition and transfer of measurement data to the supervisory 
controller. In particular, Smart-Meter installations [56] would be required for the 
separate metering of generation and load. 
3. Integrated protection systems that provide timely reaction to network fault 
conditions, unusual transient behaviour and post-event recovery in order to allow 
the system to return back to normal operating state.  
4. Intelligent power electronics-based devices for network interfacing of SSEGs and 
DGs to public electrical distribution networks [60-61]. 
5. Communication links to allow for network reconfigurability in the event of system 
disturbances or to achieve optimal system performance. Dedicated 
communications systems may be incorporated into new networks or might be 
retrofitted onto existing ones using technologies such as power line carriers, 
wireless networks, or the existing Internet communication infrastructure.  
6. Generation and demand forecasting techniques to ensure the overall balance of 
electricity generation and consumption. 
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7. Condition monitoring tools and the use of dynamic equipment ratings [62-63] to 
improve existing network utilisation, thereby enabling higher levels of DG/SSEG 
to operate without thermal violations. 
 
 
 
     2.3.1.    Relevant Work 
The SmartGrid European Technology Platform [64] has recently been introduced in 
order to “formulate and promote a vision for the development of European electricity 
networks looking towards 2020 and beyond”. Eight major research projects on the 
ANM of LV distribution networks are currently under development: (i) MicroGrids 
and More MicroGrids [37]; (ii) FENIX [65]; DER-LAB [66]; INTEGRAL [67]; 
ADDRESS [68]; SUSPLAN [69]; EU-DEEP [70]; and SOLID-DER [71].  
 
In the UK, the concepts of ANM and improved SSEG integration have recently 
gained increased attention as evident by the technical focus of the DTI, Ofgem and the 
Distribution Working Group of the Electricity Network Strategy Group [72]. Two 
major work programmes are currently under investigation, one entitled “Enabling 
Active Network Management” [73] and another one entitled “Facilitating Small-Scale 
Generation” [74] which aim to “develop the technologies, protocols, tools, processes, 
techniques and standards that would be needed to ensure that low-carbon compliant 
power systems could be operated on an active basis to ensure efficient use of 
investment and an effective contribution from potential market participants.” A recent 
report for the DTI [75] has provided a comprehensive review of 105 ANM schemes 
that have been commissioned in the UK as well as internationally, including projects 
both at the MV as well as the LV levels of electrical distribution networks. Other UK 
research activities on ANM of electrical distribution networks are presented in [76]. 
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In North America, the “advanced distribution automation” concept by EPRI (Electric 
Power Research Institute) envisions future electrical distribution systems as highly 
automated systems operated via open-architecture communications networks [77]. 
The “IntelliGrid” initiative [78], for example, attempts to create the technical 
foundation for a smart power grid that links electricity with communications and 
computer control to achieve gains in reliability, capacity, and customer services. 
Moreover, the CERTS (Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions) 
Microgrid concept [36] assumes an aggregation of loads and power electronics-based 
generators operating as a single system providing both power and heat. Similar major 
demonstration projects have also been undertaken in Japan [41] as well as other 
countries worldwide [39-40]. 
 
 
 
     2.3.2.    Information and Communication Technology 
Data communication in electrical distribution networks typically serves two purposes: 
(i) for data analysis regarding the operating state of the power system; and (ii) for 
remote use for storing, retrieving and processing data for control and management 
purposes. This allows Distribution Management Systems (DMSs) to acquire and 
produce information to be used for distribution automation purposes.  
 
Currently, the majority of communication links used for data acquisition, signalling 
and control of electrical distribution networks are dedicated connections, typically 
owned by the system operator. Figure 2.3 shows the telecommunication setup that is 
usually employed. It involves data signal communications between RTUs such as 
feeder devices, substation devices and customer devices, the DMS and other 
automated distribution functions that require data signals for automation and control.  
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Figure 2.3: Typical telecommunication setup in distribution networks. 
 
 
The anticipated move towards active LV distribution networks requires the 
coordinated management of large numbers of power system entities that are connected 
on these networks. Therefore, the importance of information and communication 
technologies (ICT) is likely to increase significantly because the control capabilities 
of these networks will partly depend on the ICT that are employed. At the same time, 
expanding distribution network services such as real-time monitoring and control as 
well as improved electricity trading applications are driving the need for increased 
bandwidth in the electricity industry. Currently, most communication technologies 
used in electrical power systems are suffering from a lack of efficient, high speed and 
bandwidth communication media [11]. Present information management systems 
must therefore be restructured to allow for more and faster information exchange. 
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Undifferentiated one-way communication links, for example via radio broadcast, is 
presently the cheapest type of communications available [11]. Within an SSEZ, one-
way communication signals could be sent in real-time from a central point in order to 
transmit real and reactive power set-points or market signals to large numbers of 
customer-owned power system components (SSEGs, ESUs and loads). However, one-
way communications do not permit a differentiated response and therefore do not 
offer the communication functionality required (Section 1.2). 
 
According to a number of researchers [79-82], Internet and Semantic Web 
technologies appear as the most cost effective and promising ways to achieve the 
peer-to-peer communication functionalities required by ANM, such as the 
management of the connected controllable entities, the management of metering 
information and the integration of market management. According to [81], “Internet is 
the undisputable choice, as it is the biggest virtual network in the world and is 
accessible to everybody independently of its platform”.  
 
For active LV distribution networks, the aim is to make available across Wide Area 
Networks (WANs) the measurement data acquired by measurement devices such as 
sensors, data loggers, power quality analysers, Smart-Meters etc. These data would 
then be processed by distributed or centralised processors and sent as control signals 
to the controllable power system entities of the network. WANs use long-distance 
carriers and may be linked by cable, optical fibres or satellites, but their users 
typically access the network using modems. In order to satisfy the requirement for 
wideband communications, the high speed Internet access Digital Subscriber Line 
(DSL) technology is proposed in [81] with speeds which can vary from 128 kbps up 
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to several Mbps. This allows data to be accessed independently of location by using 
cheap, reliable and standard access communication mechanisms and tools. The 
industry practice based on Transmission Control Protocol/Internet protocol (TCP/IP) 
for the intercommunication of all installed devices within a distribution network may 
be employed in order to ensure interoperability [82]. 
 
The cost of provision and maintenance of such advanced peer-to-peer communication 
networks, however, would be decisive towards their potential employment. The 
potential benefits realised by employing communication at the LV customer levels of 
electrical distribution networks would only be attractive if their associated costs could 
be kept as low as possible. Sharing existing communication infrastructure, i.e. 
residential broadband and the public Internet, could help to achieve that and could 
also potentially reduce implementation times, but questions regarding reliability and 
safety would also need to be taken into account.  
 
Moreover, if SSEGs are to reach their anticipated high penetration levels [5-7], they 
would need both a standard way of interconnecting to the distribution system, as well 
as a standard way for information exchange. Currently, while significant work has 
been carried out for the development and adoption of standards for connecting and 
operating SSEGs on public LV distribution networks (as for example [24] in the UK), 
considerably less work has been done to promote interoperability with regards 
information exchange. A recent draft standard proposal entitled “UCA-DER” [83] has 
aimed to define object models, services and other requirements for the exchange of 
information with small-scale DG systems, however more work is likely to be needed 
in order to define a common international standard for SSEG communications. 
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     2.3.3.    Intelligent Electronic Devices 
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED) is a broad term for communicating devices used 
in electrical transmission and distribution systems. IEDs incorporate one or more 
micro-processors with the capability to send or receive data signals to/from an 
external source. Typical IEDs include substation host computers, RTUs, 
programmable logic controllers, communication processors, digital protective relays, 
sequence of events and fault recorders and automatic system controllers [54].  
 
IEDs perform multiple functions by exchanging digital data. Their primary 
application is in the digital monitoring and protection of electric system equipment 
with the transfer of basic, raw data and control commands between IEDs and external 
systems, such as SCADA systems. Another application is in the acquisition and 
processing of protection, control and operating data for exchange with system 
applications and enterprise-wide users, such as large-scale DMSs. The potentially 
widespread application of IEDs in electrical distribution networks could provide 
integration and sharing of data through networking and distributed processing.  
 
IEDs of different types may interact with each other and with other levels of 
distribution SAS. In particular, the “IEC 61850” international standard [84] for 
substation communications allows the future development of self-configuring SAS. It 
defines SAS functions related to the protection, control, monitoring and recording of 
the equipment in the substation. These functions may be embedded within a single 
IED or may be distributed between multiple devices using communication networks.  
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Within the SSEZ concept, intelligent devices will be required to provide the hardware 
environment for the computational and I/O capabilities needed to satisfy the control 
requirements of the SSEZ. These devices must also be able to communicate with each 
other and other components within the SSEZ by employing common communication 
protocols. For reasons that will be explained in Chapter 5, this Thesis proposes the 
employment of the MAS technology, coupled with various power system 
measurement devices and a long-range peer-to-peer communications medium as a 
means of achieving these capabilities. This is because, compared with traditional 
SCADA or client-server architectures, “a multiagent system on an IP network 
provides a greater autonomy to each of the constituent parts of an inherently 
distributed power system [85]”. The communication requirements for the control 
system of an SSEZ will be described in Section 6.3.4 in greater detail. 
 
 
 
    2.4.   SSEG CONTROL 
 
In the United Kingdom, Engineering Recommendation G83/1 [24] defines a Small 
Scale Embedded Generator (SSEG) as any source of electrical energy rated up to, and 
including, 16 Ampere per phase, single or multi phase, 230/400 Volts ac. 
Furthermore, the draft European standard EN 50438 [86] uses the term “micro-
generators” to define all sources of electrical energy rated up to, and including: (i) 25 
Ampere per phase when the network connection is single phase; or (ii) 16 Ampere per 
phase when the network connection is three phase. For the purposes of this Thesis, an 
SSEG and a micro-generator will be treated as interchangeable terms, according to the 
definition provided by ER G83/1. SSEGs are anticipated to use mainly single-phase 
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connections and to operate in parallel with public LV distribution networks within 
domestic or light commercial properties. 
 
In terms of the currently available technologies, SSEGs include domestic Combined 
Heat and Power (dCHP) units, fuel cells and small RES-based units, such as small-
scale wind turbines, photovoltaic (PV) panels and micro-hydro (Figure 2.4). SSEG 
technologies that generate either DC (wind, PV, fuel cells) or non-power frequency 
AC (micro-turbines, such as dCHP) may not be directly interfaced to the LV network. 
DC electricity must be converted to AC at a desired voltage and frequency, or the 
high frequency AC from the generator is first rectified and then converted to AC.  
 
      
                     (a)                                          (b)                                          (c) 
 
Figure 2.4: A small-scale wind turbine (a); PV panel (b); and dCHP installation (c). 
 
 
 
SSEGs are currently treated as non-firm generation, whereby they must operate within 
the statutory voltage and frequency limits, but are tripped during contingency 
conditions. In order to ensure that SSEGs do not degrade the safety of the distribution 
system in the event of system disturbances, interface protections are installed in order 
to disconnect the SSEG from the LV distribution network. These may either be 
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incorporated within the SSEG or by separate devices. The voltage and frequency 
limits after which SSEGs will trip are shown in Table 2.1 for UK LV distribution 
networks. 
 
Parameter Trip setting 
(maximum range) 
Trip time 
(maximum value) 
Over Voltage 264V (230V +14.7%) 1.5 seconds 
Under Voltage 207V (230V -10%) 1.5 seconds 
Over Frequency 50.5Hz (50Hz +1%) 0.5 seconds 
Under Frequency 47Hz (50Hz – 6%) 0.5 seconds 
 
 Table 2.1: Voltage and frequency limits for the protection devices used for SSEGs 
connected in UK LV distribution networks [24]. 
 
 
 
SSEG control within the SSEZ concept assumes that the connected SSEG units are 
controlled to provide a set of key functions associated with the specific control 
requirements of the SSEZ. This requires individual SSEG units to be able to regulate 
their active and reactive power output and thus regulate the voltage at the point of 
connection to the LV distribution network, as well as to regulate feeder voltages 
through their coordinated control.  
 
In general, the control concepts and strategies employed for SSEG units largely 
depend on the interface type of the SSEG with the LV distribution network. SSEGs 
may either be directly interfaced through rotating electrical machines or through 
power electronic converters (DC/AC or AC/DC/AC). Both types comprise a primary 
energy source, which may be a fuel or a RES, the interface medium, a monitoring 
device for measurement purposes and the switchgear (fuse, circuit breaker) used at the 
point of coupling to the LV distribution network, as shown in Figure 2.5.  
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Figure 2.5: Block diagram showing a typical SSEG installation. 
 
 
In addition, a communications unit may exist to enable the SSEG to exchange 
electricity transfer information with other distribution system components or the local 
utility. Currently, the majority of SSEG units are not linked to a communication 
system which has generally been required for DG installations greater than 1MW in 
size [35]. In the near future, however, “most industry observers expect practices to 
change so that virtually every distributed resource will eventually be linked to a 
centralised or distributed control system” [35]. 
 
 
 
    2.5.   LOAD CONTROL 
 
Loads or consumption units may include motors, thermostatic loads, electronic loads, 
air conditioning and refrigeration units, discharge lighting and incandescent lighting 
[87-88]. Almost all loads consume electric power in a stochastic way that is subject to 
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seasonal and daily variations and are typically divided into four categories: 
residential, commercial, light commercial and industrial. Traditionally, customers 
located at the LV levels of electrical distribution networks have no other obligations 
except for paying their electricity bills and may extract at any time any amount of 
power within the safety limitations of their installation. Under such an operation, 
customer demand response is not required and real-time energy balancing is a 
responsibility of the system operator.  
 
In general, electrical loads may be divided into the following three broad categories: 
1. Critical loads: Load units that are essential in order to maintain production, or for 
health and safety purposes. Active control or unscheduled shutdown of these loads 
is highly undesirable. Examples include hospitals, banks, telecommunication sites, 
military bases, police stations, airports etc. 
2. Re-shiftable loads: Load units whose operation may be re-scheduled without 
significantly affecting customer comfort. The most common examples of re-
shiftable loads include washing machines, dryers, dish washers and water heaters. 
3. Curtailable loads: Load units that are able to adjust their consumption in a variable 
manner, for example by various power load control or voltage control techniques, 
depending on the equipment. Examples include space heating, air-conditioning 
units and swimming pool pumps [32]. Curtailable loads are dispatchable but to 
varying degrees depending on the type of load involved. 
 
The term Demand Side Management (DSM) is used to refer to actions which change 
the electrical demand in an electrical power system. A common definition provided in 
[89] defines DSM as “the planning and implementation of those electric utility 
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activities designed to influence customer uses of electricity in ways that will produce 
desired changes in the utility’s load shape”. In contrast to “supply-side” techniques, 
which aim to increase the energy supplied to the system by building, connecting and 
operating new generators, DSM techniques aim to make efficient use of existing 
energy assets and to defer the need for new resources.  
 
The most common types of DSM found in the literature [19-21] are: 
1. Peak Clipping: Peak clipping is generally considered as the reduction of energy 
consumption at times of peak load by using direct load control. 
2. Valley Filling: Valley filling describes the addition of off-peak loads to the 
electrical demand of the system in order to smooth the load profile and thus 
decrease customer electricity costs and/or improve overall system efficiency.  
3. Load shifting: Load shifting involves shifting loads from on-peak to off-peak 
periods in order to improve the load factor, and hence the economic efficiency of 
the utility. This is usually achieved through thermal energy storage, such as space 
and water heating, but may also include electrical energy storage or other types of 
customer load shifting. 
 
Because DSM schemes have a direct impact on the customers, they must not 
deteriorate customer comfort or supply quality to unacceptable levels. Load control 
may take place automatically or manually and is classified into two main categories: 
1. Direct load control: This requires a communication system to transmit the control 
signals sent by the utility to directly control a customer load. Most of the 
appliances targeted by utilities for direct load control, such as water and space 
heaters, air-conditioners and swimming pool pumps, provide a big amount of 
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thermal inertia and may be switched off for short periods of time with minimal 
customer impact [19-21]. Within the SSEZ concept, the direct control of re-
shiftable and curtailable customer loads by a supervisory controller is considered.  
2. Local load control: This allows customers to self-adjust loads in order to limit 
peak electrical power demand, for example by using timers, demand-activated 
breakers, thermostats, cogeneration heating, etc.  
 
 
 
    2.6.   ESU CONTROL 
 
In traditional power system operation, electrical energy storage has been provided 
through the inertia of the connected rotating generators. With the addition of new 
loads to the system, the initial energy balance has been satisfied by the system’s 
inertia with a slight reduction in system frequency. For distribution networks with 
high levels of DG and SSEG present, however, the proliferation of intermittent (and 
often inertia-less) generation will introduce a higher degree of uncertainty and thus 
present challenging issues regarding power system control and operation.  
 
According to two recent reports [22-23], electrical energy storage systems will 
become particularly important in order to decouple energy availability and demand 
and thus increase power quality and system stability. This is because in order to 
manage the balance between generation and demand under increased uncertainty due 
to intermittent generation, additional amounts of reserve will be required. This reserve 
will be supplied by a combination of synchronised reserve, provided by part-loaded 
generating plants, and standing reserve in the form of storage and/or flexible 
generation.   
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A wide range of electrical energy storage technologies [22] exist that could be 
installed at the LV ends of electrical LV distribution systems. Such technologies may 
include: (i) lead-acid batteries; (ii) hydrogen fuel cells; (iii) flywheels; (iv) 
supercapacitors; and (v) Superconducting Magnetic Energy Storage (SMES). 
Moreover, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and electric vehicles (EVs) are 
receiving considerable interest from vehicle manufacturers and policy makers [90] 
and could present significant opportunities for electrical ESM in the near future.  
 
In general, ESM may be employed for one of the following purposes [91]: 
1. For system regulation purposes whereby energy storage is used for system 
stabilisation in order to smooth out short-term load fluctuations. This allows the 
connected SSEGs to operate at a constant, stable power output level without 
altering the frequency of their generation.  
2. ESUs may be used as spinning reserve or back-up energy capacity by providing 
energy through periods when SSEG units are unavailable.  
3. ESUs may allow non-dispatchable SSEG units to operate as dispatchable units by 
permitting the generating output to vary depending on network conditions. 
4.  ESUs can provide power in order to avoid or reduce the need for load curtailment 
when the available system generating capacity from all other sources can not 
supply the respective total load demand. 
5. ESM schemes may be deployed for peak shaving purposes by providing power at 
times of peak load. This practice is similar to peak clipping for DSM.  
6. Finally, ESUs may be used as load levelling by providing storage for the surplus 
electricity that is generated during off-peak time periods. This would map 
particularly well with the usage of renewable energy sources that have an 
intermittent generation capacity output, as for example wind and solar energy. 
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The installation system for an ESU is shown in Figure 2.6 and may consist of the 
following components: (i) the ESU device which comprises an energy storage 
medium for storing electrical energy; (ii) a control and protection system which 
monitors the level of the energy stored in the energy storage medium and controls the 
operation of the ESU; (iii) a monitoring device which is responsible for real-time 
measurement purposes; and (iv) a communications unit that enables the ESU to 
communicate and exchange data with the local utility or other distribution system 
components. Similarly to SSEGs, most small-scale ESU installations currently do not 
include a long-range communications medium but this may change in future actively 
managed electrical distribution networks. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Block diagram showing a typical ESU installation. 
 
 
 
    2.7.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
This Chapter presented an overview on the control approaches typically employed in 
electrical distribution networks. The existing control approach is based on SCADA 
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systems which supervise and control power plants and electrical transmission 
networks. In contrast to MV and HV networks, at the LV customer level very little 
command, control and data acquisition is typically carried out, in accordance with the 
passive, “fit-and-forget” philosophy of Engineering Recommendation P2/5 [25]. 
 
Although passive practices were considered adequate in the past to accommodate load 
growth, LV networks with high SSEG penetrations are likely to move towards a 
higher degree of network operational management. This will require the employment 
of intelligent metering, control and communication systems, where the aim is to 
improve network performance during normal and emergency system operation. ICT 
and IEDs will become increasingly important in order to realise such networks   
 
Finally, the main control concepts employed for the management of SSEG units, as 
well as strategies for DSM and ESM were described. Within the SSEZ concept, the 
focus is on grid-dependent control strategies, where real and reactive power set-points 
are provided by a supervisory controller in accordance with overall distribution 
system operation. The controllability of the SSEGs, ESUs and controllable load units 
installed within an SSEZ is crucial, as they will determine the capability for active and 
reactive power control within the zone. In general, units that are capable of regulating 
their active and reactive power output/input at all times are preferred, because they 
provide the highest flexibility for active control.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Multi Agent Systems 
 
 
 
 
 
The theory behind Multi Agent Systems is based on distributed artificial intelligence 
computing, where the main aim is to split a complex problem into several subtasks 
and distribute the management of these tasks to individual software entities. This 
allows system intelligence to be distributed across the system components rather than 
being concentrated on a single point, which may present significant advantages that 
will later be described. The popularity of MAS has risen significantly with the 
continuous increase in Internet and Web computing, which present an environment in 
which agents can exist and interact with one another.  
 
The terms “agent” and “MAS” are used here according to the standards set by the 
Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) and in particular the FIPA Agent 
Management Reference Model [92] that defines standards for creating, locating, 
removing and communicating with agents. The advantages offered by designing and 
developing an MAS to comply with FIPA standards are explained in Section 3.3.1. 
 46
    3.1.   AGENT AND MAS ATTRIBUTES 
 
The simplest definition of an agent [93] has been used to describe a software or 
hardware entity that is situated in some environment over which it has partial control 
and particular objectives to achieve. An agent has well-defined boundaries and 
interfaces and is able to monitor the environment through sensors or data access from 
other sources and modify it by reacting autonomously to changes that occur in it. It 
has therefore been argued that, at this level, some simple existing control and 
protection systems employed at electrical distribution systems such as protection 
relays could also be classed as “agents” [94].  
 
This simple definition of an “agent” has been extended in order to include the 
reasoning and communication capabilities of the agent as well. According to this 
definition, the four key agent attributes found in the literature [95-97] are: 
1. Autonomy: Agents have a self-starting behaviour and some kind of control over 
their actions and internal state. 
2. Social Ability: Agents take part in social activities with other agents (or users) in 
order to achieve their design objectives. 
3. Reactivity: Agents interact with their environment and respond in a timely fashion 
to changes that occur in it. 
4. Pro-activeness: Agents are able to exhibit goal-directed behaviour by taking the 
initiative. 
 
Other, more general attributes of agents have been described in [95] and include: 
1. Accuracy:  Agents will always try to do what it is asked of them. 
2. Adaptivity: Agents are able to learn and improve with experience. 
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3. Adaptability: Agents are able to respond to changing environmental conditions. 
4. Mobility: Agents can move and migrate from one host platform to another. 
5. Temporal continuity: Agents are continuously running processes and have 
persistence of their identity and state over long periods of time. 
6. Reliability: Agent can not intentionally pass false information. 
7. Inferential capability: Agents can act on abstract task specifications using prior 
knowledge of general goals. 
 
The term “Multi Agent System” is used to denote the combination of one or more 
agents capable of exhibiting these attributes within a co-operative system [93]. Hence, 
from the point of view of system control, an MAS control approach is different to 
both the centralised and the fully distributed control paradigms [96]. An MAS works 
in a distributed control regime, where most decision-making occurs locally and 
autonomously. However, when necessary, an MAS may also require inter-agent 
communications, which typically occur between agents with common interests. 
 
 
 
    3.2.   ARCHITECTURAL STYLES 
 
A number of architectural styles have been used for the development of MAS. This 
Section provides an overview both on the micro- (individual agent structure) and the 
macro-level (agent society and organisational structure) of MAS architectural theory. 
 
 
 
     3.2.1.    Individual Agent Architectures 
There are three main types of individual agent architectures currently employed for 
MAS [93]: (i) deliberative, (ii) reactive and (iii) hybrid agent architectures. 
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Deliberative architectures contain an explicitly represented, symbolic model of the 
world and decide on their actions using logical reasoning based on pattern matching 
and symbolic manipulation as seen in Figure 3.1. Examples of deliberative 
architectures are IRMA [98] and the Procedural Reasoning System (PRS) [99] that 
may be seen in Figure 3.2.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Structure of an agent with a deliberative architecture [79]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The PRS agent architecture [99]. 
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Reactive architectures [100-101] do not include any kind of central symbolic world 
model, and do not use complex symbolic reasoning. Reactive agents make decisions 
directly based on sensory input or based on messages from other agents. 
 
Finally, hybrid architectures have a combination of deliberative and reactive 
behaviour. This allows the agent to respond quickly to the agents in the environment 
(reactive layer), but it also allows symbolic reasoning (deliberative layer). Common 
hybrid agent architectures that have been used for control purposes include: (i) 
layered (Figure 3.3); (ii) constraint-oriented; and (iii) task tree architectures.  
 
                                    (a)                                         (b)                                 (c) 
 
Figure 3.3: Horizontal (a), one-pass control vertical (b) and two-pass control vertical 
(c) layered architectures [138]. 
 
 
Agents built using the Java Agent DEvelopment Framework (JADE) kit [102-103] 
tend to consist of three layers: (i) a message handling (or communications) layer 
responsible for sending and receiving messages; (ii) a behavioral layer that specifies 
the behaviour of the agent, i.e. when the agent will carry out specific tasks; and finally 
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(iii) a functional layer that represents the functional attributes of the agent, i.e. the 
actions the agent can perform. The layered architecture employed by JADE agents is 
illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: The layered architecture employed by JADE agents [151]. 
 
 
In order to select the most fitting agent architecture, the different architectural types 
must be evaluated based on their suitability to meet the specific design objectives of 
the MAS. If multiple agent architectures appear to be suitable, research described in 
[104] has proposed to assess agent architectures based on generic software quality 
attributes, i.e. non functional requirements describing how well the MAS can 
accomplish its design objectives. The choice, however, will often also depend on the 
MAS development kit that is used during the implementation stage. 
 
 
 
     3.2.2.    MAS Architectures 
According to the literature [105], four main MAS organisations exist: 
1. Hierarchical MAS, in which agents communicate according to a hierarchical 
organisation. According to [105], the disadvantage of this architectural type is the 
reduction in autonomy of individual agents, as the lower levels of the MAS 
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depend on the higher levels. However, this architecture could reduce the required 
communications as well as individual agent complexity. 
2. Flat MAS, where any agent may interact with any other agent in the MAS. These 
provide the greatest autonomy, but could result in extensive inter-agent 
communications. Moreover, agents in a flat MAS must either know the agent 
identifier number of all agents that they need to interact with, or be provided with 
location mechanisms such as white and yellow pages services. 
3. A subsumption MAS is a system in which agents are themselves made up of other 
agents. In this system, the subsumed agents are completely controlled by the 
containing agents. According to [105], the fixed structure of a subsumption MAS 
provides efficiency but restricts the flexibility of the system. 
4. A modular MAS is comprised of a number of modules. Each module is typically 
flat, while inter-module communications are relatively limited.. 
 
The choice for the adopted MAS architecture typically depends on two factors: (i) the 
MAS architectural organisation provided by the MAS development kit that is used; 
and (ii) the communication and computational requirements of the overall system. If 
requirements must be kept at minimal levels, hierarchical or subsumption MAS 
architectures are often employed in order to reduce system complexity. On the 
contrary, flat MAS are typically used in applications where flexibility, “plug and 
play” capabilities and significant inter-agent communications are required.  
 
 
 
        3.3.   FIPA STANDARDS 
 
The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) [106] is a standards 
organisation that promotes MAS technologies and the interoperability of its standards 
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between different MAS implementations. In particular, the FIPA Agent Management 
Reference model shown in Figure 3.5 defines “the normative framework within which 
FIPA agents exist and operate. It establishes the logical reference model for the 
creation, registration, location, communication, migration and retirement of agents” 
[92]. The normative framework includes a set of entities that FIPA-compliant MAS 
must contain, according to Figure 3.6. These include: 
• an agent runtime environment for defining the FIPA notion of agency; 
• an Agent Platform (AP) for deploying agents in a physical infrastructure; 
• a Directory Facilitator (DF) which provides a yellow pages service for the agents 
registered on the platform; 
• an Agent Management System (AMS) acting as a white pages service for 
supervisory control over access to the agent platform; 
• a Message Transport Service (MTS) for communication between the agents 
registered on different platforms. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: The FIPA Agent Management Reference Model [92]. 
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The five entities comprising a FIPA-compliant MAS are explained later in this 
Chapter in greater detail. Firstly, however, Section 3.3.1 attempts to clarify the 
potential advantages offered to the developer by complying with FIPA standards.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: The entities that comprise a FIPA-compliant AP.  
 
 
 
     3.3.1.    Why FIPA Compliance? 
The development of agents and MAS in general that can interact with each other 
irrespective of the platform they run on is often a fundamental requirement for on-line 
industrial applications. For the control of electrical distribution networks, in 
particular, DNOs are striving for increased integration between previously separate 
systems in order to improve system performance [94]. Adoption of FIPA standards 
can provide interoperability to agents that belong to different agent platforms and 
which may have been developed by different organisations. This way, agents are able 
to dynamically discover each other and coordinate their actions using a common MTS 
as will later be described.  
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Moreover, many MAS have been employed in the past using closed architectures 
where agents were implemented without the ability for potential changes in the future. 
Adherence to FIPA specifications may provide an open and scalable architecture 
where agents can easily be added or removed. This allows additional functionality to 
be added to the system at any time by replacing existing agents with improved ones. 
The ability to reconfigure and upgrade the system with minimum complexity is 
particularly important when considering the fact that MAS could potentially be 
implemented on different sites under different operating conditions and may need to 
be upgraded in the future,. 
 
 
     3.3.2.    Agent Platforms and Development Kits 
A FIPA-compliant AP (Figure 3.5) consists of the machine(s), operating system, 
system agents and the FIPA agent management components, i.e. the AMS, the DF and 
the Agent Communication Channel (ACC). The AMS is a mandatory component and 
offers “white page services” to system agents by providing a directory of AIDs (Agent 
IDentifiers) registered with the MAS platform The DF is optional and acts as “yellow 
pages” by keeping a directory of the services offered by system agents. Finally, the 
ACC provides the MTS for the delivery of FIPA-ACL (FIPA - Agent Communication 
Language) messages between agents running on the same or different agent platforms. 
 
The implementation of the AP, as well as whether it complies with FIPA 
specifications or not, greatly depends on the Agent Development Kit (ADK) that is 
employed. There exist a number of ADKs for the development of fully FIPA-
compliant APs. In terms of the most popular publicly available ADKs, these include 
JADE [102-103], FIPA-OS [107], ZEUS [108] and the Comtec Agent Platform [109]. 
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The most popular commercially available ADKs include the Tryllian ADK [110] and 
JACK [111]. Finally, popular non FIPA-compliant ADKs include Cougaar [112] and 
MadKit [113]. A review of available ADKs may be found in [114-115]. 
 
 
 
     3.3.3.    Agent Interactions 
According to [105], four paradigms for agent interactions exist: 
1. Peer to peer communication: messages are sent directly to a specific agent. 
2. Broadcast communication: a message is sent to all agents within the MAS. 
3. Multicast communication: a message is sent to a specific group of agents. 
4. Generative communication: agents generate messages on a blackboard, which can 
be read by other agents. 
 
Agent-oriented interactions are based on high-level Agent Communication Languages 
(ACLs) [116], i.e. languages in which agent communicative acts can be expressed. 
The core of an agent message lies in the content of the ACL. However, in order to 
allow composition and interpretation of meaningful messages between agents, the 
following parameters must also be included: (i) message transport protocols; (ii) 
content languages; and (iii) ontologies. Finally, an MTS must exist to provide a 
mechanism for the transfer of ACL messages between agents.  
 
The first popular ACL was the Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language 
(KQML) [117]. In recent years, however, the agent communication standards 
developed by FIPA [118-119] and FIPA-ACL “have become the de facto standards 
used by MAS developers in the computer science community and beyond” [114-115]. 
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FIPA-ACL is based on speech act theory which states that messages represent actions 
or communicative acts (“performatives”) [119].  
 
The message transport protocol is used to carry out the physical transfer of messages 
between two agent communication channels. FIPA specifications [120] describe how 
message transport protocols may be used to transfer agent messages, however 
message transport is completely handled by the AP and therefore the MAS developer 
does not need to understand the details of the message transport protocol employed. 
The FIPA message transport reference model is shown in Figure 3.7. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: The FIPA Message Transport Reference Model [120]. 
 
 
 
An ontology provides a vocabulary for representing and exchanging knowledge about 
some topic and a set of relationships for the parameters denoted by that vocabulary. 
Because the ontology depends on the specific tasks of each domain, a standard 
ontology for agent messaging does not exist. Hence, it is necessary to design a 
specialised ontology for any individual MAS application in order to provide an 
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adequate description of the environment such that it includes all information required 
by system agents. Finally, the MTS provides the means to send and receive ACL 
messages between agents. The agents may be local to a single AP or on different APs. 
On any given platform, the MTS is provided by an ACC, which transfers the 
messages it receives according to the transport instructions contained in the message. 
 
 
 
    3.4.   MAS APPLICATIONS IN POWER ENGINEERING 
 
The IEEE Power Engineering Society Multi-Agent Systems Working Group [121] has 
created a Task Force whose aim was to carry out an extensive literature review of the 
body of work on MAS applied to Power Engineering. Durham University was part of 
this Task Force and the results may be found in [122]. Four broad fields of MAS 
applications were identified: (i) distributed control; (ii) modelling and simulation; (iii) 
state-estimation, monitoring and diagnostics; and (iv) protection. In addition, two 
recent papers [114-115] have also presented a comprehensive review of the Power 
Engineering applications for which MAS are being investigated. 
 
For the MAS-based distributed control of power systems, literature suggests that the 
applications under investigation include ANM [123-124] and in particular the control 
of MicroGrids [125-128], VPPs [53] or power plants [129], power system restoration 
[130-132] and control of shipboard electrical systems [133-134]. In addition, MAS 
have also been proposed as a means for DG dispatch for voltage support [135]. 
 
The deregulation of the electricity industry in many countries has introduced market 
systems that are influenced by a much greater number of factors than before. The 
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distributed nature of MAS may be exploited in order to simulate such complex 
markets and how they may react to specific operating conditions [136-140]. Specific 
examples include the simulation of cross-border trading [139] and the simulation of 
social considerations into market participant models [140]. In addition to electricity 
market simulation, the use of MAS as a modelling approach has also been proposed 
for transmission planning [141]. 
 
The third common power engineering application area for MAS is data management 
and interpretation for state estimation, monitoring and/or diagnostic functions. A 
transformer condition monitoring MAS is described in [142], while [143] details the 
agent-based management and analysis of SCADA and digital fault recorder data. 
MAS-based state estimation for electrical distribution networks is proposed in [144], 
as well as for substation automation in [145-146]. Finally, power system protection is 
a research area where the possibility of employing MAS technology in place of 
protection relays and associated equipment has recently been proposed [147-150].  
 
 
 
    3.5.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
This Chapter presented general theory behind the notions of “agency” and “MAS” 
according to the standards set by the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents 
(FIPA) and in particular the FIPA Agent Management Reference Model [157]. MAS 
have recently been employed in a variety of applications [93] such as air traffic 
control, process control, manufacturing, electronic commerce, patient monitoring or 
computer games, however the research described here focuses on the application of 
MAS in the Power Engineering industry as described in Section 3.4.  
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The literature review of the body of work on MAS applied for the distributed control 
of electrical power systems indicated that the research described in [125-128] and 
[123] are most closely linked with the research described in this Thesis. The first work 
is mainly concerned with the optimal participation of MicroGrid components 
(production, storage and load units) in the market [125-128]. A MAS-based 
distributed control system is presented in [125] that aims at maximising the overall 
internal benefits of the MicroGrid components, i.e. to minimise the operational cost of 
the MicroGrid. The second work proposes the employment of MAS technology with 
AuRA-NMS [123], an autonomous regional ANM system. Aura-NMS aims to 
integrate different network management tasks, such as voltage control, power flow 
management and network restoration, and is proposed as a means of offering a 
flexible ANM system for MV distribution networks with high levels of DG. 
 
The objectives of the MAS described in this Thesis differ from the two above-
mentioned pieces of research. This is because within the SSEZ concept, MAS 
technology is proposed as a means of delivering the control approach that satisfies the 
specific SSEZ control requirements, namely to: (i) overcome the LV distribution 
network constraints associated with high penetrations of SSEG; and (ii) to meet 
specific SSEZ operational goals depending on operating network conditions. Crucial 
to the functionality of the developed MAS are the reasoning and communication 
capabilities implemented inside each agent within the MAS, as well as the 
employment of a common ontology for sharing knowledge. These must be designed 
and developed specifically for the SSEZ environment and as a result, they differ from 
previous research as will be explained in Chapters 6 and 7.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
SSEG Technical Impact Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a growing need to investigate the technical impacts that the anticipated high 
penetrations of SSEGs may cause to the operation of LV distribution networks. SSEG 
technical impact studies must therefore be performed using suitable case study 
networks in order to evaluate the effects of SSEGs and quantify allowable SSEG 
penetration limits. This Chapter details the development of simulation models in the 
power systems simulation package PSCAD™/ EMTDC™ [151] for three different 
LV distribution networks: a generic UK LV distribution network, a generic European 
LV distribution network and an existing UK LV distribution network. Moreover, a 
methodology for predicting the technical impacts of SSEGs without the need for 
developing detailed computer-based models is proposed. This methodology is drawn 
from an analysis of the key electrical characteristics that determine the response of LV 
networks to the addition of SSEGs, focusing on the following technical constraints: (i) 
customer voltage rise/drop; (ii) voltage regulation; (iii) voltage unbalance; (iv) cable 
and transformer thermal limits; and (v) network losses. 
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    4.1.   TECHNICAL CHALLENGES 
 
There are a number of technical challenges that need to be considered with respect to 
the connection and operation of SSEGs on LV distribution networks. The introduction 
of SSEGs will affect the operation of the distribution system both at the LV, as well as 
the MV levels through distribution transformers. Engineering Recommendation G83/1 
[24] recommends a two-stage procedure to facilitate the connection of SSEGs on LV 
distribution networks. A “Stage 1 Connection” consists of a single SSEG installation 
and this generally has a negligible impact on the operation of the LV distribution 
network. Hence, there is no need for the DNO to either carry out a network study or to 
perform any work on the network. A “Stage 2 Connection” consists of multiple SSEG 
installations in a close geographical region. In such cases, the DNO is advised to 
assess the technical impacts of the proposed connections on the operation of the LV 
distribution network and to specify conditions for connection. 
 
A recent report [152] concluded that “the operation of SSEGs connected to the LV 
network can cause statutory voltage limits to be exceeded, recommended voltage 
unbalance levels to be exceeded and reverse real and reactive power to flow”. These 
technical challenges, along with network losses and other power quality issues have 
been well documented in a number of recent publications [153–159] and are 
explained here in greater detail. 
 
 
 
     4.1.1.    Customer Voltage Rise/Drop 
DNOs have an obligation to supply their customers at a steady-state voltage within the 
specified limits of 230V +10/-6% for LV distribution networks in the UK [42] and 
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Europe [43]. Without any SSEGs connected, the steady-state three-phase voltages at 
intermediate points in the LV distribution network are determined by network 
impedances and the loads connected. Hence, DNOs have traditionally set steady-state 
voltages near the top statutory limit at source substations during minimum loading 
conditions to allow for downstream voltage drop where voltages will approach the 
bottom limit during maximum loading conditions.  
 
The active power produced by SSEG units, however, will tend to increase the steady-
state voltage and, depending on the power factor of the generator, the reactive power 
produced or absorbed by the SSEG will also have an impact on network voltages. To 
determine whether the local steady-state voltage at the SSEG connection point has 
exceeded statutory limits, the generator, load and network characteristics must be 
considered. In addition, excessive voltage drop (230V -6% for LV networks in the UK 
[42] and Europe [43]) may also become an issue under maximum loading conditions, 
when the available generation of the connected SSEGs is low, or when the tap 
position on a secondary transformer has been changed. 
 
In symmetrical three-phase power system operation (Figure 4.1), the voltage drop 
VΔ observed on a line segment due to a balanced three-phase load is: 
 [ ] 1 r 1 1 r 11 1 P ( P )r rs r
r
R X Q j X R QV V V I R jX
V
+ − −Δ = − = + =               (4.1) 
where: 
sV                   sending end line-to-line voltage [V] 
rV                   receiving end line-to-line voltage [V] 
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I                    phase load current [A] 
1R                   positive sequence line resistance [Ω] 
1X                  positive sequence line reactance [Ω] 
θ                    angle between voltage at receiving end and load current [degrees] 
, ,s s sS P Q         sending end apparent power [VA], real power [W] and reactive power 
                       [VAr] respectively 
,L LP Q             real [W] and reactive [VAr] power input of the load respectively 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Single-line diagram of a feeder with a 3-phase load connected at the end. 
 
 
For a small power flow, the angle θ  is small and the voltage drop can be 
approximated by:  
1 r 1P r
r
R X QV
V
+Δ =                                                     (4.2) 
 
Equation (4.2) may also be used to calculate the voltage rise caused by a three-phase 
connected SSEG. The voltage rise on a feeder with one SSEG and one load connected 
at the end (Figure 4.2) is: 
1 r 1 1 1P (P ) ( )r G L G L
r r
R X Q R P X Q QV
V V
+ − + −Δ = =                           (4.3) 
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where: 
,G GP Q             real [W] and reactive [VAr] power output of the SSEG respectively 
 
  
 
Figure 4.2: Single-line diagram of a feeder with one 3-phase load and one 3-phase 
SSEG connected at the end. 
 
 
For unbalanced four-wire LV distribution networks, the voltages due to return 
currents flowing in the neutral conductor and earth need to be considered in addition 
to the voltage changes due to the phase currents. The phase-to-ground voltage drop 
along a line section l of a single-phase conductor in a four-wire system including the 
effect of self and mutual coupling between the phase and the neutral conductors and 
the effects of the grounding points may be written according to [160]: 
 AA A AB B AC C AN NAGV Z I Z I Z I Z IΔ = + + +                       (4.4) 
 BA A BB B BC C BN NBGV Z I Z I Z I Z IΔ = + + +                        (4.5) 
 CA A CB B CC C CN NCGV Z I Z I Z I Z IΔ = + + +                          (4.6) 
 NA A NB B NC C NN NNGV Z I Z I Z I Z IΔ = + + +                          (4.7) 
where: 
AGVΔ           voltage drop in phase A with reference to ground [Volts] 
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AAZ              self-impedance of phase A conductor [Ω] 
ABZ              mutual impedance of phase A and phase B conductor [Ω] 
ACZ              mutual impedance of phase A and phase C conductor [Ω] 
ANZ             mutual impedance of phase A and neutral conductor [Ω] 
similarly for phase B, C and for the neutral N. 
 
In order to relate phase voltages with reference to the neutral point of the load, the 
primary phase voltage drops with respect to neutral can be expressed as follows [160]:  
 AN AG NGV V VΔ = Δ −Δ                                             (4.8) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )A AA NA B AB NB C CC NC N AN NNANV I Z Z I Z Z I Z Z I Z ZΔ = − + − + − + −     (4.9) 
where: 
ANVΔ              voltage drop on phase A with respect to neutral [Volts] 
 
According to [160], equation (4.9) may be simplified by ignoring the mutual 
impedances between the conductors of the network without losing accuracy. The 
primary phase voltage drops with respect to neutral for phases A, B and C may hence 
be re-written as: 
A AA N NNANV I Z I ZΔ = −                                      (4.10) 
B BB N NNBNV I Z I ZΔ = −                                       (4.11) 
C CC N NNCNV I Z I ZΔ = −                                        (4.12) 
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Equations (4.10) – (4.12) are also applicable to calculate the voltage rise caused by 
the single-phase connection of an SSEG to an unbalanced four-wire LV distribution 
network. The voltage rise on the phase of connection is attributable both to phase 
currents as well as due to return currents flowing in the neutral conductor and earth.  
 
Customer voltage rise is likely to be of concern in rural networks, which are 
commonly radial networks with feeders covering long distances with relatively low 
current capacity conductors. In such networks, excessive voltage rise can be initiated 
by relatively small penetrations of SSEGs due to the high impedance of the 
conductors and because these feeders are often operated close to the statutory upper 
voltage limit to counter the relatively large voltage drops over these feeders.  
 
In essentially all LV distribution networks, the impact of any individual SSEG unit on 
the feeder primary will be almost negligible. However, when the aggregate capacity 
of many SSEG units reaches a critical threshold, steady-state voltage rise studies must 
be undertaken in order to ensure that customer voltages are maintained within 
statutory limits. A useful rule-of-thumb given in [159] states that if the injected 
current (measured at the primary level) is less than 5% of the feeder loading at the 
interconnection point and if all customers had satisfactory voltage prior to the addition 
of the SSEG, then a voltage problem on the primary is unlikely. Only after much 
above 5% injection would there be reason to worry about potential impacts.  
 
 
 
     4.1.2.    Voltage Regulation 
The introduction of SSEGs, in particular for generators based on intermittent RES, is 
likely to lead to increased voltage variation within the LV distribution system. 
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Voltage regulation in LV distribution networks is defined as the maximum allowable 
deviation between the LV busbars of the MV/LV substation and the end of service. 
Voltage regulation statutory limits differ between countries and DNOs, however in 
the UK most DNOs allow a maximum of 5-8% voltage regulation [161-163]. During 
periods of maximum generation and minimum demand, voltage regulation statutory 
limits may be exceeded due to the voltage rise caused by the power output of the 
connected SSEGs. Similarly with customer voltage rise, the impact of any individual 
SSEG unit on the system voltage variation will be almost negligible. However, when 
the aggregate capacity of many SSEG units reaches a critical threshold, voltage 
regulation studies must be undertaken to ensure that statutory limits are not exceeded. 
 
 
 
     4.1.3.    Voltage Unbalance 
Voltage unbalance in three-phase distribution systems is a condition in which the 
three-phase voltages differ in amplitude or are displaced from their normal 120 degree 
phase relationship or both [164]. Mathematically, voltage unbalance can be defined as 
the maximum deviation from the average of the three-phase voltages, divided by the 
average of the three-phase voltages and expressed as a percentage [165]. A very 
common definition is also given by using symmetrical components and is used in 
Engineering Recommendation P29 [165] and EN 50160 [43] which define the 
acceptable levels of voltage unbalance in LV distribution networks in the UK and 
Europe respectively. The percentage voltage unbalance factor (% VUF) is determined 
by the ratio of the negative- to the positive sequence voltage component and has a 
design limit of 1.3% in the UK, although short-term deviations (less than 1 minute) 
may be allowed up to 2%, which is the standard limit used in European networks. 
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% VUF = V
V
−
+
 × 100                                              (4.13)  
 
where the negative (V-) and positive (V+) sequence components may be computed 
using the following equation: 
01 1 11 1 1 120 1 120
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1 1 120 1 120
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c
V V
V V
VV
+
−
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ∠ ° ∠ − °⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥∠ − ° ∠ °⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
                          (4.14) 
where: 
Va  Vb  Vc           three-phase line or phase voltages  [V] 
V+  V-  V0           positive, negative and zero sequence voltage component [V] 
 
Single-phase loads in LV distribution networks are continually connected to, and 
disconnected from, the distribution system and are not evenly distributed between the 
three phases. Additionally, the level of unbalance present in distribution networks also 
depends on phase-conductor configurations, such as unsymmetrical spacing between 
phase conductors [165]. Voltage unbalance until now has generally not been of great 
concern, because the distribution of single-phase customer loads has been centrally 
planned by DNOs by allocating them equally across the three phases. 
 
The single-phase nature of SSEGs, however, along with the fact that their growth is 
consumer-driven and not centrally planned may result in additional unbalanced 
currents and voltages [210]. In addition to generation unbalance, load behaviour is 
also likely to change significantly in the future adding further complexity to the 
inherent symmetry of distribution systems [154]. Unbalanced voltages can result in 
adverse effects on power system equipment and on the electrical network, which is 
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intensified by the fact that a small unbalance in the phase voltages can cause a 
disproportionately large unbalance in the phase currents [165].  
 
 
 
     4.1.4.    Thermal Limits 
Transformers and network lines, such as overhead lines and underground cables, have 
a thermal rating determined by the maximum current carrying capacity of that 
component. If a component is loaded above its thermal rating for an extended period 
of time, it will overheat which could then lead to permanent damage, or even to a 
dangerous event such as a fire or explosion [164]. Hence, protection systems are 
employed to ensure the safety of humans and network equipment. The different types 
of thermal ratings that could be quoted by DNOs are: 
1. Continuous ratings, which indicate 100% rated current for 100% of the time. 
2. Cyclic ratings, which are based on a specific load-shape, load-duration etc. 
3. Seasonal ratings, which are based on a seasonal variation. 
 
The presence of SSEGs will alter current flows in the LV distribution network and the 
extent of the effect of SSEG output current on the thermal rating of the network will 
mainly depend on the interaction between demand and generation. With a suitable 
choice of site and connection scheme, SSEGs could have a beneficial effect, with no 
increase in the currents circulating in the network and even some significant 
reductions. For high SSEG penetration scenarios, however, the operation of SSEGs 
may cause an increase in the overall current flowing in the network, bringing system 
components closer to their thermal limits. Since the majority of LV distribution 
networks have a radial topology, the line sections that will be affected the most by the 
change in power flows are those in which SSEGs are connected.  
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• Cable Thermal Limits  
The current flowing in an overhead line OHLI  can be defined [167]: 
OHL
Qc Qr QsI
R
+ −=                                            (4.15) 
where: 
QC       heat exchange by convection per length, dependant on air temperature,  
                conductor temperature, wind speed and wind direction [W/m] 
QR       heat exchange by radiation, dependant on air and conductor temperature  
                [W/m] 
QS     solar heat gain, dependant on solar radiation [W/m] 
R     conductor resistance, dependant on conductor temperature [Ω/m] 
 
In underground cables it is also necessary to consider the heat production by eddy 
currents in the metal sheets and internal thermal resistances of the cable [168]. The 
current flowing in an underground cable is thus defined by: 
( )
( ) ( )( )
1 2 3 4
1 1 2 1 2 3 4
1
2
1 1
d
UC
W T n T T T
I
R T n T n T T
⎡ ⎤Δθ− + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤+ + λ + + λ + λ +⎣ ⎦
                   (4.16) 
where: 
Δθ               conductor temperature rise above the ambient temperature [K] 
Wd                      dielectric loss for the insulation surrounding the conductor [W/m] 
T1,2,3                  thermal resistances of the different insulations [mK/W] 
T4                       external thermal resistance [mK/W] 
n                 number of load-carrying conductors in the cable 
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λ1,2                     ratio of losses in the metal sheaths to total losses in the cable 
 
 
• Distribution Transformer Thermal Limits 
Distribution transformers are referred to in terms of operating voltage and nominal 
kVA rating. Their kVA rating indicates the amount of apparent power that can be 
transferred between their two sets of terminals. At low demand and high SSEG 
penetration scenarios, it is possible that the power output of the connected SSEGs in 
the network may exceed local demand. This would cause the surplus power to be fed 
into the higher voltage system (11kV or 20kV) through distribution transformers, 
which in extreme cases might exceed their nominal ratings [169]. Secondary 
distribution transformers are usually fitted with off-load tap changers and therefore 
this rating is symmetrical and does not vary with the direction of the power flow. For 
transformers fitted with On-Load Tap-Changers (OLTCs), however, reverse power 
flows may present an even more significant problem as the OLTC mechanism can 
impose an asymmetrical power flow limit, greatly reducing the transformer’s kVA 
rating when power flows in the reverse direction [169]. 
 
 
 
     4.1.5.    Network Losses 
When electricity is transported across the transmission and distribution system, a 
proportion of the electricity is dissipated as heat giving rise to electrical losses. The 
losses considered here are the load losses, i.e. the losses dependent on the power flows 
in the system. Since losses are a quadratic function of the current, the largest losses 
occur during peak loading conditions of the network. For underground cables and 
overhead lines, the majority of losses are conductor losses due to their impedances. 
The dielectric losses and sheath losses at voltage levels of distribution networks are 
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relatively small compared with conductor losses and may be neglected. The 
connection of SSEGs may reduce the amount of power transferred from remote 
generation via distribution and transmission networks and hence also reduce system 
losses. For a feeder with a load and an SSEG, as shown in Figure 4.2, feeder losses 
Plosses may be calculated as: 
2 2
2
2
( ) ( )G L G L
losses
r
P P Q QP I R R
V
− + −= =                          (4.17) 
 
In addition to network lines, distribution transformers are also responsible for losses 
within distribution systems. Transformers have fixed losses that are the heat losses 
within the iron core (hysteresis and eddy current losses) and load losses represented 
by the heat produced by the current flowing through their windings (resistive copper 
losses). These may be calculated using the short-circuit resistance of the transformer 
and the output current. 
 
 
 
    4.2.   CASE STUDY NETWORKS 
 
Three different LV distribution networks have been adopted as the case study 
networks for the purposes of this research. The first case study network represents an 
urban generic UK radial LV distribution network, as approved by UK DNOs [152]. 
The second case study network represents a typical European radial sub-urban LV 
network which has been adopted as a benchmark LV system by CIGRE TF C6.04.02 
[170]. Finally, the third case study network represents an existing urban UK radial LV 
network, operated by E.ON UK Central Networks. 
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     4.2.1.    UK Generic LV Distribution Network 
The UK generic distribution network contains six 11kV feeders, each supplying eight 
11/0.4kV 500kVA ground mounted distribution transformers and 400V substations. 
Simulation results described here focus on the connection of SSEGs on just one 400V 
substation of the distribution network, which represents a 1.2km long underground 
cable LV distribution system serving 384 evenly-distributed customers. Maximum 
and minimum domestic load figures were taken from Electricity Association sources, 
which show that, including diversity of demand, the minimum and maximum demand 
figures of each domestic single-phase load are 0.16kVA and 1.3kVA respectively 
[152]. The total load is 61.44kW at minimum demand, equal to 12.3% of transformer 
capacity, and 499.2kW at maximum demand, equal to 99.8% of transformer capacity. 
More detailed network data may be found in [152]. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Single-line diagram of the UK generic LV distribution network. 
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     4.2.2.    European Generic LV Distribution Network 
The network comprises a single 20/0.4kV 400kVA distribution transformer and three 
400V outgoing feeders: one residential, one industrial and one commercial. The 
residential feeder is 350m long and supplies 14 single-phase and 12 three-phase 
connected customers. The industrial feeder is 200m long and supplies a three-phase 
connected workshop, while the commercial feeder is 330m long and supplies 15 
single-phase and 3 three-phase connected customers. Customers are not spread 
uniformly throughout the network and are connected with different service cables, 
which are typically 30m long. Load figures based on standardised coincidence factors 
for residential, industrial and commercial customers were used, as described in [170]. 
The total maximum demand is 272.1kW, or 68% of transformer capacity, while the 
total minimum demand is 85.2kW, equal to 21.3% of transformer capacity. Detailed 
network data may be found in [170]. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Single-line diagram of the European generic LV distribution network 
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     4.2.3.    UK Existing LV Distribution Network 
The network comprises a single 11/0.4kV 500kVA distribution transformer and four 
400V outgoing feeders with a total length of 1,588m. The remote end of the second 
feeder has an open link point to a feeder from another LV network, which in the event 
of a fault may be closed. For the purposes of this Thesis, however, the network is 
assumed to be radial. In total, there are 198 single-phase customers taken from 400V 
three-phase street mains; each customer is assumed to use a 30m long service cable. 
The total load (customer loads and public street lighting) is measured at 
approximately 450kVA during maximum and 75kVA during minimum loading 
conditions. For the purposes of this Thesis, all demand is attributed to customer loads. 
Hence, demand per customer equals 0.375kW under minimum and 2.27kW under 
maximum loading conditions compared to 0.16kW and 1.3kW respectively in the UK 
generic network. Detailed network data may be found in the Appendix – Table A-1. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Single-line diagram of the existing UK LV distribution network 
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    4.3.   MODELLING APPROACH 
 
The LV distribution network models described above were modelled using the power 
systems simulation package PSCAD™/EMTDC™ [151]. PSCAD™ is the graphical 
user interface for the EMTDC™ transients' and POWER FLOW simulation engines. 
The Fortran-based EMTDC™ solution engine represents and solves differential 
equations (for both electromagnetic and electromechanical systems) in the time 
domain at a series of discrete intervals (time steps). Hence, PSCAD™ is most suitable 
for simulating the time domain instantaneous responses of electrical power systems. 
 
Using suitable equivalent models of network components, PSCAD™ is capable of 
representing and simulating a power distribution system, with neutral wires and 
system grounding explicitly represented. This makes PSCAD™ a useful tool for the 
analysis of unbalanced multi-grounded 4 or 5-wire LV distribution systems. All 
distribution network models described here were modelled as multi-grounded three-
phase four-wire systems. The secondary side of the substation transformers are wye 
connected and are solidly grounded along with the neutral wires. As the neutral is 
multi-grounded and the LV system is inherently unbalanced, a parallel return path 
exists through the earth for neutral (zero sequence) current, even in the absence of any 
fault. Using a reference node, which is normally the ground potential, network 
solution for an LV line with three phases a, b, c and a neutral conductor n may then be 
given by the following 4x4 matrix:  
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where: 
V                     vector of bus voltages measured from the reference node [V p.u.] 
I                      vector of injection  bus currents [A p.u.] 
Z                     bus impedance matrix [Ω p.u.] 
 
SSEGs are modelled as current sources with a fixed power factor that is 
predetermined and held constant throughout any particular simulation. The use of 
current sources ensures that the output current is not affected by minor voltage 
variations. Before each simulation run the power factor of each generator is set by 
adjusting the phase angle of the generator relative to the phase angle of the supply 
voltage. For SSEGs in the UK, the SSEG power factor under normal operation at 
rated power must be within the range of 0.95 lagging to 0.95 leading [24]. 
 
Single- and three-phase loads are modelled as constant active and reactive power 
consumers connected to the distribution network. Static load models are used, which 
express the characteristics of the loads at any instant of time as functions of voltage 
magnitude and frequency. The load real power component P and reactive power 
component Q are considered separately, using the well-known expressions: 
0 0( / ) (1 )
NP
PFP P V V K dF= + ⋅                                     (4.19) 
0 0( / ) (1 )
NQ
QFQ Q V V K dF= + ⋅                                    (4.20) 
 
where: 
P0  ,Q0               rated real [W] and reactive[VAr] power 
V                        load voltage [V] 
V0                      rated load voltage [V] 
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NP, NQ              dP/dV, dQ/dV voltage index for real and reactive power 
KPF, KQF            dP/dF, dQ/dF frequency index for real and reactive power 
 
The frequency of the distribution system with or without SSEGs is assumed to remain 
constant at 50Hz, hence varying the values of NP and NQ determines the type of 
loads used in the simulation: NP=NQ=0 represents constant power loads, NP=NQ=1 
represents constant current loads and NP=NQ=2 represents constant impedance loads. 
All simulations were carried out using constant power loads. 
 
Primary and distribution transformers are represented by a general series model 
containing resistances and reactances and are based on the classical modeling 
approach, where inter-phase coupling is not represented. They are modelled in an 
ideal mode, as their magnetising current is small compared to normal load current and 
their magnetising shunt impedance is large, and thus negligible. Distribution lines 
(overhead lines and underground cables) are also represented by a general series 
model containing resistances and reactances. Their shunt capacitances are neglected 
due to the relatively short length of the feeders and the distribution voltage level. 
 
 
 
    4.4.   SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
Five technical impacts were investigated in order to identify the effects of high SSEG 
volumes on the three networks: (i) customer voltage rise, (ii) voltage regulation, (iii) 
voltage unbalance, (iv) thermal limits and (v) network losses. Different simulation 
scenarios were devised, whereby the parameters affecting each impact were varied. 
The term “SSEG volume” is used to denote the capacity of installed SSEG in the 
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network. Results described here focus on the particular parts of each network where 
the impacts of SSEGs are most severe, i.e. the remote ends of the feeders where 
SSEGs are connected for voltage regulation, voltage rise and voltage unbalance 
studies and “cable hot spots” for thermal limits. 
 
Original results focus on the UK generic and the EU generic LV distribution 
networks, while results from the UK existing LV distribution networks are used in 
order to validate the methodology that is proposed in Section 4.5. 
 
 
 
     4.4.1.    Customer Voltage Rise and Voltage Regulation 
Voltage profile studies were undertaken by considering the effect of the following 
parameters on the level of system voltage change with increasing SSEG penetrations: 
(i) loading conditions, (ii) SSEG/load power factor, (iii) network impedances, (iv) 
SSEG network location and (v) SSEG phase location. Allowable SSEG volumes on 
both networks were then determined considering (i) customer voltage rise statutory 
limits and (ii) voltage regulation statutory limits, as shown in Table 4.1.   
 
Loading conditions, by influencing the line voltage at SSEG connection point, are 
important when considering the volumes of SSEGs that can be accepted. For both 
issues, minimum loading conditions represent the worst-case scenario with regards to 
the allowable SSEG volume that may be accommodated. For customer voltage rise, 
this is because under minimum loading conditions the connected network feeders are 
operating closer to the +10% statutory upper voltage limit compared to maximum 
loading conditions and hence the effect of increasing SSEG capacity is exaggerated. 
 80
For voltage regulation, this is because under maximum loading conditions the voltage 
drops across network feeders are higher compared to minimum loading conditions, 
thus allowing a higher bandwidth before voltage regulation limits are exceeded and 
hence higher SSEG volumes to be connected. 
 
Operating the connected SSEGs or loads at a leading power factor (i.e. importing 
VArs from the network) has been found to reduce customer voltages, thus alleviating 
voltage regulation and voltage rise issues. Lagging power factors (i.e. exporting 
VArs) have been found to have the exact opposite effect. The effect of varying 
SSEG/load power factors, however, has been found to be less marked for voltage 
regulation issues, because the voltages at the LV busbars of the substation will also 
drop/rise according to the SSEG/load power factors and hence deviation will be 
affected. 
 
Network impedance and voltage rise due to SSEG power output have been found to 
have a linear relationship, as expected from Equation 4.3. Hence, doubling the 
impedance of any network will allow only half SSEG capacity to be connected before 
voltage rise and voltage regulation statutory limits are exceeded, while halving this 
value has been found to have the exact opposite effect (Table 4.1). 
 
Finally, the non-uniform connection of SSEGs has been examined, firstly by 
considering the phase location of the connected SSEGs and secondly by considering 
their network location. The first investigation yielded a useful observation regarding 
the severe effect unbalanced generation has on network voltages and therefore the 
SSEG volumes that can be accommodated. Assuming that the neutral and phase 
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conductors have the same impedance and that the feeder neutral conductor is the only 
return path, it can be stated that if the generation is greater on one of the three phases 
of a 4-wire network, the voltage rise observed on this phase is equivalent to that 
observed when six times the additional balanced generation is connected across the 
three phases. This is because customers on a 3-phase 4-wire network are connected to 
the neutral and hence the change in the phase-to-neutral voltage ( A NVΔ , BNVΔ  and 
C NVΔ ) will equal the change in the phase-to-ground voltage ( AGVΔ , BGVΔ  and 
CGVΔ ) plus the change in the neutral-to-ground voltage ( NGVΔ ). 
A N A G N GV V VΔ = Δ + Δ                                  (4.21) 
B N B G N GV V VΔ = Δ + Δ                                   (4.22) 
 C N C G N GV V VΔ = Δ + Δ                                   (4.23) 
 
For the second case (“SSEG clustering”), different SSEG volumes were connected on 
only one feeder of the UK generic network and on the residential feeder of the 
European generic network. Allowable SSEG volumes were found to have 
significantly dropped due to statutory limits being exceeded in the feeders where 
SSEGs were connected (Table 4.1).  
 
This is because, as expected, localised generation was found to have the greatest 
impact on customer voltages compared to generation at different network segments. 
In particular, clustering SSEGs at the remote ends of a network represents the worst-
case scenario, since this is the weakest part of the network and hence more prone to 
customer voltage rise and voltage regulation issues.  
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 CUSTOMER  
VOLTAGE RISE 
VOLTAGE  
REGULATION 
 UK EU UK EU 
SSEG and load 
power factor: 
    
             - Unity 185 535 770 325 
             - 0.95 Lead 380 765 860 425 
             - 0.95 Lag 123 340 615 255 
Double impedance at 
unity power factor 
92 268 385 160 
SSEG clustering:     
             - One feeder 48 285 185 140 
             - Remote ends 28 170 122 105 
 
Table 4.1: Allowable SSEG volumes [kW] for the UK and European generic 
networks for permissible voltage regulation and voltage rise limits. 
 
 
 
     4.4.2.    Voltage Unbalance 
For voltage unbalance studies, the impact of connecting different SSEG volumes on 
only one phase of various parts of the two networks was considered, with the other 
two phases assuming to contain no SSEGs. The following factors were considered: (i) 
loading conditions, (ii) SSEG/load power factor, (iii) network impedances, (iv) 
neutrals and earthing resistances. 
 
For LV distribution networks with uniform demand across the three phases, loading 
conditions were found to have no influence on the amount of unbalanced SSEG 
volumes that may be accommodated. It has been found that it is the amount of 
unbalanced generation connected that will determine whether the %VUF has 
exceeded statutory limits, independent of loading conditions. 
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Varying the power factor of the connected SSEGs or loads of the phase of interest 
was found to have a small significance on the values of %VUF present in both UK 
and European generic networks. Lagging power factors were found to slightly 
increase, and leading power factors slightly decrease the values of the %VUF present 
compared to the unity power factor scenario for reasons explained above (Table 4.2). 
 
Network impedance was found to be an important factor with regards to voltage 
unbalance, with the difference here compared to balanced studies being that the 
values of the neutral conductors also have a significant effect. In all the cases, low 
impedance lines were found to have a positive effect on the values of %VUF present 
compared to high impedance lines, however impedance and allowable SSEG volumes 
no longer have a linear relationship. This is because the %VUF does not increase 
linearly with increasing impedance (Table 4.2). Results linking the % VUF with 
varying network impedance have shown that when the UK generic network is 
operating at just below voltage unbalance statutory limits (1.3%), halving the network 
impedance will reduce the %VUF by 22%. Doubling the network impedance has 
been found to increase the %VUF present by 65%, while if impedance is then further 
doubled, the %VUF present has been found to further increase by 88%, as shown in 
Figure 4.6. The same pattern is observed in the European generic network, where the 
higher the %VUF present is, the higher it will increase with increasing impedance due 
to the presence of higher neutral currents (Table 4.2). 
 
As both networks are multi-grounded 4-wire systems, the effects of neutrals and 
earthing resistances with respect to voltage unbalance were also considered. It was 
found that the more severe system unbalance is, the larger the neutral currents which 
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would flow in the neutral conductors. In the UK generic network, if the %VUF was 
kept within UK statutory limits (1.3%), neutral currents were found to be significantly 
less than phase currents, approximately one fourth of phase currents. However, for 
the European generic network, due to a larger %VUF being allowed (2%) and due to 
unequal system impedances, neutral currents were found in some segments to be 
equal to phase currents. In general, the magnitude of neutral currents in different 
segments within each network was found to vary, as feeders are multiple grounded. 
 
Similar studies have shown that if neutral wires were ignored, less than 25kW of 
unbalanced SSEG penetrations would only be allowed in the UK generic network, 
significantly less than using a 4-wire system (47.6kW). For the European generic 
network, this figure would be just 8kW under maximum loading conditions, i.e. just a 
fifth of using a 4-wire system (39.5kW). Hence, neutral wires clearly are very 
important in mitigating voltage unbalance issues. 
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Figure 4.6: Results for %VUF in the UK generic network. 
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Changing the values for the grounding resistances of the neutral point of the 
substation transformer and the grounding points along the neutral wire was also 
considered. Values used varied between 1-3Ω and 20-40Ω respectively. These are 
typical and recommended values taken from [171]. Results showed that variation of 
the grounding resistances did affect, although not significantly, the neutral currents 
and neutral voltages, but they were found to have a negligible effect on the value of 
the %VUF present in the system.  
 
 
Table 4.2: Allowable SSEG volumes [kW] on one phase of one 400V feeder of the UK 
and European generic network for voltage unbalance limits. 
 
 
 
     4.4.3.    Thermal Limits 
Both cable and transformer thermal limits were found to depend almost entirely on the 
interaction between total demand and the power output of the connected SSEGs, and 
as such, minimum loading conditions represent the worst-case scenario with respect to 
the SSEG volumes that may be accommodated. The power factor of the connected 
SSEGs and loads was also considered: for transformer thermal limits, where 
transformer kVA ratings are taken as reference, the best case scenario has been found 
to be when load and SSEG power factors equal to unity (i.e. there are no reactive 
 VOLTAGE UNBALANCE 
 UK EU 
SSEG and load power factor:   
                - Unity 47.8 27.0 
                - 0.95 Lead 49.5 25.6 
                - 0.95 Lag 46.1 33.5 
50% Impedance 61.0 39.4 
200% Impedance 29.0 15.1 
300% Impedance 20.2 10.2 
400% Impedance 15.5 7.6 
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power flows). For cable thermal limits, where Ampere ratings of the cables are taken 
as reference, the best case scenario has been found to be when loads and SSEGs are 
consuming reactive power, i.e. operating at a leading power factor, because network 
current flows are reduced (Table 4.3). 
 
While localised generation has no effect on transformer thermal limits, it is very 
important when considering cable thermal limits. Although a network line may be 
able to operate without its thermal limits being exceeded for a specific SSEG volume 
distributed uniformly, it may not be able to do this if all of the SSEG units are 
concentrated in one location and connected to a single feeder (“hot spot”).    
 
 CABLE THERMAL 
LIMITS 
TRANSFORMER 
THERMAL LIMITS 
 UK EU UK EU 
SSEG and load power 
factor: 
    
               - Unity 1,045 340 610 505 
               - 0.95 Lead 1,063 357 585 479 
               - 0.95 Lag 1,010 320 550 452 
 
Table 4.3: Allowable SSEG volumes [kW] for the UK and European generic network 
for cable and transformer thermal limits. 
 
 
 
     4.4.4.    Network Losses 
Loading conditions have a direct effect on network losses: at low penetrations, SSEGs 
tend to decrease losses, but as the penetration reaches and exceeds local demand, 
SSEGs tend to increase network losses (Figure 4.7). Reduction or increase in losses 
has also been observed at higher voltage levels, and these generally follow the same 
pattern as the losses at the voltage levels where SSEGs are connected. The power 
factor of the connected SSEGs or loads has been found to be an important factor 
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contributing to network losses, but only at high SSEG penetration scenarios. 
Assuming the load power factor is unity, a leading SSEG power factor, although 
beneficial for voltage rise and voltage regulation issues, will increase network losses 
compared to a unity SSEG power factor, while a lagging SSEG power factor will also 
increase network losses, although not as much (Table 4.4). Finally, the effect of 
varying network impedances with respect to network losses has also been examined, 
as shown in Figure 4.7 and Table 4.4. As expected from Equation 4.3, network 
impedance and network losses have been found to have a linear relationship.  
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Figure 4.7: Results for network losses in the UK generic network. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4: Network losses [in kW] for different SSEG penetrations and power factors 
for the UK generic network under minimum and maximum loading conditions. 
 NETWORK LOSSES 
 MININUM LOAD MAXIMUM LOAD 
 PG/PD=0 PG/PD=0.5 PG/PD=2 PG/PD=0 PG/PD=0.5 PG/PD=2 
SSEG and 
load power 
factor: 
      
 - Unity 3.5 2 3.7 50 24 48 
 - 0.95 Lead 3.5 2.3 4.1 54 27 52 
 - 0.95 Lag 3.5 2.1 3.9 53 26 50 
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    4.5.   PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
 
Using the simulation results described in Section 4.4, a methodology for SSEG impact 
analysis of LV networks has been developed that may be used to predict a network’s 
response to the addition of high SSEG volumes without the need to carry out a 
simulation. The methodology makes use of the key factors identified through 
simulation and simplifies the analysis by comparing the network under study with 
either the UK or the European generic network, depending on which of the two 
networks is deemed by the user to be the most similar. This allows approximate 
allowable SSEG volumes to be predicted on any case study LV network quickly and 
easily and without the need for developing detailed computer-based models. The key 
factors that have been identified through simulation as having an effect on the 
technical impacts of SSEGs under investigation are shown in Table 4.5. This table 
presents the key factors along with the technical impacts under consideration but also 
describes the specific circumstances which cause the most severe adverse effects. 
 SSEG TECHNICAL IMPACTS 
 Customer 
Voltage Rise 
Voltage 
Regulation 
Voltage 
Unbalance 
Key Factors    
Network symmetry Asymmetrical Asymmetrical Asymmetrical 
Network topology Radial Radial Radial 
Network length Long Long Long 
Distribution 
substation voltage 
 
High 
 
-  
 
- 
Network lines high R, low X1 or  
high R, high X2 
high R, low X1 or 
high R, high X2 
high R, low X1 or 
high R, high X2 
Distribution 
transformer 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
SSEG power factor Lagging Lagging Lagging 
SSEG network 
location 
Clustering,  
Remote end4 
Clustering,  
Remote end4  
Clustering,  
Remote end4 
SSEG phase location Clustering at same 
phase 
Clustering at same 
phase 
Clustering at same 
phase 
Loading conditions Minimum Minimum - 
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 SSEG TECHNICAL IMPACTS 
 Cable Thermal 
Limits 
Transformer 
Thermal Limits 
Network Losses 
Key Factors    
Network symmetry Asymmetrical - - 
Network topology Meshed - Meshed 
Network length - - Long 
Distribution 
substation voltage 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
Network lines Low thermal 
ratings 
 
- 
High impedance 
Distribution 
transformer 
 
- 
Low thermal 
rating 
High  
impedance 
SSEG power factor Non unity3 Non unity3 Non unity3 
SSEG network 
location 
Clustering at the 
same line segment 
 
- 
 
- 
SSEG phase location Clustering at same 
phase 
- - 
Loading conditions Minimum Minimum Light 
 
Table 4.5: Key factors causing adverse SSEG technical impacts that need to be 
considered in a methodology for assessing allowable SSEG volumes in a network. 
 
1 assumes leading SSEG/load power factor 
2 assumes lagging SSEG/load power factor 
3 assumes unity power factor loads 
4 assumes uniform SSEG penetration 
 
 
 
     4.5.1.    Apparent Impedance 
In order to produce the methodology, the concept of apparent impedances was 
developed drawing on work described in [172] where a technique for reducing a radial 
network into a single line equivalent was developed for the fast computation of load-
flow calculations and voltage instability analysis of radial distribution networks. The 
apparent impedance method presented here differs from the single line equivalent 
impedance method described in [172] in that it is applied in reverse order as it starts 
from the point of known network impedances. The methodology derives a value for 
overall network apparent impedance in three steps. 
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• Step 1: Determining the apparent impedance at a network location (single 
customer). 
• Step 2: Determining the apparent impedance at a network location (multiple 
customers). 
• Step 3: Determining the overall network apparent impedance (all customers, all 
locations). 
 
Step 1 determines the apparent impedance for a single customer at a network location 
by summing the impedances between the substation and the specific customer 
location.  Step 2 determines the apparent impedance at a network location for multiple 
customers by assuming that all customers are supplied by similar service cables. The 
apparent impedance, considering all customers connected to that point, will then be 
the sum of the impedances between the substation and a single customer connection 
point, multiplied by the total number of customers in that location. 
( ) ( )ap ap
location customerZ m Z≅ ⋅                                        (4.24) 
where: 
Zlocation(ap)                 apparent impedance [Ω] of a network location with customer 
                                 connections 
m                              number of customers connected to the location 
Zcustomer(ap)                apparent individual customer impedance [Ω] 
 
Step 3 determines the overall network impedance by summing the apparent 
impedances of all network locations where customers are connected.  
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
n
ap ap ap ap
net net net location
i
Z R jX Z
=
= + = ∑                       (4.25) 
where: 
Znet(ap)                        apparent impedance of the network [Ω] 
Rnet(ap) , Xnet(ap)           apparent resistance[Ω] and reactance[Ω] of the network 
n                                 number of network locations with customer connections 
 
Since the maximum allowable SSEG volume that can be accommodated on the two 
generic networks is known, it is possible to gain a first estimate of the allowable 
SSEG volume of a different network by comparing their overall network apparent 
impedances. However to gain a more accurate prediction of the allowable SSEG 
volume a number of further considerations must be taken into account as shown in 
Table 4.5. Additionally, the ratio between the number of customers in the selected 
generic network and the network under study must be taken into account. For uniform 
SSEG penetration scenarios this may be done by calculating the average single 
customer apparent impedance for each network. 
 
Using the network line data found in [152] and [170] respectively, the overall network 
apparent impedance of the UK generic network, for a scenario where every customer 
has an SSEG connected,  is calculated to be Rnet(ap) = 24.981 Ω and Xnet(ap) = 5.822 Ω 
for 384 single-phase customers, while the overall network apparent impedance of the 
European generic network, for the same scenario, is Rnet(ap) = 7.9615Ω and Xnet(ap) = 
1.9665Ω for 16 three-phase and 26 single-phase connected customers (Appendix – 
Table A-2). These impedances may be used as benchmark overall network apparent 
impedances when applying the methodology on any case study LV network.  
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     4.5.2.    Description of the Methodology 
SSEG impact analysis using the methodology on any case study LV network takes 
place in three main stages: Firstly, the inherent network and load characteristics of the 
LV network under investigation must be obtained and reviewed, according to Table 
4.5. Secondly, the user must consider specific scenarios for the type (i.e. active and 
reactive power output profile) and phase and network location of the connected 
SSEGs. Typically this is done through a deterministic analysis of the worst-case 
conditions for each of the five SSEG impacts, however explicit scenarios may also be 
devised. Having determined the SSEG penetration scenarios to be considered, the 
overall network apparent impedance of the selected generic network and the network 
under study must be calculated for each scenario. 
 
Finally, estimated allowable SSEG volumes may be obtained based on either statutory 
regulations (voltage regulation, voltage rise, voltage unbalance) or equipment ratings 
(cable and transformer thermal limits). These may be quantified by considering the 
allowable excess SSEG power output in the case study network for each SSEG impact 
in comparison to results obtained from the selected generic network.  
 
 
 
     4.5.3    Application of the Methodology 
In order to validate the proposed methodology, it has been applied on the existing 
public LV network described in Section 4.2.3 and results obtained have been 
compared against simulation results. The first step of the methodology is to obtain and 
review the main characteristics of the network that have been identified as having an 
impact on the five SSEG technical impacts under consideration. This may be seen in 
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Table 4.6 which shows that the case study network can be described as Asymmetrical, 
Radial, Medium Length, with a High distribution substation voltage, Medium line and 
transformer resistances and reactances while having Heavy loads per customer. 
 
Network symmetry Due to unbalanced system impedances and the unbalanced 
distribution of single-phase customers, the network is 
inherently Asymmetrical.  
Network topology The network has a radial layout, with four feeders being 
supplied from the LV busbars of the infeeding MV/LV 
substation. Each feeder supplies a number of branches; 
customers are connected at various parts of each branch. The 
remote end of the second feeder has an open link point to a 
feeder from another LV network, which in the event of a 
fault may be closed. For the purposes of this Thesis, 
however, the network under study is assumed to be Radial. 
Network length Excluding the service cables used, the network is 1,588m 
long, an increased length of 388m compared to the UK 
generic network. It can be categorised as Medium Length. 
Distribution 
substation voltage 
Subsequent to the recent European Voltage Harmonisation, 
the nominal UK voltage is now 230/400V. Most LV 
networks, however, have remained unchanged and are still 
operated to supply 240/415V. For the purposes of this paper, 
distribution substation voltage is assumed to be 
approximately 250V, the same as the UK generic network. 
This can be categorised as being High. 
Network lines The following underground cables are used: 300mm2 
(327m), 185mm2 (235m), 120mm2 (498m), 70mm2 (528m). 
Detailed data are provided in the Appendix. This can be 
categorised as predominantly Medium R, Medium X. 
Distribution 
transformer 
The distribution transformers used are similar to the UK 
generic network. Detailed data are provided in [152].  This 
can be categorised as having a medium thermal rating and 
typical impedance. 
Loading conditions There are 198 single-phase customers taken from 400V 
three-phase street mains; each customer is assumed to use a 
30m long service cable. The total load (customer loads and 
public street lighting) is measured at around 450kVA during 
maximum and 75kVA during minimum loading conditions. 
For the purposes of this work, all demand is attributed to 
customer load. Demand per customer equals 0.375kW under 
minimum and 2.27kW under maximum loading conditions 
compared to 0.16kW and 1.3kW respectively in the UK 
generic network. This can be categorised as Heavy loading. 
 
Table 4.6: Inherent network characteristics of the case study existing public UK network. 
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The second step is to consider the type, phase and network location of the connected 
SSEGs, by examining specific scenarios for SSEG penetrations under measured 
minimum loading conditions in the network. Different scenarios have been devised, as 
illustrated in the following section. For simplicity, unity power factors are assumed 
for the loads and SSEGs connected. It must be noted that the following text takes each 
technical impact in turn and in isolation, therefore the methodology not only allows 
SSEG volumes to be predicted but also the order in which they are expected to be 
encountered. 
 
 
 
     4.5.3.1    Customer Voltage Rise 
Customer voltage rise is anticipated to be the most limiting constraint to the operation 
of SSEGs in the network. Predicted results using the methodology are as follows: 
 
• Uniform distribution of SSEGs throughout the network 
The first scenario considers the uniform distribution of SSEGs across all customers of 
the case study network. The overall network apparent impedance is Rnet(ap) = 12.2824 
Ω and Xnet(ap) = 2.9476 Ω for 198 single-phase customers (Appendix – Table A-2). 
Average single customer apparent impedance is hence Ravg-cust(ap) = 0.062032 Ω and 
Xavg-cust(ap) = 0.014887 Ω which is slightly less than  Ravg-cust(ap) = 0.06505 Ω and Xavg-
cust
(ap) = 0.01516 Ω for the UK generic network. 
 
Simulation results have shown that the allowable excess SSEG power output on the 
UK generic network is 124kW. This is calculated as the difference between the SSEG 
volume on the network (185kW, Table 4.1) and the total network load PD (61kW). 
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Hence, by comparing apparent impedances the estimated allowable excess SSEG 
power output on the case study network is: 
0.06505124 130
0.062032excess
P kW kWΩ= × =Ω  
while the estimated allowable SSEG volume PG equals PG = Pexcess + PD = 130kW + 
(198 x 0.375kW) = 204kW (1.03kW per customer). 
 
• SSEG feeder clustering 
The second scenario considers the uniform distribution of SSEGs across all customers 
of the second feeder only. The overall feeder apparent impedance in the case study 
network is Rnet(ap) = 7.341 Ω and Xnet(ap) = 1.949 Ω for 107 customers. For the UK 
generic network, each 400V feeder supplies 96 customers and has an overall feeder 
apparent impedance equal to Rnet(ap) = 6.24525 Ω and Xnet(ap) = 1.45548 Ω.  The 
allowable excess SSEG power output on one feeder of the UK generic network has 
been found to equal Pexcess = 48kW – (96 x 0.16kW) = 32.6kW. The excess SSEG 
power output that can be accommodated on the second feeder of the case study UK 
network is then Pexcess = 30.9kW, or alternatively the predicted SSEG volume PG = 
30.9kW + (107 x 0.375kW) = 71kW (0.66kW per customer). This was subsequently 
found to be inaccurate, the reasons for this are discussed in Section 4.5.4. 
 
• SSEG phase clustering 
Non-uniform SSEG distribution across the three phases of the second feeder is 
considered, by assuming that phase A has double the SSEG capacity of the other two. 
The estimated allowable balanced SSEG volume for the second feeder was found, 
using the proposed methodology, to be PG = 71kW, representing a SSEG volume of 
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23.6kW/phase. Using the observation described in Section 4.1.1, voltage rise statutory 
limits on phase A would be exceeded if 16kW were connected on phase A and 8kW 
on phases B and C, i.e. total generation of only 32kW.  
 
 
 
     4.5.3.2    Voltage Regulation 
The same three scenarios were considered with regards to voltage regulation statutory 
limits and the predicted results are as follows: 
 
• Uniform distribution of SSEGs throughout the network 
For the case study network, the estimated allowable excess SSEG power output is 
Pexcess = 744.5kW compared to 710kW in the UK generic network. The predicted 
allowable SSEG volume on the network is hence PG = 744.5kW + (198 x 0.375kW) = 
819kW (4.135kW per customer). 
 
• SSEG feeder clustering 
The estimated allowable excess SSEG power output that can be accommodated on the 
second feeder of the network is Pexcess = 161.2kW compared to 170kW for a 400V 
feeder in the UK generic network. The estimated allowable SSEG volume on the 
feeder is then PG = 161.2kW + (107 x 0.375kW) = 201kW (1.9kW per customer). 
 
• SSEG phase clustering 
Assuming that phase A has double SSEG capacity compared to the other two phases, 
voltage regulation limits on phase A would be exceeded if 44kW were connected on 
phase A and 22kW on phases B and C, i.e. a total generation of 88kW.  
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     4.5.3.3    Voltage Unbalance 
This scenario considers the voltage unbalance caused by uniform connection of SSEG 
units on all customers of one phase of the second feeder of the case study network. 
The average apparent customer resistance of the feeder (Ravg-cust(ap) = 0.0686 Ω) is 
slightly (5%) higher than that of a 400V feeder of the UK generic network (Ravg-cust(ap) 
= 0.062032 Ω). The estimated allowable SSEG volume may then be approximated to 
be equal to that obtained for the UK generic network (47.8kW per phase).  It must be 
noted however that if the impedances were not comparable this task would be more 
difficult as the relationship has been shown in Section 4.1.3 to be non linear. Table 4.2 
has been produced to help the user in this respect by linking the %VUF present in the 
network with varying network impedance. 
 
 
 
     4.5.3.4    Cable Thermal Limits 
The worst case scenario in this respect would be the connection of high levels of 
SSEGs on the second feeder, where one underground cable (section 2.1-2.2 from 
Figure 4.5) is used to supply a large number of customers. Although the feeder in the 
case study network consists mainly of 70mm2 cables, which have a smaller cross 
sectional area than the UK generic network (95mm2 and 185mm2), all sections of the 
case study feeder that carry larger loads are designed with 300mm2 cables. These have 
increased cable thermal limits (465A) compared to the 185mm2 cables used in the UK 
generic network (355A) [173].  
 
Considering a uniform SSEG connection, the estimated allowable excess SSEG power 
output on that feeder is: Pexcess = 3 × Vline × Iphase × cosθ = 3 × 400V × 465A = 558kW 
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compared to approximately Pexcess = 282kW in the UK generic network. This 
corresponds to an estimated allowable SSEG volume on that feeder of PG = 558kW + 
(107x 0.375kW) = 600kW (5.59kW per customer), which represents an extreme 
penetration scenario and hence cable thermal limits are not expected to be the most 
limiting network constraint to the operation of SSEGs for this particular LV network. 
 
 
 
     4.5.3.5    Transformer Thermal Limits 
When the power flows within the UK generic network are such that the transformer is 
operating at its thermal limits (Prating = 500kVA), network losses of Plosses ≈ 50kW 
(Figure 4.7) were observed. Assuming similar current and power flows, the network 
losses of the case study UK network under this scenario are: 
0.06203250 47.7
0.06505losses
P kW kWΩ= × =Ω . 
Hence, estimated SSEG volumes of PG = Prating + PD + Plosses = 500kW + 75kW + 
47.7kW = 622.7kW (3.1kW per customer) would be required in order to exceed the 
case study network transformer’s thermal limits.  
 
 
 
     4.5.3.6    Network Losses 
Increase in network losses due to the operation of SSEGs is less likely to occur in the 
network under study compared to the UK generic network. This is because demand 
per customer for this particular network is approximately double (0.375kW under 
minimum and 2.27kW under maximum loading conditions) compared to the UK 
generic network (0.16kW and 1.3kW respectively) and hence the SSEG power output 
per customer required to exceed local demand will also effectively double. 
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     4.5.4    Discussion 
Table 4.7 shows the predicted results produced by the methodology in comparison to 
the simulated results derived from the PSCAD™ model. It can be seen that there is 
generally reasonable agreement between the two sets of results in cases of uniform 
SSEG penetrations throughout the network. 
 
 METHODOLOGY
RESULTS 
SIMULATION 
RESULTS 
Customer voltage rise              204 
              711 
             204 
              851 
Voltage regulation              819 
             2011 
             819             
             2011 
Voltage unbalance           47.81/ph            411/ph 
Transformer thermal limits              623              625 
Cable thermal limits              6001              6051 
 
Table 4.7: Allowable SSEG volumes [kW] for the case study public UK LV network using 
the methodology compared to the accurate results produced by simulation.  
 
1 assumes SSEG volume on the second feeder of the network only. 
 
 
Taking a closer look at these results it can be seen that the methodology predictions 
are accurate regarding voltage regulation for both uniform and non-uniform 
distributions of SSEG. This is because this particular technical impact can be assessed 
adequately by only considering the impedances and power flows between the 
distribution transformer and the end of each feeder. In the case of customer voltage 
rise, the methodology is accurate for a uniform distribution of SSEGs where the 
assumed distribution transformer voltage is accurate. However for SSEGs on only one 
feeder this assumption is not correct which is reflected in the discrepancy between the 
methodology results and the simulation results. A full load flow calculation would be 
required to remove this error completely. 
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The voltage unbalance predictions are reasonably accurate but not exact as they are 
based on the assumption that the case study network impedances are exactly the same 
as those found in the UK generic network. This assumption was made due to the non 
linear relationship between network impedance and the voltage unbalance in the 
network. For cases where the impedances are significantly different, Table 4.2 can be 
used in order to obtain an estimate on the allowable SSEG volumes that may be 
accommodated. 
 
When considering transformer and cable thermal limits the methodology predictions 
are again reasonably accurate, the errors are due to errors in losses predictions caused 
by differences in customer distribution and hence in power flows. However it must be 
noted that the PSCAD™ simulations used in this research employed fixed loads only, 
taking diversity into account, and that for an improved assessment of the thermal 
stresses imposed on cables and transformers dynamic load and generation profiles 
should be used for extended simulation runs. PSCAD™ is capable of carrying out 
such simulations and they are described in work carried out at Durham University in 
[169]. This method was not used in this case as the focus of this work was to quantify 
allowable SSEG volumes under worst case conditions.  
 
 
 
    4.6.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
The anticipated high penetrations of SSEGs on public LV distribution networks are 
likely to present DNOs with a number of technical impacts relating to power quality, 
distribution system efficiency and potential equipment overloads. Impact studies need 
to be performed using suitable case study networks in order to evaluate the effects of 
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SSEGs on LV distribution networks and quantify allowable SSEG penetration levels. 
Four wire PSCAD™ models have been used to analyse one UK generic and one 
European generic LV distribution network in order to determine their response to the 
operation of high levels of SSEG. Significant differences between the two networks 
were observed regarding both the SSEG volumes that may be accommodated (Table 
4.8), and the order in which the five constraints were encountered (voltage regulation, 
voltage rise, voltage unbalance, cable and transformer thermal limits, and network 
losses). Voltage rise was shown to be the most limiting constraint for the UK generic 
network and voltage regulation and cable thermal limits were found to be the most 
limiting constraints for the European generic network. 
 
Based on the simulation results obtained for the two generic networks and the 
development of an apparent impedance method, a methodology for SSEG impact 
analysis of LV networks was presented that may be used to predict the network 
response to the addition of high SSEG volumes for real LV networks without the need 
for simulation. The proposed methodology was then applied to an existing public UK 
LV network operated by E.ON UK Central Networks. A four-wire PSCAD™ model 
of this network was also developed and used to validate the methodology. There was 
reasonable agreement between the simulation results and the methodology predictions 
providing confidence that the methodology could in some cases be used instead of 
detailed modelling. When comparing the results from the UK generic model and the 
UK LV network operated by E.ON UK Central Networks it became apparent that 
although the order in which the constraints would be encountered remains the same, 
the SSEG volumes at which they are encountered are quite different (Table 4.8). This 
is because of differences between generic and real networks in terms of details such as 
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the number and location of customers, their consumer demands, length and impedance 
of lines and distribution substation voltages (Table 4.5). 
 
These differences illustrate that the generic networks are often quite different from 
real networks and therefore the results of SSEG impact studies carried out on generic 
networks alone must be treated with caution. This emphasises the need for specific 
impact studies to be performed by DNOs on their LV networks in order to investigate 
the technical impacts of SSEGs and to assess SSEG penetration limits within each LV 
network. If SSEG proliferates as anticipated [4-6], the number of studies required 
could place a significant burden on DNOs. 
 
The proposed methodology offers a means of managing this, without the need for 
developing a detailed computer-based model of the network and simulating a range of 
operating scenarios. The methodology allows approximate SSEG penetration limits 
on any case study LV network to be predicted quickly and easily, following a step-by-
step approach as illustrated in the paper. The strength of the methodology presented 
here is that although it is based on studies carried out on generic networks it contains 
adaptation steps designed to ensure it is applicable to real LV networks. 
 
  UK Generic 
    Network 
  EU Generic 
    Network 
  UK Existing 
    Network 
Customer voltage rise          185         535          204 
Voltage regulation          770         325          819 
Voltage unbalance        47.8/ph        27/ph         41/ph 
Transformer thermal limits          610         505          625 
Cable thermal limits         1,045         340          605 
Contribution to network losses           80         180           90 
 
Table 4.8: Allowable SSEG volumes [kW] for the three case study LV networks.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Control Approach Selection 
 
 
 
 
 
Central to the secure and satisfactory operation of the SSEZ are the control and 
communication architectures to be adopted. Accurate and safe communications 
between the customer-owned power system entities, measurement devices installed on 
the distribution system and utility control centres are essential if the SSEZ is to satisfy 
its specific control requirements, as will be described in Section 5.1. Power system 
operation is generally divided into two main types: centralised operation where 
decision-making is based on system wide information, and distributed (or decentra-
lised) operation which is based on local information. Despite years of ongoing 
research and demonstration projects [39-40], it remains unclear what the appropriate 
architecture for distributed automation systems at the LV feeder level should be. 
 
Having presented the specific control requirements of an SSEZ, this Chapter attempts 
to compare centralised and distributed control approaches over their suitability to 
satisfy these requirements. The employment of a distributed control approach, realised 
 104
through the MAS technology, is proposed here due to the significant benefits that may 
be realised in three key areas: (i) scalability and openness; (ii) resilience and 
reliability; and (iii) communication efficiency. These areas will be shown to be 
particularly important when considering future high SSEG penetration scenarios.  
 
 
 
    5.1.   CONTROL REQUIREMENTS OF AN SSEZ 
 
Since SSEZs contain sections of public LV networks, they must be transformed from 
passive to active entities to facilitate the connection and proliferation of SSEGs. This 
must be achieved without impairing the ability of DNOs to operate their networks 
within necessary performance standards [42-43]. The research described here 
considers normal operating conditions, i.e. no faults present. The control system 
adopted aims to ensure that the power system operates within the existing network 
protection settings. A key aim is that, even with high levels of SSEG penetration, it 
will control the generation, load and energy storage such that protection devices do 
not operate and thus customer interruptions are minimised as are generator trips.  
 
Aside from the technically-driven goal of ensuring secure system operation (Section 
5.1.1.), an SSEZ should also have the ability to provide the local DNO with 
predictable and controllable demand or generation. In turn, this could lead to 
increased economic benefits due to group interaction with energy markets and the 
potential provision of ancillary services to DNOs. Increased economic benefits could 
facilitate the proliferation of SSEGs and hence offer significant environmental 
benefits for RES-based SSEGs. Depending on network conditions, five different 
operational goals for an SSEZ have been identified (Section 5.1.2). 
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     5.1.1.    Low Voltage Distribution Network Constraints 
In order to overcome steady-state customer voltage rise issues, the control system 
needs to be able to measure the magnitudes of all single-phase customer voltages. 
These values should then be compared with the 230V +10/-6% statutory limits 
defined in [42] for UK and [43] for European LV distribution networks. If the 
magnitude of a single-phase voltage falls outside the statutory limits, the control 
system must be able to change the power flows in the SSEZ so that this voltage can 
return within the statutory limits. This may be achieved by: (i) reducing the power 
output of SSEGs; (ii) diverting power into ESUs; and/or (iii) increasing the load in the 
locally affected area. Moreover, importing reactive power could reduce local steady-
state voltages hence alleviating excessive voltage rise issues, while exporting reactive 
power could have the exact opposite effect thus alleviating voltage drop issues. 
 
Overcoming steady-state voltage regulation issues within an SSEZ requires the 
control system to measure the magnitudes of all single-phase voltages at the remote 
point of each feeder and compare these values to the single-phase voltages at the LV 
busbars of the MV/LV distribution transformer supplying the SSEZ. If steady-state 
voltage deviation falls outside statutory limits, the control system must be able to 
change the power flows in the SSEZ so that this value can return within desired limits. 
This may be achieved similarly as with customer voltage rise/drop issues. 
 
With regards to overcoming steady-state voltage unbalance, measurement of the 
magnitudes and angles of each of the phase voltages at the remote end of the SSEZ’s 
feeders must be processed and compared with the maximum allowable %VUF (1.3% 
for the UK [166] and 2% for Europe [43]). In the event that voltage unbalance 
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exceeds this limit, the control system would need to change the single-phase power 
flows to restore balance to the voltages by manipulating the power output/input of the 
SSEGs, loads and/or ESUs located on the relevant phase. 
 
Overcoming thermal issues within the SSEZ requires the control system to measure 
the RMS values of the currents (A) at known ‘hot spots’ within the SSEZ and 
compare them to the appropriate cable ratings. For reverse power flow issues, the 
control system must be able to compare apparent power flow (kVA) values to 
transformer ratings. If values exceed equipment ratings, the control system needs to 
be able to change the power flows in the network to solve these issues.  
 
Finally, in order to reduce network load losses, the aim of the control system is to 
minimise reactive power flows within the SSEZ. This requires the control system to 
measure reactive power flows at SSEZ branches and then change the operating power 
factors of customer-owned power system entities accordingly. Network load losses 
may also be reduced by manipulating active power flows within the zone in order to 
achieve an overall balance, but this type of loss reduction is only considered as an 
operational goal (“self-sufficiency”) as will later be described. 
 
 
 
     5.1.2.    Operational Goals 
Depending on network conditions, five different operational goals for an SSEZ have 
been identified [31-32]. If local generation is not enough to cover local demand, the 
goal of an SSEZ could be to not export any power to the distribution network. On the 
opposite, if local generation exceeds local demand, an SSEZ could aim for zero power 
import. If there is a good match between local demand and generation an SSEZ could 
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attempt to operate self-sufficiently, with no power import and no power export from 
the distribution network. A fourth possible goal could be for the SSEZ to operate as a 
fixed load by having a constant power import from the distribution network over a 
period of time. Finally, and in line with the request of the local DNO, the last possible 
operational goal for an SSEZ could be to provide dispatchable power to the 
distribution network over a specified time period. 
 
Synoptically, the five identified operational goals are: (i) zero power export, (ii) zero 
power import, (iii) zero power import and export (self-sufficiency), (iv) constant 
power import and (v) dispatchable power. All operational goals are concerned with 
providing predictable and controllable demand/generation to the upstream distribution 
network and in return for this service the local DNO could compensate the SSEZ for 
its contribution to network operation. Meeting these goals could increase the value of 
SSEGs in the energy market and also increase their environmental impact. 
 
As evident from the above, SSEZ operational goals depend on the interaction between 
the connected demand and generation within the zone. At any time, the power balance 
for an SSEZ feeder may be calculated according to the following equations: 
1 1
( ) ( )
feeder feedern n
in out
i i
P i P i
= =
=∑ ∑                                             (5.1) 
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G ESU D losses
i i
P i P i P i P i P i
= =
+ + = +∑ ∑                   (5.2) 
where: PG (i), PESU (i)  and PD (i)  are the SSEG, ESU and load power input/output at 
an SSEZ feeder i respectively, P(i) corresponds to the net power injection at the feeder 
and Plosses(i) correspond to the associated load losses. In order to determine the total 
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amount of regulating power required in an SSEZ, SSEG and ESU power export are 
regarded as negative loads while load and ESU demand, as well as the curtailed SSEG 
power output are treated as positive load.  
 
For an SSEZ to meet an operational goal, the control system to be adopted needs to be 
able to measure the three-phase power flows at the PCC of the SSEZ with the 
distribution network and then change the power flows within the SSEZ depending on 
the desired operational goal. This should be done at half-hourly intervals, in 
accordance with UK and most European electricity market procedures [8-9]. For 
power dispatch, communication links between the control system and the DNO need 
to be established to allow the SSEZ to receive a central request from the DNO to 
specify the required change in power exchange with the distribution network. In line 
with this central request, the control system will then determine if it is capable of 
delivering the specified power and will decide how to achieve this. 
 
 
 
    5.2.   POTENTIAL CONTROL APPROACHES FOR AN SSEZ 
 
Two potential control approaches have been identified. The first one would be the 
extension of traditional centralised control systems from their current operation to 
cover LV networks as well. This would require the presence of a central controller 
located at the DNO control room or at the secondary distribution substation level 
which would receive measurement data from critical [174] or even all nodes within 
the SSEZ. Using automated reasoning and data interpretation, the controller would 
process this data and send control commands to all controllable entities within the 
SSEZ in accordance with the specific control requirements of the zone (Figure 5.1).  
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Figure 5.1: Centralised control operation for an SSEZ. 
 
 
 
The second potential control solution would be the development of a distributed 
control approach. Depending on system communications and the locations where 
control decisions are made, a number of distributed control structures could be used 
for the control of an SSEZ. For the purposes of this research, the distributed control 
approach assumes that each controllable customer-owned power system entity within 
the SSEZ has its own controller with decision-making capabilities. Each controller is 
able to autonomously react to changing network conditions, but is also capable of 
interacting with other system controllers when necessary. This may be achieved using 
a common communications network as shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
Brief descriptions of both potential control approaches will be given in the next 
Section and they will both be evaluated on their capability to overcome the challenges 
and realise the opportunities presented with the connection of SSEGs on LV 
distribution networks.  
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Figure 5.2: Distributed control operation for an SSEZ. 
 
 
 
     5.2.1.    Centralised Control Approach 
Existing SCADA systems employed for the control of electrical networks do not 
provide any information on individual LV customers, as this has little or almost no 
effect on the running of the system. In particular, the SCADA systems used by UK 
DNOs are a mixture of 2nd and 3rd generation systems, i.e. technologies dated since 
the early 1980s and 1990s respectively and were not designed to accommodate DG or 
SSEG [11]. In general, centralised control is employed where the cost of network 
infrastructure is high and as a consequence is static or very slow to change. The main 
advantage of this approach is that it offers full network transparency, allowing optimal 
control decisions to be made based on the objective functions of the controller.  
 
The potential number of SSEG units and the nature of their incremental connection 
can complicate their centralised control. With respect to the control of an SSEZ, the 
most fundamental limitations of using a centralised control system are linked to: (i) 
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lack of scalability and openness, (ii) lack of resilience and reliability and (iii) lack of 
efficient communications. Using a centralised control system means that the 
additional connection of new system components would require re-programming of 
the central controller, which could prove to be complex and time-consuming, 
especially taking into account the potential number of customers within an SSEZ. 
Additionally, a failure of a single component or a software error in the central 
controller could result in a complete failure of the control system. 
 
Moreover, in centralised control systems all data needs to be periodically collected at 
a central point and then distributed throughout the system, which places a heavy 
burden on the communications infrastructure. Finally, SSEG units are anticipated to 
be owned by different individuals or organisations that are not likely to have hardware 
and communications systems from the same vendor [12-13]. Communications could 
therefore prove to be challenging unless global communication standards and 
protocols are employed.  
 
 
 
     5.2.2.    Distributed Control Approach 
According to a number of researchers [31, 37, 44-46], a distributed management and 
control approach for LV distribution networks could potentially offer advantages over 
a centralised approach in the areas of: (i) reliability and resilience, (ii) scalability and 
openness and (iii) communications efficiency. In terms of scalability and openness, 
the distributed approach offers a means of managing the growth of entities, such as 
customers, SSEGs, storage devices and network infrastructure within the LV 
distribution network. This growth is managed through the instantiation of the 
 112
corresponding number and type of distributed controllers, often without the need for 
rewriting software.  
 
Further, these controllers may facilitate a “plug-and-play” capability, which permits 
new entities to easily participate in system operation. In contrast, a centralised 
approach would require permission to be granted and software modifications to be 
made every time a new entity was added to the SSEZ. Given that the consumer-driven 
growth of SSEGs is dynamic and unforeseen, scalability and openness are important 
features when considering SSEZs, but also between instances of SSEZs. 
 
With regard to resilience and reliability, properly designed distributed control 
approaches may present no single point of system failure. Furthermore, in the event of 
individual failures the system remains operational, however its performance may be 
degraded. As such, the system is resilient to individual failures, which in turn 
increases system reliability. Conversely, a centralised system is vulnerable since 
failure at the point of control could result in the system ceasing to operate. This cease 
in operation could lead to unsafe operating conditions within the SSEZ, such as 
exceeding statutory limits and equipment ratings.  
 
Within the distributed approach, communication efficiency gains can be realised 
through the execution of local autonomous control actions, which reduces the 
likelihood of communication bottlenecks. For example, when solving a steady state 
voltage problem, all agent control actions may be performed locally and 
autonomously by the relevant subset of the agent community. In comparison to a 
centralised approach, this level of communication is less intensive. Further, this 
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reduction in communication intensity is achievable for all other control actions 
undertaken by the distributed controllers within the SSEZ but with varying degrees of 
localisation and autonomy. A centralised approach would require communication 
links between all entities participating within the SSEZ and the central point, which is 
likely to become a communication bottleneck.  
 
According to [114-115], there are two main types of distributed computing that have 
been used for Power Engineering applications: MAS and Service Oriented Computing 
(SOC). SOC approaches that have been used for Power Engineering applications are 
grid computing [226] and web-services [227]. All three technologies offer a means of 
managing distributed hardware and software resources, however they differ in their 
specific application areas. Grid computing is “normally focused on harnessing 
hardware resources to solve computationally complex problems” [114], while web-
services are “designed to offer interoperability between software systems, providing 
the mechanisms for the discovery of those systems and their communication across a 
network” [114]. According to the authors, “it is the co-operative and pro-active 
nature of agents that set them apart from grid computing and web-services” [114], 
and therefore applications where the agent attribute of autonomy (Section 3.1) is 
required tend to be the cases where MAS are preferred. The following Section 
attempts to justify the selection of MAS by looking at the characteristics of MAS 
technology and how they match with the specific control requirements of an SSEZ. 
 
 
 
     5.2.3.    Why MAS for the control of an SSEZ? 
As with most computer programming paradigms, a general advice on when to 
consider the MAS technology tends to be requirement-driven rather than technology-
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driven. Thus, the characteristics of the target domain must be examined to check if 
they match with the characteristics of the domains for which MAS technology has 
been found suitable. Here, the employment of agent technology for the distributed 
control of an SSEZ is justified by looking at why the four main agent attributes would 
be required for this particular control problem: 
 
1. Autonomy: Due to the potential number of controllable entities within an SSEZ, 
the control system is required to operate without extensive need for 
communications and with minimal human supervision. Furthermore, control of 
customer-owned power system entities must be based on these components having 
only a partial representation of the SSEZ. Hence, control decisions must be taken 
with a degree of autonomy, i.e. self-starting behaviour. Within an MAS, agents are 
capable of autonomous action by taking the initiative and by changing their 
behaviour depending on the goals they are aiming to meet. Autonomous agents are 
not dependant on control calls from other software modules and may be added or 
removed from the MAS without affecting the ability of the remaining agents to 
operate. 
As an example, an agent is able to identify when operating conditions (i.e. demand 
versus generation) within the SSEZ allow for a particular operational goal to be 
met, and behave autonomously by instructing controllable entities within the 
SSEZ to change their power inputs/outputs accordingly. 
 
2. Social ability: Communication between different components is needed to satisfy 
the SSEZ control requirements as described in Section 5.1. For example, in the 
event of voltage unbalance statutory limits being exceeded at an SSEZ feeder, an 
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agent responsible for voltage unbalance needs to communicate with other agents 
located on each of the three phases of the affected area and change the power 
flows by increasing or decreasing the generation or demand of the relevant phases 
in order to restore balance to the SSEZ. 
The social ability of agents is more than just an ability to exchange data [93]. 
Agents are able to negotiate and interact in a cooperative or competitive manner, 
depending on their particular implementation. This ability is particularly important 
when considering that power system entities within an SSEZ are owned by 
different customers which may have different objectives from these units. This 
research, however, assumes that the overall system goal is always a higher priority 
compared to individual agent goals (“good citizen” behaviour) as will be 
explained in Section 6.6. 
 
3. Reactivity: The SSEZ concept represents a dynamically changing environment. 
The adopted control approach must therefore allow flexible response to dynamic 
changes that occur within the SSEZ environment in order to either overcome an 
identified LV distribution network constraint or to meet an operational goal. An 
MAS is able to exhibit such flexibility and adaptability by coordinating the actions 
of agents with different behaviours and design objectives in order to solve a 
particular problem. As an example, in order to solve a customer voltage rise 
problem, system agents could react by issuing control commands to the relevant 
SSEZ power system entities, such as SSEG power output reduction, ESU charging 
and/or increasing customer load, in accordance to changes occurring inside the 
SSEZ environment. 
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4. Pro-activity: Goal-directed behaviour is needed in order to meet the SSEZ control 
requirements. Agents operating within an SSEZ are able to demonstrate such 
behaviour by using the resources available to them, such as: (i) measurement data 
from monitoring points within the SSEZ; (ii) knowledge with regards existing 
statutory regulations and distribution equipment ratings; and (iii) in the case of 
operational goals, the amount of power and time period as specified by the 
particular operational goal. The required functionality in order to satisfy the 
control requirements of an SSEZ was described in Section 5.1, however as an 
example, if a section of LV cable is close to becoming thermally overloaded, an 
agent could exist that anticipates this situation and exhibits pro-active behaviour 
by issuing mitigating control commands such as SSEG power output reduction, 
and/or decreasing the load. 
 
 
 
    5.3.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
Despite years of ongoing research, development and demonstration projects [39-40], 
it remains unclear what the appropriate architecture for distributed automation 
systems at the LV feeder level should be. A distributed management and control 
hierarchy is being proposed by a number of researchers [31, 37, 44-46], while other 
researchers [47-49] argue for more centralised management and control schemes 
where LV feeder-level devices have little autonomy. 
 
This Chapter describes the selection of the most suitable control approach for an 
SSEZ based on the specific SSEZ control requirements, namely to: (i) to overcome 
the LV distribution network constraints associated with high penetrations of SSEG; 
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and (ii) meet a set of SSEZ operational goals for the provision of predictable and 
controllable demand or generation to the upstream distribution network. The 
employment of a distributed management and control approach, realised through the 
MAS technology, is proposed here due to the significant benefits that can potentially 
be realised in three key areas: (i) scalability and openness; (ii) resilience and 
reliability; and (iii) communication efficiency. This is because of the potential number 
of SSEG units and the nature of their incremental connection which can complicate 
their centralised control.  
 
At the same time, however, there are significant challenges arising from the possible 
employment of such a distributed control approach. The transition from the current 
centralised to a fully decentralised control approach might be difficult for DNOs to 
adopt, as a number of regulatory and trust issues could arise. Moreover, decentralised 
control approaches have limited operating experience compared to centralised 
approaches. Finally, a significant research challenge arising due to the multi-objective 
nature of this particular control problem could be the occurrence of conflicts between 
the actions of individual agents. Conflict resolution techniques must therefore be 
investigated and their impact on the individual agent and system architecture design 
must be taken into account. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
Design of the SSEZ Control System 
 
 
 
 
 
This Chapter details the design of the SSEZ control system based on the MAS 
technology, placing particular emphasis on the reasoning and communication 
capabilities of system agents. The design of the MAS has been devised to enable 
diagnosis of system operating conditions and to provide the appropriate control 
actions to the customer-owned power system entities such that the specific control 
requirements of the SSEZ are met. This may be achieved through responsive control, 
whereby control actions are based on reacting timely and appropriately to changes 
occurring in the SSEZ environment. The MAS presented here is based on the case 
study network described in Section 6.1 as well as on the structured approach proposed 
in [228]. It involves firstly defining the requirements and design tasks of the MAS as 
a whole (Section 6.2) and then specifying the individual agents within the MAS 
(Section 6.3), their reasoning capabilities (Section 6.5), as well as their interactions 
and the ontology required to support inter-agent communications (Section 6.6).   
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In addition to MAS design, this Chapter also describes the design of an SSEZ 
Relational Database Management System (RDBMS) in Section 6.7. The aim of the 
RDBMS is to allow measurement data within the SSEZ to be stored and retrieved by 
the relevant system agents in order to provide information regarding the current status 
of the SSEZ, thereby enabling analyses of network events and network performance. 
The design of the SSEZ control system may be seen schematically in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
  
 Figure 6.1: The design of the SSEZ control system. 
 
 
 
    6.1.   CASE STUDY SSEZ 
 
For the purposes of this research, the UK generic LV distribution network described 
in Section 4.2.1 is considered as the case study SSEZ that the MAS design is based 
on. The design of the MAS must be generic enough to be applicable to any type of LV 
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distribution network but at the same time the number and type of system agents 
present will depend on the specific technical characteristics of the SSEZ, such as the 
type, location and number of SSEGs, ESUs and controllable loads present, the 
installed measurement and communication devices, network feeders etc.  
 
The case study SSEZ is assumed to contain the typical network protection settings 
employed in existing LV distribution networks [173] but there are no measurement, 
control and communication devices present, such as for example IEDs (Section 2.3.3). 
This is in accordance with the current “fit-and-forget” operating philosophy employed 
by DNOs for LV distribution networks (Section 2.1). Moreover, each customer is 
assumed to have installed a single-phase SSEG with a rating of 2.5kW. The rationale 
for choosing this particular rating per customer corresponds to results from Table 4.8 
which illustrate that at this level of SSEG penetration each of the LV network 
constraints under consideration may be encountered. However, if lower SSEG 
penetration scenarios were assumed, the number and type of agents that are required 
to satisfy the SSEZ control requirements could be different as will later be described.  
 
Furthermore, it is also assumed that 10% of the customers have installed an ESU 
capable of a continuous power input/output of 5kW and that every customer has 
installed a controllable consumer demand attributing to 1kW. These assumed values 
are intended to illustrate the role of employing ESM and DSM schemes within the 
SSEZ. Consequently, the case study SSEZ contains 384 single-phase SSEGs, i.e. 24 
single-phase SSEGs in each service section evenly distributed across the three phases, 
384 controllable consumer demands and 38 ESUs. The case study SSEZ under a 
passive control approach is shown in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2: The case study SSEZ under a passive control approach. 
 
 
 
    6.2.   TASK DECOMPOSITION 
 
In order to realise the control tasks of the MAS, these tasks must be decomposed into 
several sub-tasks whose execution may then be assigned to system agents. The task 
hierarchy for overcoming the LV distribution network constraints under consideration 
is shown in Figure 6.3, while Figure 6.4 illustrates the task hierarchy for meeting an 
SSEZ operational goal. 
 
Both involve three main stages: (i) state assessment, where measurement data from 
specific measurement points within the SSEZ are collected and processed by the 
relevant agents; (ii) action planning and decomposition, where potential control 
actions are identified; and (iii) action execution, where control actions are sent to the 
relevant customer-owned power system entities and are also reviewed. 
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Figure 6.3: Task hierarchy for overcoming the identified LV network constraints. 
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Figure 6.4: Task hierarchy for meeting an identified operational goal. 
 
 
 
    6.3.   DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM AGENTS 
 
Table 6.1 presents which of the listed attributes the agents operating within the 
proposed MAS-based control approach need to exhibit such that the LV distribution 
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constraints can be overcome and the operational goals can be met. From the eleven 
agent attributes listed in Table 6.1, eight are viewed as essential in order to satisfy the 
specific control requirements of an SSEZ. 
 
Required 
Agent 
Attributes 
Customer
voltage 
rise/drop 
Voltage 
regula-
tion 
Voltage 
unba-
lance 
Thermal
limits 
Network 
losses 
Opera-
tional 
goals 
Autonomy 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Social Ability  9 9 9  9 
Reactivity 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Pro-activeness 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Accuracy 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Adaptivity       
Adaptability 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Mobility       
Temporal 
Continuity 
9 9 9 9 9 9 
Reliability 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Inferential 
Capability 
      
 
Table 6.1: Required individual agent attributes of the MAS control approach. 
 
 
 
Having identified the attributes that system agents need to exhibit, it is now necessary 
to define the types of agents required to satisfy the specific control requirements of an 
SSEZ and adhere to the specifications developed by FIPA [92]. There are three types 
of agents, namely: (i) direct control agents; (ii) indirect control agents; and (iii) utility 
agents. The agents reside on a particular agent platform, as shown in Figure 6.5, 
which provides the message transport service in order to allow agents from the same 
or different agent platforms to communicate.  
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Figure 6.5: The FIPA-based SSEZ agent platform management model. 
 
 
 
     6.3.1.    Direct Control Agents 
This type of agent directly controls a customer-owned power system entity (SSEG, 
ESU or consumer demand) within the SSEZ in order to achieve its design goals. 
Given the nature of these goals, there are three categories of direct control agents: 
- Generator Agent (GA) ~ an agent that controls the real and reactive power set-
points of an SSEG unit. 
- Consumer Demand Agent (CDA) ~ an agent that controls the demand of a 
controllable customer load, which may be either: (i) re-shiftable, (ii) curtailable, or 
(iii) critical. The first two types constitute the “low priority loads” which ideally 
are the only load types to be managed. Curtailable loads are dispatchable, but to 
varying degrees depending on the type of load involved (Section 2.5). 
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- Energy Storage Agent (ESA) ~ an agent that controls the real and reactive power 
set-points of an ESU. 
 
Instances of these agents contribute towards overcoming the LV distribution network 
constraints under consideration and meeting the SSEZ operational goals. Each of 
these agents uses local measurements at the terminal point of the unit it is controlling 
in order to make the appropriate control decisions. These agents behave autonomously 
where possible, however in certain circumstances they respond to requests from 
indirect control agents as will later be described. The locations of the direct control 
agents in the case study SSEZ are shown in Figure 6.6. In accordance with the 
controllable customer-owned power system entities that exist in the network, the case 
study SSEZ is assumed to contain 384 GAs, 384 CDAs and 38 ESAs. 
 
The implementation of each direct control agent on an actual SSEZ requires a 
processing unit with a microprocessor that supports the installation of a Java Virtual 
Machine, where the agent environment of the MAS is then embedded. In addition, a 
physical and logical connection between every installed customer-owned power 
system entity and the direct control agent that controls this entity must exist, along 
with a common long-range communications medium for inter-agent communications. 
 
 
 
     6.3.2.    Indirect Control Agents 
This type of agent indirectly controls a power system entity (SSEG, ESU or consumer 
demand) within the SSEZ in order to achieve its goals. There are four categories of 
indirect control agents, which are able to influence the actions of direct control agents. 
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- Thermal Limits Agent (TLA) ~ an agent that indirectly controls the power flow 
through a cable or transformer. 
- Operational Goals Agent (OGA) ~ an agent that indirectly controls the power flow 
at the interface (PCC) between the SSEZ and the upstream distribution network. 
- Unbalance Agent (UA) ~ an agent that indirectly balances the power flow across 
each of the three phases of an SSEZ feeder. 
- Voltage Regulation Agent (VRA) ~ an agent that indirectly controls the voltage 
variation between the LV busbars of the distribution transformer supplying the 
SSEZ and the remote ends of the SSEZ. 
 
Each of these agents uses measurement data from strategic points within the SSEZ in 
order to decide which direct control agents need to be employed in order for the 
indirect control agent to achieve its design objectives. Measurement data may be 
provided either from customer-owned power system entities within the SSEZ, or from 
dedicated measurement devices that need to be installed at specific locations within 
the SSEZ. The indirect control agents in the case study SSEZ are shown in Figure 6.6.  
 
There exist 4 UAs, each controlling the % VUF at the remote ends of the four 400V 
SSEZ feeders. The term remote end is used to signify the last customer on each of the 
three phases of the fourth service sections. The rationale for choosing these locations 
as the points where UAs monitor voltage unbalance within the SSEZ case study is 
based on results described in Section 4.4.2 that have identified these points as the 
worst case locations for voltage unbalance. For similar reasons, 4 VRAs exist that 
monitor the voltage variation between the LV busbars of the distribution transformer 
supplying the SSEZ and the remote ends of each of the four 400V SSEZ feeders. 
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Moreover, 5 TLAs exist that are responsible for protecting cables and transformers 
from thermal damage. Research described in Section 4.4.3 has identified the location 
of four cable “hot spots”, i.e. one in each SSEZ feeder. Therefore, there exist 4 TLAs 
that use measurements from these vulnerable sections of the distribution network such 
that they can intervene to protect the cable from thermal damage. An additional TLA 
is employed in order to ensure that reverse power flows through the distribution 
transformer do not exceed their corresponding kVA ratings. Finally, the MAS also 
contains 1 OGA occupied with meeting the identified SSEZ operational goals. 
 
 
 
     6.3.3.    Utility Agents 
This type of agent performs administrative duties and is in alignment with FIPA 
specifications [92]. Each agent platform contains two utility agents which facilitate 
the efficient operation of direct and indirect control agents within the MAS: 
- Agent Management System (AMS) ~ a mandatory component of the FIPA 
specification, which is responsible for offering “white pages” services to other 
agents by maintaining a directory of registered agents. 
- Directory Facilitator (DF) ~ an optional component of the FIPA specification, 
which provides “yellow pages” services by enabling agents to identify services 
offered by other agents. 
 
Utility agents are not responsible for any control actions, but their operation is central 
to the functionality of the MAS because they ensure compliance with FIPA 
specifications, and also offer “plug and play” capabilities to the system by allowing 
new agents to automatically register their services and announce them to the other 
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agents in the system. This provides functionality to the MAS that is not “hard-wired” 
by the system developer, but is allowed to change as the system runs [114]. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: The MAS-based control approach on the case study SSEZ. 
  
 
 
    6.3.4.    Communication Links 
Data exchanges between agents include the exchange of control commands and mea-
surement data. The number of communication links required depends on the number 
and type of direct and indirect control agents present. In turn, these depend on:  
1. The direct control agents that need to be installed depend exclusively on the 
number and type of controllable customer-owned power system entities present. 
The network and phase location of a direct control agent does not have an impact 
on communication links because direct control agents do not send any control 
commands to other agents. They do, however, require two-way communication 
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links with the power system entity they are coupled with in order to receive real-
time measurement data and to send back control commands (“action execution”).  
2. The number and type of indirect control agents that need to be installed depend on 
the specific technical characteristics of the SSEZ (such as the number of cable 
“hot spots”, the number of network feeders for voltage unbalance and voltage 
regulation etc) but also on the SSEG penetration limits that may be accommodated 
before each LV distribution network constraint is encountered. If, through 
simulation studies, these are found to be too high for some network constraints 
under consideration, then their respective indirect control agent(s) may not be 
required thereby also minimising the need for installing new dedicated 
measurement devices.  
In addition, network location is important because indirect control agents must 
only send control commands to direct control agents that can help them to achieve 
their objectives. For example, a TLA responsible for protecting a specific cable 
section from thermal damage must only send control signals to the direct control 
agents that are located in that particular cable “hot spot”. 
 
The required data links for the agents of the case study SSEZ are shown in Figure 6.6 
and are also explained in greater detail in Section 6.7. 
1. The OGA and the TLA that is responsible for protecting the distribution 
transformer from thermal damage must be able to send control signals to all direct 
control agents located within the SSEZ. 
2. Each TLA, VRA and UA must have established command links with the direct 
control agents located on the particular feeder for which they are responsible. 
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3. Finally, the AMS and the DF are responsible for administrative duties within the 
MAS and therefore communication links with all direct and indirect control agents 
are required, in accordance with FIPA specifications [92]. 
 
The following points regarding communications are assumed for the case study SSEZ: 
1. Agent connectivity: A mechanism must exist for establishing a physical and 
logical connection between every installed customer-owned power system entity 
(SSEG, ESU or controllable consumer demand) and the direct control agent that 
controls this entity. As an example, a JAVA-based “Generator Agent” and an 
XML-RPC server have been employed in [128] in order to access generator data 
settings and working parameters from the inverter of the generator as shown in 
Figure 6.7. The XML-RPC is an Internet standard that encapsulates information 
under XML (eXtensible Markup Language) and uses HTTP (HyperText Transfer 
Protocol) as communications protocol.  
 
 
Figure 6.7: Control architecture used in [128] for connectivity between a JAVA-
based generator agent and an inverter-based SSEG. 
 
 
 
2. Syntactic and semantic interoperability: Understanding of the concepts contained 
within the data exchanged between system agents, power system entities and 
measurement devices is critical for the functionality of the control system. A 
common problem discussed in the literature when employing MAS technologies is 
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their proprietary nature which could limit communications among devices that do 
not have hardware and systems from the same vendor [46]. This could be 
achieved through the use of appropriate protocols and standards in order to 
achieve systems integration. As an example, OPC (OLE for Process Control 
where OLE stands for Object Linking and Embedding) server/clients are used in 
[127] in order to achieve this functionality.  
3. Network interoperability: An available long-range communications medium is 
required for communication purposes. In order to reduce costs and implementation 
times, existing communication infrastructure such as resi-dential broadband and 
the public Internet could be used (Figure 6.8) but issues regarding reliability and 
safety would also need to be taken into account. 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Agent communication links using broadband and the public Internet. 
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    6.4.   OPERATING STATES OF SYSTEM AGENTS 
 
In order to ensure that the LV distribution network constraints under consideration are 
overcome, the operation of direct and indirect control agents relies on general power 
systems control and operation theory described in [175]. Three operating states were 
identified in order to be implemented inside the functionality of the developed direct 
and indirect control agents: (i) normal; (ii) alert; and (iii) emergency state, as shown in 
Figure 6.9. In contrast to evaluating voltage and current profiles or allowable real and 
reactive power flows, there is not a standard or reference value for network losses in 
LV distribution networks. Hence, network losses are not taken into account when 
determining the operating states of system agents. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Flow chart of the proposed MAS-based control system. 
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     6.4.1.    Normal State 
If all agents are operating in their normal state, system voltages (for customer voltages 
Vi, voltage regulation Vreg,i and voltage unbalance %VUFi), currents Iij (for cable 
thermal limits) and apparent power flows Skt (for transformer thermal limits) are 
located within their desired operating limits. 
 
min_ max_desired desired
i i iV V V≤ ≤   where: i = 1, 2, …, Ncustomers                           (6.1) 
min_ max_
, , ,
desired desired
reg i reg i reg iV V V≤ ≤   where: i = 1, 2, … Nfeeders                 (6.2) 
max_% % desiredi iVUF VUF≤   where: i = 1, 2, … Nfeeders                           (6.3) 
,max_| | | |
line line
ij ij desiredI I≤   where: i, j = 1, 2, … Nnetwork_lines                          (6.4) 
,max_| | | | | | | |
t t t t
k k k k desiredS P j Q S= + ≤   where:  i = 1, 2, … Ntransformers       (6.5) 
 
The aim of the control system is to provide the individual active (P) and reactive (Q) 
power set-points for the customer-owned power system components (SSEGs, ESUs, 
controllable loads) in order to: 
1. Maximise the total SSEG active power output (PG) in the SSEZ: 
   
1
max ( )
GN
G Gi
i
P P
=
Δ = ∑                                           (6.6) 
where PGi is the active power output of the i-th SSEG and NG is the number of 
SSEGs within the SSEZ. 
This is achieved by ensuring that SSEGs are operating at their maximum power 
output and by avoiding unnecessary active generation curtailment. 
2. Minimise system losses in the SSEZ branches and the MV/LV windings of the 
distribution transformer(s). 
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1, 1 1
min ( )
tB NN
losses ij ij t t
i j k
P R I R I
= = =
Δ = +∑ ∑                         (6.7)  
where Iij Rij is the current and resistance between branches i and j; NB is the 
number of branches; It Rt is the current and resistance of the k-th MV/LV 
distribution transformer; and Nt is the number of transformers supplying the SSEZ 
(likely to be 1).  
Network loss reduction is achieved through reactive power flow minimisation as 
described in Section 5.1.1, while reduction in network losses through active 
power flow minimisation is only considered as an SSEZ operational goal (“self-
sufficiency”). 
 
During normal state, SSEGs are operated such that all their available active power is 
injected into the SSEZ, while their reactive power output is regulated based on local 
reactive power flow minimisation. This is only considered for cases, however, where 
the active power output remains unaffected. At the same time, Q injection (lagging 
power factor) or absorption (leading power factor) can not exceed existing regulation 
limits (0.95 leading to 0.95 lagging) as defined by [24] in the UK. Finally, the 
management of loads and ESUs during the normal state is only considered for cases 
where they can assist the SSEZ in order to meet an operational goal.  
 
An SSEZ only attempts to meet an operational goal if all system agents are operating 
in their normal state. If one or more system agents move into an alert state while the 
SSEZ is attempting to meet an operational goal, operation of system agents remains 
unchanged. If, however, one or more of the indirect control agents within the MAS 
enter their emergency state, the operational goal must be dropped in order to ensure 
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secure system operation which is the single most important requirement of the SSEZ. 
This is achieved by the relevant indirect control agent sending an ACL message to 
inform the OGA that the operational goal must be cancelled. 
 
 
 
     6.4.2.    Alert State 
If one or more of the system parameters (voltages, currents, power flows) that are 
being monitored in various locations within the SSEZ exceed their desired operating 
limits, the respective agents are said to be operating under the alert state. The aim of 
the control system is to provide the individual active (P) and reactive (Q) power set 
points for customer-owned power system components in order to restore the system 
back to its normal operating state.   
 
min_ min_permissible desired
i i iV V V≤ ≤  or  max_ max_desired permissiblei i iV V V≤ ≤ , 
where: i = 1, 2, …, Ncustomers                                           (6.8) 
min_ min_
, , ,
permissible desired
reg i reg i reg iV V V≤ ≤  or  max_ max_, , ,desired permissiblereg i reg i reg iV V V≤ ≤ , 
where: i = 1, 2, …, Nfeeders                                             (6.9) 
max_ max_% % %desired permissiblei i iVUF VUF VUF≤ ≤   where: i = 1, 2, … Nfeeders     (6.10) 
,max_ ,max_| | | | | |
line line line
ij desired ij ij permissibleI I I≤ ≤  where: i, j = 1, 2, … Nnetwork_lines   (6.11) 
,max_ ,max_| | | | | |
t t t
k desired k k permissibleS S S≤ ≤     where:  i = 1, 2, … Ntransformers          (6.12) 
 
In the event of exceeding the desired voltage rise or voltage regulation limits, GAs 
operating under the alert state firstly attempt to regulate the reactive power of their 
respective SSEGs in order to keep the steady-state voltage at the minimum desired 
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limit (Vimin_desired , Vregmin_desired) or the maximum desired limit (Vimax_desired , 
Vregmax_desired). SSEG reactive power support, however, is only considered for cases 
where the active power output of these units remains unaffected. At the same time, 
ESAs and CDAs operating under the alert state attempt to increase/reduce the load in 
the affected area by controlling the power consumption of their respective ESUs and 
controllable consumer demand. Traditionally, due to the relatively low X/R ratios of 
LV distribution networks, reactive power support has rarely been employed at the LV 
customer level [8]. Simulation results for LV distribution networks with high SSEG 
penetrations (Table 4.1), however, have shown that significantly higher SSEG 
volumes may be accommodated by changing the operating SSEG power factor from 
unity to 0.95 leading. Power factor control is considered in order to avoid active 
generation curtailment and hence maximise the total energy yield of the SSEGs.  
 
For voltage unbalance and cable and transformer thermal limits, simulation results 
(Tables 4.2 and 4.3) have shown that reactive power control is not a particularly 
effective mitigation strategy. Therefore, corrective actions are performed only through 
DSM and ESM schemes. In general, energy storage devices such as batteries and ultra 
capacitors are considered ideal for short term power requirements (seconds to 
minutes), but for longer term needs (such as minutes to hours) DSM of non-critical 
(“low-priority”) loads is preferred as a source or sink of reserve power. Curtailment or 
disconnection of critical loads is not performed during the alert state because it 
produces clear inconvenience to SSEZ customers and is therefore only considered 
during emergency system operation. 
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     6.4.3.    Emergency State 
The SSEZ is said to be operating under the emergency state if one or more of the 
system parameters have exceeded their maximum or minimum permissible operating 
limits, according to either statutory regulations (customer voltage rise/drop, voltage 
regulation and voltage unbalance) or equipment ratings (cable and transformer 
thermal limits).  
 
min_ permissible
i iV V≤  or  max_ permissiblei iV V≤      i = 1, 2, …, Ncustomers                 (6.13) 
min_
, ,
permissible
reg i reg iV V≤  or  max_, ,permissiblereg i reg iV V≤  where: i = 1, 2, …, Nfeeders  (6.14) 
max_% %permissiblei iVUF VUF≤   where i = 1, 2, … Nfeeders                           (6.15) 
,max_| | | |
line line
ij permissible ijI I≤  where: i, j = 1, 2, … Nnetwork_lines        (6.16) 
,max_| | | |
t t
k permissible kS S≤   where:  i = 1, 2, … Ntransformers                   (6.17) 
 
Under the emergency state, SSEGs are operated in active power regulation mode, 
whereby they reduce their scheduled active power output in order to bring the system 
back to the alert state. Active power curtailment, however, has important economic 
consequences as the SSEG owner loses part of its revenue which will have an impact 
on the SSEG payback time. If secure system operation can not be achieved due to 
technical reasons (i.e. due to the SSEG minimum stable power output being reached), 
disconnection of these units will be necessary. In that case, the MAS-based control 
system must also ensure that the disconnected SSEGs are brought back to service 
once normal system operation is resumed. 
 
A number of active power dispatch techniques have been proposed, such as: 
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1. Conventional reactive power/voltage (Q/V) and active power/frequency (P/f) 
droops or non-conventional active power/voltage (P/V) and reactive power/ 
frequency (Q/f) droops [176]. These droops are typically implemented in a purely 
distributed manner, with each SSEG/DG responsible for setting its individual P 
and Q set-points, and by using a number of voltage source inverters in parallel for 
redundancy [177]. 
2. Active power dispatch based on the “Last In First Off” (LIFO) policy [178], 
where the power output of new DGs/SSEGs in the system is typically constrained 
in intervals of 33%. 
3. Active power dispatch based on proportionality sharing policies that are typically 
derived from power flow sensitivity factors that relate the changes in distribution 
system power flows to DG/SSEG nodal power injections [179]. 
4. Active power dispatch based on optimisation criteria, such as: (i) fuel cost 
minimisation or profit maximisation; (ii) network losses minimisation; or (iii) 
emissions minimisation or renewable power generation maximisation [175].  
 
The applicability of different SSEG active power dispatch techniques within the SSEZ 
concept are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. 
 
 
 
    6.5.   AGENT REASONING 
 
FIPA standards govern the basics of agent architecture [92], as well as inter-agent 
message formats and protocols [120], but they do not specify how agents achieve their 
reasoning capabilities. For the MAS under consideration, the reasoning capabilities of 
system agents may be divided into two main categories: (i) reasoning about ACL 
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messages that agents are receiving from other agents within the MAS; and (ii) 
reasoning about inputs that agents are receiving directly from the SSEZ environment, 
i.e. values from the installed measurement devices within the SSEZ. Hence, system 
agents must be able to reason both about where the input is coming from, as well as 
about what the input is. The research described in this Thesis is concerned with 
responsive control, whereby control actions are based on reacting timely and 
appropriately to changes occurring in the SSEZ environment. 
 
Due to the potential number of direct control agents within the MAS, the processing 
time and power of the hardware entities where these agents are to be housed must be 
kept as low as possible, in order to also reduce the associated costs of employing a 
MAS-based control system. Thus, the reasoning capabilities of system agents must be 
kept as simple as possible, while at the same time ensuring that the SSEZ remains 
functional independent of the operating state. Moreover, system agents must be 
designed to operate with minimal human supervision, i.e. with a high degree of 
autonomy. This is due to the potential number of controllable entities that may exist 
within an SSEZ, as well as due to the nature of their incremental connection. 
 
 
 
     6.5.1.    Rule-based Reasoning 
Agent decision-making is performed according to the set of rules described in Section 
6.4, which are governed by the three agent operating states. The idea behind rule-
based reasoning is to represent knowledge of a particular environment in a form called 
“rules”. A rule consists of “if – then” statements, i.e. several premises and a 
conclusion; if all the premises are true, then the conclusion is also considered true. 
The rules for agent behaviour in the proposed MAS are shown in Table 6.2.  
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Condition If Then 
 
 
Customer over-voltage or 
under-voltage 
 
Voltage regulation issues 
 
Maximum voltage limits 
exceeded 
1. Reactive power support 
2. DSM & ESM 
3. SSEG active power  
    curtailment 
4. SSEG disconnection 
 
Minimum voltage limits 
exceeded 
1. Reactive power support 
2. DSM & ESM 
3. Load disconnection 
 
 
Voltage unbalance issues 
 
 
%VUF exceeded 
1. DSM & ESM 
2. SSEG active power  
    management 
3. SSEG or load  
    disconnection 
 
Cable and transformer 
thermal limits 
 
Thermal limits exceeded 
1. DSM & ESM 
2. SSEG active power  
    curtailment 
3. SSEG disconnection 
 
Operational goals 
 
An operational goal has 
been identified 
1. DSM & ESM 
2. SSEG active power  
    management 
 
 
 
 
Multiple control actions 
need to be taken simulta-
neously in the network 
 
 
Occurrence of conflicts 
 
 
 
 
Voltage limits and 
thermal limits exceeded 
1. Mitigate against voltage 
    issues. 
2. Mitigate against 
    thermal issues. 
 
Voltage unbalance and 
voltage rise / regulation 
limits exceeded 
1. Mitigate against voltage 
    rise issues. 
2. Mitigate against voltage 
    regulation issues. 
3. Mitigate against voltage 
    unbalance issues. 
Meeting an operational 
goal and overcoming 
network constraint(s) 
simultaneously 
1. Mitigate against  
     network constraint(s) 
2. Attempt to meet the 
     operational goal   
 
Table 6.2: Rules for agent behaviour in the proposed MAS. 
 
 
   
Execution of these decisions is performed through conventional feedback control 
loops. Action execution is adapted to the process through a continuous state 
assessment which monitors the difference between measured parameters and their 
predefined target values. Measurement data and agent control decisions must 
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therefore be updated in real-time or close to real-time which requires a fast and 
continuous feed of information to and from the system agents and the measurement 
devices within the SSEZ, which could present significant research challenges as will 
be described in Section 9.2.1. Implementation of action execution in the developed 
MAS is described in greater detail in Section 7.1.6. 
 
 
   
     6.5.2.    Conflict Resolution 
Under high SSEG penetration scenarios, customer voltage rise has been found to be 
the most likely limiting LV distribution network constraint in the case study SSEZ 
(Table 4.8). In order to ensure that customer voltages are maintained within statutory 
limits, active management of the connected SSEGs, ESUs and consumer loads will be 
required. As a result, it is possible that the other network constraints may not be 
encountered within the system. In the possibility of multiple network constraints 
being encountered simultaneously, however, or in the possibility of conflicting goals 
(Table 6.2), agent decision-making is based on the set of rules that is explained below. 
An example for the former is a case where both voltage rise and cable thermal limits 
are encountered. The second possibility might arise if a direct control agent receives 
conflicting messages from different indirect control agents.  
 
In both cases, issues associated with voltage control are given a higher priority 
compared to thermal limits issues. This is because in most distribution systems, 
system equipment (cables, lines and transformers) will not be critically damaged if 
their maximum current rating capacity has been exceeded by a small margin and for a 
short period of time. Additionally, each equipment manufacturer interprets maximum 
allowable current ratings slightly differently and DNOs adopt different loading 
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methodologies as detailed in their organisation specific sections of Engineering 
Recommendation G81 [180]. Hence, approximate figures are normally used for the 
maximum carrying capacity of cables, lines and transformers. For voltage control 
issues, however, common statutory regulations are employed in all UK LV 
distribution networks and adhering to these regulations is a higher priority for the 
control system.  
 
In addition, direct control agents always assume that control actions received from an 
OGA have a lower priority than control actions associated with overcoming a network 
constraint. This is because secure system operation is the single most important 
requirement of the proposed SSEZ control system. 
 
 
 
    6.6.   AGENT COORDINATION 
 
The SSEZ control system may be characterised as a collection of decision-making 
components (“agents”) with limited processing capabilities and where inter-
component communications must be kept as low as possible due to the potential 
number of these components. In a MAS domain with limited resources, i.e. where 
system agents only have a partial representation of the environment, coordination of 
agent activity is often necessary in order to satisfy the design goals of the MAS. In 
general, these goals may be achieved by either [93]: 
• Competition, where agents are self-interested and compete for resources. 
• Cooperation, where agent coordination is non-antagonistic. 
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Under the proposed MAS, agent coordination is achieved through cooperation of 
system agents. The system depends on fairness and on the truthfulness of agents, i.e. 
individual agents within the MAS do not lie in order to gain benefits compared to 
other agents. This type of agent behaviour is often termed as “good citizen” behaviour 
[93] and is suitable for the SSEZ concept where the overall goal is always given a 
higher priority compared to individual goals. 
 
Having defined all tasks in the system (Section 6.2), as well as the agents that are 
required to perform these tasks (Section 6.3), agent interactions within the MAS must 
also be identified. This includes the identification of the sequence of ACL messages 
required for agent communications, as well as the design of the common ontology 
used by agents to exchange information.  
 
 
 
     6.6.1.    Ontology Design 
Control tasks that involve inter-agent communications require agents that share the 
same ontology and use a common MTS in order for them to be able to request or 
provide the transfer of a resource. The MTS, along with the parameters required for 
inter-agent messaging, depend on the ADK that is employed and is explained in 
Section 7.1.4 in greater detail. Ontologies, however, depend on the specific tasks of 
each domain and thus a standard ontology for agent messaging does not exist [94]. It 
is necessary to design a specialised ontology for any individual MAS application in 
order to provide an adequate description of the environment such that it includes all 
concepts that may appear in conversations between system agents. The general 
requirement when designing an ontology is to keep it as simple as possible, while 
ensuring that the ontology is complete enough to allow agents to perform their tasks 
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[181]. This is a challenging task because the same domain can usually be expressed 
by means of several different sets of concepts and classes by individual MAS 
developers, i.e. by means of different ontologies.  
 
With the increasing popularity of FIPA-compliant MAS in the power industry 
(Section 3.4), greater integration between previously separate systems could be 
realised if the developed MAS were able to interoperate and share information. In 
order for this to occur, however, agents that belong to different agent communities 
would have to share the same standards for agent messaging and content grammar 
(such as FIPA-ACL and FIPA-SL [120]) and also use a common ontology. If they do 
not use the same ontology, they may be able to engage in conversations but these are 
unlikely to be productive because they would not be able to discuss about objects 
(such as for example a generator or an ESU) using the same concepts [94].  
 
According to research described in [94, 114-115], developing a large standardised 
ontology for power engineering applications would be impractical as it would not be 
specific enough to cover all possible interactions between agents. As a potential 
solution, the development of “bilingual agents” [94] was proposed in order to 
integrate agents that use different ontologies. In addition, FIPA have proposed the 
employment of “ontology agents” that provide ontology-related services to the MAS, 
such as maintaining a list of public ontologies and translating expressions between 
different ontologies [182]. As the number of supported ontologies increases, however, 
the development of ontology agents becomes more complicated due to the increasing 
number of mappings and translations that need to be created by the developer.   
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For this reason, the ontology of the MAS described in this Thesis only includes 
concepts and classes required by system agents for inter-agent messaging, i.e. whose 
instances have to be encoded inside the content of exchanged messages. If an agent 
provides a particular service, it only needs to understand messages related to that 
service. This supports the development of a distributed system where each agent only 
handles the required information. A potential limitation of this approach, however, is 
that any future additions to the ontology would not be understood by existing agents, 
as it does not provide or deal with the new concepts. 
 
The ontology design process was based on general recommendations from [181] and 
takes place in three main steps. The first requires the identification of the terms used 
in order to describe the main domain concepts, such as ‘Generator’, 
‘consumerDemand’, ‘energyStorageUnit’, ‘Transformer’ and ‘networkLine’. The next 
stage is to identify the classes describing these terms, as shown in Figure 6.10. All 
classes describing a domain concept must be included every time the resources of that 
concept need to be exchanged. For example, in order to describe a ‘Generator’ the 
‘generatorName’, ‘generatorNetworkLocation’, ‘generatorPhaseLocation’, 
‘generatorRating’ and ‘generatorType’ must all be specified. Finally, the attributes of 
each class need to be defined, i.e. the variables that describe each class. These are 
described in greater detail in Section 7.1.4 where the development of the ontology is 
explained and discussed. 
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Figure 6.10: The ontology for the MAS-based control of an SSEZ. 
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     6.6.2.    Agent Interactions 
During the MAS design stage, all agent interaction tasks were identified along with 
the sequence of agent messages required to perform these tasks. Hence, the ACL 
message parameters and their contents were determined for all inter-agent messages in 
order to design the agent message handlers for each task such that they conform to the 
FIPA interaction protocols [119]. As an example, Figure 6.11 shows the message 
sequence diagram for the voltage unbalance control task of the UA. 
 
 
Figure 6.11: Message sequence diagram for the voltage unbalance task of a UA. 
 
 
 
Having observed that the %VUF at the remote ends of an SSEZ feeder has exceeded 
its desired operating limits, the UA firstly sends a “query-ref” message with content 
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“Voltage_Unbalance” to the DF. The DF acts as a “yellow pages” and replies with an 
“inform” message to allow the UA to find out which direct control agents located on 
that particular feeder are able to mitigate this voltage unbalance. The UA then needs 
to identify the AIDs of these agents by interacting with the AMS. Having established 
their AIDs, the UA then sends “proposal” messages to these agents in order to: (i) 
control an SSEG in case of a GA; (ii) control an ESU in case of an ESA; or (iii) 
control a controllable customer load in case of a CDA.  
 
Depending on their availability, direct control agents respond with an “accept-
proposal” or a “reject-proposal” message to inform the UA that the submitted 
proposal has been accepted or rejected respectively. An agent may also respond with a 
“reject-proposal” in the event of conflicting goals or if a higher priority control action 
must firstly be taken, as explained in Section 6.5.2. In the event of a failure (such as a 
mechanical failure for example or loss of communications between the direct control 
agent and the entity it controls), or if the message is for whatever reason not 
understood, the agent responds with a “failure” or “not-understood” message 
accordingly. The process described above is repeated until the %VUF is brought back 
to its desired limits and secure system operation is restored.  
 
 
 
    6.7.   RELATIONAL DATABASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
 
Data management within the SSEZ control system is performed through the relational 
database management system (RDBMS), where the term RDBMS is used to describe 
the entire application supporting a database, including all server and client 
components. The RDBMS allows measurement data within the SSEZ to be stored and 
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retrieved by the relevant system agents in order to provide information regarding the 
current status of the SSEZ. This may allow system engineers to detect network events 
and evaluate the performance of the SSEZ. 
 
The inclusion of database agents within an MAS for information management 
applications and architectures was proposed in [79]. These agents are responsible for 
providing FIPA ACL-based access to the database and for distributing relevant data to 
system agents that query the database. The presence of database agents, however, for 
this particular MAS application would be challenging due to the potential number of 
databases (and thus database agents) that would exist. Therefore, direct and indirect 
control agents themselves are responsible for accessing and managing the data they 
require in order to achieve their design objectives.  
 
Section 6.7.1 describes the architecture of the proposed RDBMS, which consists of 
the following four types of databases: (i) an indirect control database where data for 
indirect control agents are stored; (ii) an SSEG database for each SSEG installed 
within the SSEZ; (iii) an ESU database for each ESU; and (iv) a consumer demand 
database for each controllable load. The different tasks performed by the RDBMS are 
explained in Section 6.7.2, while Section 6.7.3 describes the four different database 
types that exist within the RDBMS in greater detail. 
 
 
 
     6.7.1.    Architecture of the RDBMS 
In a typical industrial installation where data management is required, a machine with 
large amounts of disk space available is allocated as the database server. The RDBMS 
that supports it is installed on the same machine with a server application that handles 
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all requests of storing, updating and retrieving information. In addition, a database 
administrator is responsible for all administrative tasks within the server. The 
architecture for the RDBMS of an SSEZ is made up of the following databases: 
1. The indirect control database where data used by indirect control agents are 
stored. The indirect control database receives measurement data values from the 
following measurement devices located at strategic locations within the SSEZ: 
a. Three-phase voltage measurements at the LV busbars of the distribution 
substation, to be compared against the three-phase voltages at the remote 
ends of all SSEZ feeders.  
b. Three-phase voltage and phase angle measurements at the remote ends of 
the SSEZ feeders, to be used for calculating voltage unbalance factors. 
c. Three-phase real and reactive power flows at the PCC of the SSEZ with 
the distribution network, to be used for: (i) transformer thermal limits; (ii) 
to identify an operational goal depending on network conditions; and (iii) 
to ensure that an operational goal has been met. 
d. Single- or three-phase current flows at known “hot spots” to be used for 
ensuring that these cable sections have not exceeded their thermal limits. 
2. Several distributed databases, in accordance with the number of controllable 
customer-owned power system entities within the SSEZ. Each distributed 
database receives measurement data values from the entity it is coupled with and 
is also sending measurement data to the direct control agent that controls this 
entity. The following measurement data values must be extracted:  
a. Customer steady-state voltages, currents and phase angles, in order to 
ensure that statutory regulations [42] have not been exceeded and to ensure 
that reactive power flows are minimised thereby reducing network losses.  
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b. Real and reactive power inputs/outputs of the controllable customer-owned 
power system entities, to be used for assessing the operating status of these 
entities and for their coordinated management and control. 
 
The rationale for designing an RDBMS that also contains an indirect control database 
instead of one that is based on a purely distributed architecture is that indirect control 
agents require measurement data from locations where there are no direct control 
agents installed. The exception is voltage unbalance which could be mitigated using 
measurement data from existing distributed databases. However, if this data is 
unavailable, dedicated measurement devices would be required. The required data 
links for the agents of the case study SSEZ are shown in Figure 6.5 and were 
discussed in Section 6.5.2. Figure 6.5 can be updated to include the location of the 
required databases within the case study SSEZ, as seen in Figure 6.12.  
 
Figure 6.12: The MAS-based control approach and RDBMS on the case study SSEZ. 
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System agents may be located on the same or different APs, with all inter-agent 
communications and mechanisms for changing, adding or removing agents 
completely handled by the AP (Figure 6.4). Similarly, the databases of the RDBMS 
may be hosted on the same server if a common communications medium is employed. 
However, it is also possible that these databases are running separately. The 
advantages and disadvantages of each approach are discussed below: 
1. If all databases are hosted on the same server, the machine where the indirect 
control database is running could be allocated as the database server and could be 
positioned at the distribution substation level. In addition, the indirect control 
agents and the utility agents of the MAS could also be running on the same 
machine. A database administrator (i.e. the SSEZ system operator) would be 
responsible for administrative tasks within the server and could also keep a record 
of all distributed databases (and hence all controllable power system entities) that 
exist within the SSEZ. This could have the additional advantage of allowing direct 
control agents to know the network and phase location of the power system entity 
they are controlling. It should be noted, however, that real-time measurement data 
from the distributed databases are not to be updated in the indirect control 
database as that would be too heavy on communications due to the potential 
number of distributed databases that may exist. 
2. The second possibility would be for the distributed databases and the indirect 
control database to be running separately, without data exchange. The indirect 
control agents and the utility agents could still be running on the same machine as 
the indirect control database. The database administrator, however, would no 
longer be able to have a global view of the system and thus keeping a record of all 
customer-owned entities within the SSEZ would become more challenging.   
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     6.7.2.    Functionality of the RDBMS 
The RDBMS is running in parallel with the MAS, while a standard interface between 
agents and their respective databases must exist to allow for data exchange. The 
following tasks are performed by the RDBMS, which run at different timescales and 
which involve the transfer of different types of data within the SSEZ: 
1. Data acquisition: This functionality is similar to traditional SCADA systems 
employed in power distribution management systems. The RDBMS takes raw 
measurement data from measurement devices within the SSEZ and translates the 
data in the correct format to be used by system agents. This is because data 
management must be performed according to the global ontology employed.  
2. Data storage: The RDBMS stores measurement data values and all events detected 
by system agents as historical data. The required measurement data were 
described in Section 6.7.1, while event detection is associated with the LV 
network constraints under investigation: (i) customer voltage rise/drop; (ii) voltage 
regulation; (iii) voltage unbalance; (iv) cable and transformer thermal limits. For 
reasons explained in Section 6.4, network losses are not considered here. 
3. Data access and management: In order to minimise data exchange, only relevant 
data are transferred from the RDBMS to the appropriate system agents. Access to 
the indirect control database is provided only to indirect control agents who are 
able to query the database and retrieve appropriate stored data in order to achieve 
their design objectives. In addition, direct control agents act based on local 
information only, which is stored in each individual distributed database.  
4. User interaction: User interaction denotes the ability of the RDBMS to handle 
queries from users and to retrieve and display associated results. As an example, 
such queries could be used by system engineers in order to evaluate the 
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performance of the SSEZ in terms of (i) customer minutes lost; (ii) customer 
interruptions; and (iii) network losses, similar to traditional distribution network 
performance evaluation. 
 
 
 
     6.7.3.    Design of the RDBMS 
Database design for any application normally takes place in three main stages [183]:  
1. Firstly, the data to be stored in each database needs to be determined. This process 
requires knowledge of the specific SSEZ control requirements in order to extract 
the necessary information to be used by the direct and indirect control agents.  
2. The relationships between the different data elements need to be established in 
order to determine how these elements are related with each other. For a database 
that is coupled to a SSEG unit, for example, when the “real power output” of the 
SSEG remains the same but the “reactive power output” changes, the “operating 
power factor” needs to change accordingly. However, when both “real power 
output” and “reactive power output” change, it is not necessarily true that the 
“operating power factor” will change as well.   
3. Having determined the relationships between the different data elements, the 
required data for each database are then mapped into a table for each database that 
stores data in rows and columns.  
 
Tables B-1 to B-4 in Appendix B illustrate the four different types of databases that 
exist within the SSEZ: (i) an SSEG database that is coupled to a SSEG unit and the 
GA that controls it (Table B-1); (ii) a load database that is coupled to a controllable 
consumer demand and the CDA that controls it (Table B-2); (iii) an ESU database that 
is coupled to an ESU and the ESA that controls it (Table B-3); and (iv) an indirect 
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control database, which receives data from measurement devices within the SSEZ and 
is coupled to the indirect control agents (Table B-4). These databases comprise all the 
necessary information and measurement data required by system agents in order to 
achieve their design objectives. Two types of data are contained: 
1. Static data, whose values are fixed and do not change over time. 
2. Dynamic data, which are measurement data whose values are dynamically 
changing. 
In addition, some values (marked with * in the Tables below) are not dynamically 
updated, but may still change during the runtime of the database.  
 
 
 
    6.8.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
This Chapter described the design of the MAS-based control system for an SSEZ, 
with particular emphasis on the reasoning and communication capabilities of system 
agents. The design of the MAS was devised to enable diagnosis of system operating 
conditions (Section 6.4) and to provide the appropriate corrective actions to the 
customer-owned power system entities (SSEGs, ESUs and controllable loads) such 
that the specific control requirements of the SSEZ are met.  
 
The reasoning capabilities of system agents were kept as simple as possible, while at 
the same time ensuring that the SSEZ remains functional independent of the operating 
state. This was done in order to minimise the required processing time and power of 
the hardware entities where the agents are to be housed and thus also reduce their 
associated costs. In addition, system agents were designed to operate with minimal 
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human supervision due to the potential number of controllable entities that may exist 
within an SSEZ. 
 
Agent coordination was achieved through cooperation of system agents. The design of 
the required agent interactions included the identification of the sequence of ACL 
messages and the design of a common ontology for information and knowledge 
exchange. Ontology design (Section 6.6.2) only included concepts and classes 
required by system agents for inter-agent messaging, while the modeling of the 
identified agent interactions was described in Section 6.6.3.  
 
In addition to MAS design, the design of a Relational Database Management System 
(RDBMS) for an SSEZ was detailed in Section 6.7. The aim of the RDBMS is to 
allow measurement data within the SSEZ to be stored and retrieved by the relevant 
system agents. Four different types of databases were described in Section 6.7.3: (i) 
an SSEG database that is coupled to a SSEG unit and the GA that controls it; (ii) a 
load database that is coupled to a controllable consumer demand and the CDA that 
controls it; (iii) an ESU database that is coupled to an ESU and the ESA that controls 
it; and (iv) an indirect control database, which receives data from measurement 
devices within the SSEZ and is coupled to the indirect control agents. Data from these 
databases allow information to be provided regarding the operating status of the 
SSEZ, thereby enabling analyses of network events and network performance. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
SSEZ Control System Software  
Development 
 
 
 
 
 
This Chapter details the software development of the SSEZ control system that 
comprises of the MAS and the RDBMS that were described in Chapter 6. In order to 
achieve this, two main software packages were employed: (i) JADE, which is a 
middleware for the development of fully FIPA-compliant MAS; and (ii) MySQL, 
which is a software that can deliver fast, multi-threaded, multi-user and robust SQL 
(Structured Query Language) database servers for RDBMS.  
 
Section 7.1 provides an introduction to JADE and details the main reasons that make 
it particularly suitable for this application. The different services offered by system 
agents are described, along with the behaviours and event handling code that were 
implemented inside each agent. In JADE, agents communicate via asynchronous 
message passing and the implementation of inter-agent messaging is described in 
Section 7.1.4. Moreover, the development of a common ontology specific to the 
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active control of an SSEZ is detailed in Section 7.1.5 using two different pieces of 
software: Protégé, which is a JAVA-based open-source platform for the development 
of domain models and knowledge-based applications with ontologies; and the 
OntologyBeanGenerator plug-in, which is a Protégé Tab widget that generates Java 
files representing an ontology. Finally, Section 7.1.6 describes the implementation of 
the designed reasoning capabilities to system agents.  
 
Section 7.2 provides an introduction to MySQL along with the potential benefits that 
may be realised through its application based on the specific requirements and 
characteristics of the SSEZ environment. The development of the proposed RDBMS 
is detailed in Section 7.2.2 and is based on two common tools offered by MySQL: (i) 
the MySQL command line client tool which allows MySQL client programs to be 
invoked from the command line; and (ii) the MySQL Administrator which contains a 
graphical user interface to assist the user in system development. Finally, connectivity 
between the agents within the MAS and the developed databases is achieved through 
Java DataBase Connectivity (JDBC), which is the industry standard for interface 
between applications developed using the Java programming language and a wide 
range of databases. 
 
A block diagram showing the different software tools that were employed for the 
development of the SSEZ control system, along with their interfaces, is shown in 
Figure 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1: SSEZ control system software development. 
 
 
 
    7.1.   JADE – JAVA AGENT DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 
 
JADE is a software framework for the development of fully FIPA-compliant MAS 
[102-103]. It simplifies MAS implementation through a middleware that complies 
with FIPA specifications and through a set of graphical tools that supports the 
debugging and deployment phases. JADE is implemented in Java language and is 
made of various Java packages, giving MAS developers “both ready-made pieces of 
functionality and abstract interfaces for custom, application dependent tasks” [184]. 
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The JADE Agent Platform complies with FIPA specifications to provide 
interoperability not only in the platform architectural design (Figure 3.4), but also in 
the communication infrastructures (Figure 3.5). It includes all mandatory components 
that manage the agent platform, i.e. the agent communication channel, as well as the 
AMS and the DF. All agent communications are performed through message passing, 
where FIPA ACL [119] is the language to represent messages. The AP can be 
distributed on several hosts. Only one Java application, and therefore only one Java 
Virtual Machine (JVM), is executed on each host. Each JVM is basically a container 
of agents that provides a complete run time environment for agent execution and 
allows several agents to concurrently execute on the same host.  
 
A MAS application using JADE is typically composed by one or several containers 
running on several distributed machines which may be running under different 
operating systems. The first container is the main container which maintains a central 
registry of all others so that agents can discover and interact with each other (Figure 
7.4). The overall MAS is then monitored and managed using the JADE remote agent 
management Graphical User Interface (GUI) [102-103]. 
 
Similarly, the MAS for the control of an SSEZ may be composed of one or several 
run-time containers launched on several hosts within an accessible long-range 
communication medium, such as for example the Internet. The hardware devices 
where direct and indirect control agents are running, such as industrial PCs, may each 
execute one JVM, and their operation would be comparable to the IEDs that are 
commonly employed for power distribution network control (Section 2.3.3). The 
hardware devices that are coupled to the customer-owned controllable power system 
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entities would host the direct control agents controlling these entities, while the 
hardware devices that are located at the distribution substation level would host the 
indirect control agents and the utility agents. Depending on the computing and 
communication resources available, the latter could also be achieved by using only 
one machine where utility and indirect control agents could be running. 
 
 
 
     7.1.1.    Why JADE? 
The reasons that make JADE suitable for industrial applications, and in particular for 
distributed real-time industrial applications, were described in detail in [94] and [102-
103]. According to [94], the four key requirements for selecting an ADK (Agent 
Development Kit) may be summarised as follows: 
1. Robustness: the AP must be able to run indefinitely without memory leaks or 
crashes, in order to ensure reliability and robustness. 
2. Standards support: the AP must provide interoperability with FIPA standards and 
protocols for reasons explained in Section 4.3.1. 
3. Flexibility of agent deployment: the ADK must provide mechanisms for 
modifying the agents launched at system start-up, as well as for adding/removing 
agents in order to deal with changing operating conditions. 
4. Active developers and community support: a large and active community of users 
is desirable in the event that developers require support as well as to ensure that 
the ADK is continuously updated and improved. 
 
JADE was selected because it was found to meet all these requirements: 
1. Robustness: A number of demonstration research projects [94, 114-115, 125-128, 
142-143] have provided evidence for the reliability and robustness of JADE 
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agents. In addition, supplementary support tools were designed and developed 
[185] in order to “provide the ability to keep agent systems up 24/7 and facilitate 
the management of what could be thousands of agents”.  
2. Standards support: JADE ensures full FIPA-compliance through a set of system 
services and utility agents in compliance with FIPA specifications [92]: white-
page (AMS) and yellow-page (DF) services, message transport and parsing 
service and a library of FIPA interaction protocols [118-120]. 
3. Flexibility of agent deployment: JADE allows the deployment of new agents 
while the AP is running, which means that agents are able to enter the system 
without the need to stop and restart the other agents [103]. This may be done 
either to replace existing agents with improved ones, or to add new agents in order 
to provide new services and functionalities. Moreover, JADE provides simple 
mechanisms for distributing agents on different hosts, which in a real-world 
application may allows some agents to run on-site and some off-site.  
4. Active developers and community support: JADE is currently the most widely 
used ADK [114-115] and is supported by a large and active community of users. 
This improves and simplifies MAS development by ensuring that support may be 
readily available, while also ensuring that developers remain up to date with 
standards, features, and bug fixes. 
 
 
 
     7.1.2.    Agent Services 
The functionality and openness of the MAS largely depends on the “white-” and 
“yellow-page” services offered by the AMS and DF utility agents respectively. Table 
7.1 shows a list of the services that were implemented along with a brief description. 
As it can be seen from the table, direct control agents are responsible for most of the 
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services because they are responsible for performing the tasks delegated to them by 
indirect control agents, but they are also responsible for: (i) maintaining steady-state 
customer voltages within statutory limits; and (ii) minimising reactive power flows 
within the SSEZ and thereby also reducing network load losses. 
 
Service Responsible Agents Description 
White_pages AMS The AMS maintains a directory of all 
registered agents within the system.   
Yellow_pages DF The DF enables system agents to 
dynamically discover the services 
offered by other agents in the system. 
Voltage_Regulation VRA, GA,  
CDA, ESA 
The VRA employs the services of the 
direct control agents in order to 
mitigate excessive rise or drop in 
voltage regulation. 
Voltage_Unbalance UA, GA,  
CDA, ESA 
The UA employs the services of the 
direct control agents in order to 
control excessive voltage unbalance. 
Cable_Thermal_Limits TLA, GA,  
CDA, ESA 
The TLA employs the services of the 
direct control agents in order to 
protect a network line from thermal 
damage. 
Transformer_Thermal_ 
Limits 
TLA, GA,  
CDA, ESA 
The TLA employs the services of the 
direct control agents in order to 
protect the distribution transformer(s) 
supplying the SSEZ from thermal 
damage. 
Operational_Goals OGA, GA,  
CDA, ESA 
The OGA employs the services of the 
direct control agents in order to meet 
a specified operational goal. 
Direct_Control GA, ESA, CDA Under the Direct_Control service, 
direct control agents are responsible 
for keeping customer voltages within 
specific operating limits, and also for 
minimising active network losses 
based on power factor correction.  
 
Table 7.1: Services offered by system agents within the developed MAS. 
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An important point to note is that, as demonstrated through simulation results in 
Chapter 4, the network and phase location of the customer-owned power system 
entities to be controlled play an important role in order to overcome the LV 
distribution network constraints under investigation. Thus, it is crucial that indirect 
control agents employ the services of the direct control agents that are located on the 
relevant network line and/or connection phase with respect to the identified LV 
distribution network constraint. This may be achieved by dividing a particular indirect 
control service (for example “Voltage_Regulation”) into several sub-services (for 
example “Voltage_Regulation-1”, “Voltage_Regulation-2”, etc.) and then registering 
the relevant direct control agents that are able to overcome the identified network 
constraint. However, this assumes that information with regards the network and 
phase location of all customer-owned power system entities within the SSEZ is 
known. Subject to the agreement of the local DNO, this information could be 
provided through the use of an RDBMS as described in Section 6.7.1.  
 
 
 
     7.1.3.    Inter-agent Messaging 
FIPA standards govern the framework within which FIPA agents exist and operate 
(Section 4.4), but also the formats and protocols [118-120] to be used for inter-agent 
messaging. In JADE, agents communicate via asynchronous message passing which 
allows them to carry out tasks without having to wait for messages from other agents. 
Messages are retrieved from a queue of messages and may be selected by the agent 
according to the agent’s priority. Messages are providing a transport envelope that 
comprises the set of parameters detailing, for example, to whom the message is to be 
sent. The general structure of a FIPA-compliant message is depicted in Figure 7.2. 
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Figure 7.2: FIPA message structure. 
 
 
 
The core of inter-agent messaging is the content of the ACL message, which may 
contain one or more message parameters. A list of all FIPA ACL message parameters 
is given in Table C-2 in the Appendix. According to [118], the only mandatory 
parameter in all ACL messages is the performative, although it is expected that most 
ACL messages will also contain sender, receiver and content parameters. A list of the 
most commonly used performatives is shown in Table C-3 in the Appendix.  
 
 
 
     7.1.4.    Ontology 
JADE allows the creation of application-specific ontologies, independent of the 
adopted content language. This is because the code that implements the ontology and 
the code that sends and receives messages do not depend on the adopted content 
language [103]. JADE provides three ways to implement inter-agent communications: 
1. The first and simplest way uses strings to represent the content of agent messages. 
This is appropriate when the content of agent messages is atomic data, but not for 
abstract concepts, objects or structured data.  
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2. In the second way, Serialised Java objects may be sent directly as the content of 
agent messages. This is a popular method for local applications where all agents 
are implemented in Java programming language. 
3. The third method requires the definition of the transmitted ontology objects as 
extension of predefined classes so that JADE can encode and decode messages in 
a standard FIPA format. This may allow the agents implemented in JADE to be 
able to interoperate with other agent communities. 
The ontology described in Section 6.6.1 was developed according to FIPA 
specifications [182]. These require the developed ontology to be composed of two 
parts: (i) a vocabulary that describes all the concepts used by agents; and (ii) the 
relationships between these concepts must also be specified. As an example, the 
following scenario may be considered: a UA (e.g. UA-2) attempts to request from a 
GA (e.g. GA-12) to curtail its active power output in order to restore voltage 
unbalance in a SSEZ feeder. The content of the message must include the AID of the 
agent that is requested to perform this task (i.e. GA-12), as well as a descriptor that 
determines the action to be performed (i.e. “realPowerOutReduction”).  
 
In order to develop an ontology using JADE, the Ontology class predefined in JADE 
must be extended and the following set of interfaces must be added specific to the 
application domain: (i) Concepts; (ii) AgentActions; (iii) Predicates; and (iv) AIDs 
(Agent IDentifiers).  
1. Concepts model domain concepts, such as SSEGs, ESUs, loads, transformers and 
network lines, as seen in Figure 6.10. As an example, an SSEG unit using the 
developed ontology may be described as follows: 
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(Generator : generatorName “GA-13” : generatorType: “WindTurbine” : 
generatorRating “1.5kW” : generatorNetworkLocation “node_5” : 
generatorPhaseLocation “phase_A”) 
2. An AgentAction is a special type of concept that indicates actions that can be 
performed by some agents, e.g. 
(realPowerOutReduction (Generator : generatorName “GA-13”)) 
3. Predicates are expressions that specify concept relationships, and there are two 
types of predicates: (i) directControlAgent; and (ii) indirectControlAgent, e.g. 
(directControlAgent (Generator : generatorName “GA-13”)) 
4. Finally, AIDs indicate the agents that perform the requested actions.  
 
The designed ontology was implemented using two software tools: (i) Protégé [186], 
which is a JAVA-based open-source platform for the development of domain models 
and knowledge-based applications with ontologies; and (ii) the 
OntologyBeanGenerator plug-in [187], which is a Protégé Tab widget that generates 
Java files representing an ontology. The OntologyBeanGenerator plug-in uses the 
BeanOntology class [188] to simplify the ontology development process by allowing 
the developer to create the ontological classes (“beans”) representing the concepts, 
agent actions and predicates relevant to the addressed domain and add them to the 
MAS ontology class by means of the Protégé GUI [186].  
 
Figure 7.3 shows an excerpt of the designed ontology class hierarchy that has been 
implemented using the Protégé GUI and the OntologyBeanGenerator plug-in. Figure 
7.3(a) illustrates the AgentActions in detail, while Figure 7.3(b) details the 
consumerDemand, energyStorageUnit, Generator, networkLine and Transformer 
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concepts of the SSEZ ontology. The ontology model of Protégé consists of classes, 
slots and slot facets. Classes are concepts which correspond to objects, or types of 
objects, in the domain. In the SSEZ ontology classes include all concepts, agent 
actions, predicates and AIDs.  
 
                                 
(a)                                                                (b) 
 
Figure 7.3: The AgentActions (a) and Concepts (b) of the developed ontology. 
 
 
In addition, classes have attributes and relations between them, such as the name, the 
type, the rating and the location of a generator. In Protégé, class attributes and 
relations such as those seen in Figure 7.3(b) are described using slots. Slots have 
properties, for example generatorRating is a number (i.e. a Float class) which must 
always have a positive value. Having created the Java files that describe the Concepts, 
AgentActions, Predicates and AIDs of the SSEZ ontology, these files may then be 
directly imported into the agents of the developed MAS. 
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     7.1.5.    Agent Reasoning 
As mentioned in Section 6.5, FIPA standards govern the basics of agent architecture 
[92], as well as inter-agent message formats and protocols [120], but they do not 
specify how agents achieve their reasoning capabilities. This is an important 
characteristic of MAS that distinguishes it from classical distributed control 
techniques and allows the software written for each agent to encompass its own level 
of intelligence [96]. The decision-making capabilities of an agent are then determined 
in accordance with this intelligence.  
 
Under the developed MAS, agent decision-making is performed based on the set of 
rules for agent behaviour shown in Table 6.2. These rules have been adopted for all 
direct and indirect control agents using simple “if-then” statements. Action execution 
is adapted to the process through a continuous state assessment which dynamically 
monitors the difference between the measured parameters for each agent (such as 
voltages, currents and power flows) and their predefined target values. These target 
values are based on either statutory regulations (for customer voltages, voltage 
regulation and voltage unbalance) or equipment ratings (for cable and transformer 
thermal limits).  
 
Feedback control is achieved using “while” statements that continuously test an 
expression (such as if the measured customer steady-state voltage is higher than the 
statutory limit of 253V) and executing the expression’s block until the expression 
evaluates to false (in this case, for example, to curtail the real power output of a 
connected SSEG). For the purposes of this research, it is assumed that measurement 
data and agent control decisions are updated in real-time or close to real-time which 
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would require a fast and continuous feed of information to and from the system agents 
and the measurement devices within the SSEZ. 
 
The following methods are employed by direct and indirect control agents for the 
management of the connected SSEGs, ESUs and controllable loads within the SSEZ, 
as shown in Table 7.2: (i) realPowerOutReduction; (ii) realPowerOutIncrease; (iii) 
reactivePowerOutReduction; (iv) reactivePowerOutIncrease; (v) realPowerIn-
Reduction; (vi) realPowerInIncrease; (vii) reactivePowerInReduction; (viii) 
reactivePowerInIncrease; (ix) loadRescheduling;  (x) deviceDisconnection; and (xi) 
deviceReconnection. For reasons explained in Section 6.4, reactive power support is 
only considered for voltage management and network loss reduction purposes within 
the SSEZ and is performed by SSEGs and ESUs only.  
 
Moreover, loadRescheduling, deviceDisconnection and deviceReconnection are sent 
by system agents as single commands and therefore feedback control loops are not 
employed for their execution. The other nine methods, however, are continuously 
running when selected until the measured parameter reaches its predefined target 
value. If this can not be achieved using the originally selected command (for example 
if reactive power support does not bring the local steady-state voltage back to its 
desired limits), the subsequent control command will be selected by the agent 
according to Table 6.2. The implementation of the agent reasoning capabilities, along 
with the different active and reactive power dispatch techniques that have been 
investigated, are examined in Chapter 8 in greater detail.  
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Command Responsible Agents Description 
realPowerOutReduction GA, ESA, and all 
indirect control agents
Reduction in the real power 
output of a SSEG or ESU. 
realPowerOutIncrease GA, ESA, and all 
indirect control agents
Increase in the real power output 
of a SSEG or ESU. 
reactivePowerOutReduction GA, ESA, UA, VRA Reduction in the reactive power 
output of a SSEG or ESU. 
reactivePowerOutIncrease GA, ESA, UA, VRA Increase in the reactive power 
output of a SSEG or ESU. 
realPowerInReduction CDA, ESA, and all 
indirect control agents
Reduction in the real power 
input of a load or ESU. 
realPowerInIncrease CDA, ESA, and all 
indirect control agents
Increase in the real power input 
of a load or ESU. 
reactivePowerInReduction GA, ESA, UA, VRA Reduction in the reactive power 
input of a SSEG or ESU. 
reactivePowerInIncrease GA, ESA, UA, VRA Increase in the reactive power 
input of a SSEG or ESU. 
loadRescheduling CDA and all indirect 
control agents 
Rescheduling the operation of a 
load for a specified time. 
deviceDisconnection GA, ESA, CDA, UA, 
TLA, VRA 
Disconnection of a SSEG, ESU 
or load. 
deviceReconnection GA, ESA, CDA, UA, 
TLA, VRA 
Reconnection of a SSEG, ESU 
or load. 
 
Table 7.2: The different commands exchanged by system agents for action execution 
within the developed MAS. 
 
 
 
    7.2.   MYSQL 
 
MySQL is one of the most popular open source software available for the 
development of fast, multi-user and robust SQL-based relational database 
management systems (RDBMS) [189]. SQL is a standard database programming 
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language designed for providing access and managing data in RDBMS. The term 
RDBMS was used in Section 6.7 in order to describe the entire application supporting 
a database, including all server and client components. A relational model is the basis 
for any RDBMS and is composed of three main elements: (i) a collection of objects or 
relations in tabular form, with each table consisting of a set of rows and columns; (ii) 
relational operators that can manipulate the data in tabular form; and (iii) data 
integrity methods [183]. MySQL provides all three elements by running as a server 
that provides multi-user access to a central database or several distributed databases. 
 
MySQL is used as the RDBMS of choice for a wide range of applications, and in 
particular for Internet applications, because it can provide similar functionalities to 
those provided by most commercial RDBMSs [190]. MySQL has a rich feature set, as 
will be described in Section 8.2.1, but is also considered easy to install and administer 
and requires little maintenance other than adding or modifying user permissions and 
creating, updating or removing databases [183]. 
 
 
 
     7.2.1.    Why MySQL? 
Similarly to selecting the most appropriate control approach for an SSEZ (Chapter 5), 
the choice for the adopted RDBMS should be driven by the specific requirements and 
characteristics of the SSEZ environment. The feature set of MySQL is described in 
detail in [190]. A number of the core features offered by MySQL fit particularly well 
with the requirements and characteristics of the SSEZ environment, in particular: 
1. Scalability: Because of its modularity and flexibility in configuration, MySQL is 
employed to systems varying in size from small embedded systems to systems 
hosting databases with millions of records. This feature of MySQL is important 
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because the proposed RDBMS will contain both types, with a small distributed 
database embedded within each controllable power system entity installed by 
SSEZ customers and one large database containing data regarding the operation of 
the overall SSEZ. 
2. Portability: A MySQL database may run on all popular operating systems such as 
Unix, Linux, Windows, Solaris, MacOS X etc. This is important because the 
hardware entities where direct and indirect control agents are running may use 
different operating systems and thus the operation of system databases should 
remain unaffected. 
3. Speed: MySQL is considered to be one of the fastest RDBMSs currently available 
[190]. Speed of operation for storing, updating, querying and retrieving data is 
crucial for the functionality of the developed control system, both in order to 
overcome the LV distribution networks constraints under consideration as well as 
to meet an operational goal. However, the overall speed of operation will also 
depend on: (i) the time it takes for the database to acquire the raw data from the 
measurement devices within the SSEZ; and also (ii) on the communications 
between agents and (iii) between agents and the customer-owned power system 
entities. The first factor will depend on the interface and communications medium 
between the SSEZ databases and the customer-owned power system entities, the 
second factor will depend on the MAS development kit and on the 
communications medium used, while the last factor will depend on the interface 
and communications medium between the MAS and the customer-owned power 
system entities.  
4. Access from other languages/systems: Due to MySQL’s popularity, a number of 
tools exist for connecting to MySQL from Java, C/C++, Perl, PHP, ODBC and 
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other languages and systems. Because most MAS development kits are 
implemented using the Java programming language (Section 4.4.2), MySQL 
becomes a particularly attractive option due to an application programming 
interface called Java DataBase Connectivity (JDBC). JDBC provides methods for 
querying and updating data in a database using Java and is described in greater 
detail in Section 7.2.2.3. 
5. Robustness and security: MySQL is considered to be one of the most robust open 
source RDBMS available [190]. However, robustness will also depend on the 
stability of the operating system that the MySQL server is running on, with 
different implementations of MySQL achieving different degrees of robustness 
[190]. In addition, system security is crucial in order to prevent unauthorised 
modification or retrieval of data. MySQL allows the restriction of users’ rights 
from a database based on login name, password and the hostname that users are 
connected from. This could be particularly important for the DBMS application 
for an SSEZ, where large numbers of customers will be connected to the system 
and thus partitioning of responsibilities and capabilities of different users will be 
necessary. 
 
 
 
     7.2.2.    Developing the RDBMS 
The software development of the RDBMS that was described in Section 6.7.3 is 
detailed here. As mentioned in Section 6.7.3, the proposed RDBMS is made up of 
four different types of databases: (i) an SSEG database that is coupled to a SSEG unit 
and the GA that controls it (Table B-1 in the Appendix); (ii) a load database that is 
coupled to a controllable consumer demand and the CDA that controls it (Table B-2); 
(iii) an ESU database that is coupled to an ESU and the ESA that controls it (Table B-
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3); and (iv) an indirect control database, which receives data from measurement 
devices within the SSEZ and is coupled to the indirect control agents (Table B-4). 
 
Two different tools provided by MySQL may be deployed: (i) the MySQL command 
line client tool [191] which allows MySQL client programs to be invoked from the 
command line; and (ii) the MySQL Administrator [192] which contains a GUI to 
assist the user when developing the database. Both tools perform similar 
administrative tasks, such as configuring, monitoring, starting and stopping MySQL 
servers, managing users and connections and other administrative tasks [190]. 
However, each tool has its own advantages and disadvantages: the MySQL command 
line client tool is very fast, but requires large amounts of typing in order to execute 
queries, to insert, update and retrieve data etc which slows down the overall 
programming time. At the same time, the MySQL Administrator is more user-friendly 
and also provides an overview of the settings that are crucial for the performance, 
reliability, and security of MySQL servers, but may execute slower than the MySQL 
command line client [190].  
 
Specific examples for the four different types of databases described in Section 6.7.3 
have been implemented and interfaced with the relevant agents of the developed MAS 
using the Java DataBase Connectivity (JDBC) tool as will be described in Section 
7.2.3. Table 7.3 illustrates a snapshot of a database that is coupled to a controllable 
consumer demand and the CDA that controls it. 
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+-------------------------------------+-----------------+ 
| data_type                           | value           | 
+-------------------------------------+-----------------+ 
| network_location                    | feeder_12       |  
| phase_location                      | phase_A         |  
| load_type                           | reshiftable     |  
| grid_dep_operation                  | yes             | 
| real_power_rating                   | 3.0kW           |  
| current_real_power_input            | 0.0kW           | 
| current_reactive_power_input        | 0.0kVAr         | 
| current_operating_pf                | 0.0             | 
| control_steps                       | 0               | 
| minimum_outage_time                 | 40m:00s         | 
| maximum_outage_time                 | 70m:00s         | 
| lead_time                           | 30s             | 
| activation_signal                   | control         | 
| date                                | 10-10-2008      | 
| time                                | 22h:56m:00s     | 
| start_date                          | 10-10-2008      | 
| start_time                          | 23h:00m:00s     | 
| duration                            | 60m:00s         | 
| lower_normal_state_voltage_limit    | 225.0V          |  
| upper_normal_state_voltage_limit    | 235.0V          |  
| lower_alert_state_voltage_limit     | 216.2V          |  
| upper_alert_state_voltage_limit     | 253.0V          |  
| lower_emergency_state_voltage_limit | 207.0V          |  
| upper_emergency_state_voltage_limit | 264.0V          |  
| current_steadystate_voltage         | 233.5V          | 
| current_operating_state             | normal          |  
| lower_frequency_limit               | 49.5Hz          |  
| upper_frequency_limit               | 50.5Hz          |  
| current_operating_frequency         | 50.0Hz          |         
+---------------------------+---------------------------+ 
 
Table 7.3: Database developed in MySQL for a controllable consumer demand that is 
coupled with the CDA that controls it. 
 
 
 
Moreover, the MySQL Administrator tool may be used by the system administrator to 
provide an overview of the databases running within the DBMS, particularly so if the 
databases that are interfaced to the customer-owned power system entities are also 
hosted on the same server. As an example, Figure 7.4 shows a list of SSEG databases 
(“ssegdb”) that have been registered and running on a MySQL server entitled 
“inputs”. This list may be updated periodically and provides information to the system 
administrator with regards the addition or removal of SSEGs to the system, as well as 
their technical characteristics (the “static” data from Table B-1 in the Appendix).  
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Figure 7.4: Using the MySQL Administrator in order to provide an overview of the 
databases running within the developed DBMS. 
 
 
 
 
     7.2.3    Java DataBase Connectivity - JDBC  
Having designed and developed the databases to be used for the RDBMS, the next 
issue concerns how system agents can have access to these databases. JDBC is the 
industry standard for interface between applications developed using the Java 
programming language and a wide range of databases – SQL databases and other 
tabular data sources, such as spreadsheets or flat files [193]. It allows Java 
applications to query, update and retrieve data from database servers in a portable 
way: having installed a driver for a given server engine, JDBC applications may then 
communicate with any server of that type. The JDBC specifications [194] define the 
interfaces and classes required for any Java application to interface with an underlying 
database and they are based on the commands of the SQL programming language.  
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In order for a Java application to access a database developed using MySQL, a JDBC 
driver called MySQL Connector/J [195] is typically used. The driver is pure-Java 
implementation of the MySQL protocol and does not rely on the MySQL client 
libraries. Figure C-1 in the Appendix illustrates the code for an agent which registers 
in an input database and then checks the value for the current flow in a line segment. 
If this value is higher than a particular limit, the agent instructs the relevant GAs to 
curtail their real power output in order to reduce this current flow.  
 
 
 
    7.3.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
This Chapter described the software development of the SSEZ control system that 
comprises of the MAS and the RDBMS that have been presented in Chapter 6. JADE 
[102-103] was used for implementing the MAS for reasons explained in Section 7.1.1. 
Moreover, the development of a common ontology specific to the active control of an 
SSEZ is detailed in Section 7.1.5 using two different pieces of software: Protégé [186] 
and the OntologyBeanGenerator plug-in [187]. The development of the RDBMS is 
detailed in Section 7.2.2 and is based on two common tools offered by MySQL: (i) the 
MySQL command line client tool [191] and the MySQL Administrator [192]. Finally, 
connectivity between the agents within the MAS and the developed databases is 
achieved through Java DataBase Connectivity (JDBC) [193], which is the industry 
standard for interface between applications developed using the Java programming 
language and a wide range of databases. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
Evaluation of the SSEZ Control   
System 
 
 
 
 
 
The previous two Chapters discussed the design and software development of the 
proposed MAS-based control system. In this Chapter, various evaluation scenarios are 
outlined in order to assess the operation of the developed control system on the case 
study SSEZ. The aim is to evaluate its performance based on the specific SSEZ 
control requirements (Section 5.1), and to identify the main strengths and weaknesses 
that are offered by this particular distribution network control paradigm. In addition to 
the software tools described in Chapter 7, PSCAD/EMTDC is used for modelling the 
case study SSEZ as described in Section 4.3.  
 
The evaluation process that has been employed is shown in Figure 8.1. Detailed 
communication issues, such as time delays between inter-agent communications, 
agent-to-database communications, or between direct control agents and the 
customer-owned power system entities have not been taken into account when 
evaluating the functionality of the developed control system. The rationale behind this 
is that these issues will depend on the specific implementation characteristics of the 
control system, i.e. on the software and hardware devices as well as the data rate of 
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the communications medium used, and as such they were considered to be outside the 
scopes of this Thesis. 
 
 
Figure 8.1: The evaluation process of the developed control system. 
    8.1.   POWER SYSTEMS EVALUATION 
 
The case study SSEZ described in Section 6.1 is used for evaluating the functionality 
of the developed control system. The case study SSEZ under a passive control 
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approach is shown in Figure 8.2 and is based on the UK generic LV distribution 
network model presented in Section 4.2.1. Each customer is assumed to have installed 
a single-phase SSEG with a rating of 2.5kW, a controllable consumer demand 
attributing to 1kW and it is also assumed that 10% of the customers have installed an 
ESU capable of a continuous power input/output of 5kW. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: The case study SSEZ under a passive control approach. 
 
 
 
Table 8.1 illustrates the assumed limits for the operating parameters of the case study 
SSEZ. Voltage profiles and real and reactive power flows within the SSEZ feeders are 
a function of the real and reactive power input/output of the installed SSEGs, ESUs 
and controllable and uncontrollable consumer demands as shown in Equation 5.1. 
C
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e   Lower normal state customer voltage limit 220.0 V 
  Upper normal state customer voltage limit 250.0 V 
  Lower alert state customer voltage limit 216.2 V 
  Upper alert state customer voltage limit 253.0 V 
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  Lower emergency state customer voltage limit 207.0 V 
  Upper emergency state customer voltage limit 264.0 V 
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   Upper normal state current flow limits 280.0 A 
  Upper alert state current flow limits 320.0 A 
  Upper emergency state current flow limits 355.0 A 
Tr
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fo
rm
er
 
Li
m
its
   Upper normal state apparent power flow limit 420.0 kVA 
  Upper alert state apparent power flow limit 460.0 kVA 
  Upper emergency state apparent power flow limit 500.0 kVA 
V
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  Upper normal state %VUF limit 0.8% 
  Upper alert state %VUF limit 1.0% 
  Upper emergency state %VUF limit 1.3% 
V
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eg
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  Lower normal state voltage regulation limit -4.0% 
  Upper normal state voltage regulation limit +4.0% 
  Lower alert state voltage regulation limit -4.5% 
  Upper alert state voltage regulation limit +4.5% 
  Lower emergency state voltage regulation limit -5.0% 
  Upper emergency state voltage regulation limit +5.0% 
 
Table 8.1: Limits for the operating parameters of the case study SSEZ. 
 
 
 
In order to implement an appropriate control strategy, it is therefore necessary to 
determine the capability for active and reactive power control of the customer-owned 
power system entities within the SSEZ. System agents have access to this information 
through the relevant SSEZ databases, as described in Section 6.7.3. For the purposes 
of this research, two assumptions were made with regards the control capabilities and 
the operation of the installed power system entities within the SSEZ: 
1. The installed SSEGs are assumed to be capable of regulating their active and 
reactive power output at all times during their operation; and 
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2. A grid-dependent control strategy is assumed for all controllable customer-owned 
power system entities within the SSEZ. In return, customers are assumed to 
receive financial rewards for their contribution to distribution system operation.  
 
These assumptions were made in order to increase the capability for active and 
reactive power control within the overall SSEZ. Coordinated P/Q control is required 
in the event of system disturbances or when the SSEZ is attempting to meet an 
operational goal (Section 5.1). The developed control system would be able to operate 
without these two assumptions, but flexibility for control would be limited and thus 
system performance would be affected, for example by requiring more SSEG active 
power output to be curtailed and thus reducing the total SSEG energy yield.  
 
As an example, assuming that there 10 SSEGs operating within an SSEZ, Figure 8.3 
shows the probability of having different proportions of SSEG capacity operating 
under different availabilities [15]. SSEG availabilities are assumed to be independent 
from each other and that there are no common modes of failure between the installed 
SSEGs. For example, assuming that the SSEGs are operating at an availability of 0.9, 
there is a 0.92 probability that 80% of the connected SSEGs are available, 0.73 
probability that 90% are available, and 0.35 probability that all SSEGs are available. 
Using the binomial distribution as in Figure 8.3, the system operator could estimate 
the proportion of controllable customer-owned entities within the SSEZ. In general, 
electric-led dCHP units, ESUs and controllable consumer demands would be expected 
to have high average availabilities, while heat-led dCHP units, PV units and small-
scale wind turbines would be expected to have lower average availabilities.  
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Figure 8.3: Probability of having different proportions of SSEG capacity available for 
different availabilities.  
 
 
The following Sections attempt to evaluate the performance of the developed control 
system to satisfy the specific control requirements of the SSEZ, namely to: (i) 
overcome the identified LV distribution network constraints (Sections 8.1.1 – 8.1.5); 
and (ii) meet an SSEZ operational goal (Section 8.1.6). In all cases, agents are 
responsible for determining the P and Q set-points for all customer-owned power 
system entities in response to the dynamically changing SSEZ environment.  
 
 
 
     8.1.1.    Customer Voltage Rise 
The evaluation scenarios devised here focus on overcoming customer steady-state 
voltage rise, which is seen by a number of researchers [152-159] as the most likely 
limiting network constraint to the operation of SSEGs on radial LV networks. The 
aim of the control system is to ensure that all customer steady-state voltages are 
located within their statutory limits [42]. Steady state voltage rise can be mitigated by: 
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(i) importing reactive power in order to reduce the voltage in the locally affected area; 
(ii) increasing the electrical load through DSM schemes; (iii) diverting power into the 
installed ESUs through ESM schemes; and (iv) reducing the active power output of 
the installed SSEGs. These interventions can be performed individually or collectively 
by system agents, as will later be described.  
 
In order to simulate a customer voltage violation at the branches of the case study 
SSEZ, an increase in generation and/or a reduction in load can be initiated. Table 8.1 
defines the operating voltage limits as: (i) 250V as the upper normal state customer 
voltage limit; (ii) 253V as the upper alert state customer voltage limit; and (iii) 264V 
as the upper emergency state customer voltage limit. Figure 8.4 illustrates a minimum 
load scenario (0.16kW per customer) where there are no agents deployed in the 
system and each SSEZ customer has installed a SSEG with a rating of 2.5kW. 
Initially, at time t = 0 - 0.5sec, it is assumed that the connected SSEGs are not 
producing any power. All voltages are located within their permissible limits, with the 
highest voltage being at Feeder 1 (249.3V). At time t = 0.5 - 1sec, each SSEG is 
assumed to operate at 20% of its rated power output (i.e. 0.5kW), while at time t =1 -
1.5sec this figure rises to 50% (i.e. 1.25kW), at time t = 1.5 - 2sec to 75% (i.e. 
1.875kW) and at time t = 2 - 2.5sec to 100% (2.5kW). It can be seen that the steady-
state voltage rise limit of 253V is exceeded under a SSEG penetration scenario of 
approximately 0.55kW per customer, which under a passive control approach would 
result in SSEG disconnection in order to ensure secure system operation.  
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Figure 8.4: Feeder voltages at different time intervals – no control. 
 
 
 
Feeder Voltage @ t 
= 0-0.5sec 
Voltage @ t 
= 0.5-1sec 
Voltage @ t 
= 1-1.5sec 
Voltage @ t 
= 1.5-2sec 
Voltage @ t 
= 2-2.5sec 
1 249.3V 250V 251V 252.0V 253.1V 
2 248.9V 251.2V 253.8V 256.5V 259.4V 
3 248.7V 251.8V 255.2V 258.7V 262.5V 
4 248.4V 252.1V 256.9V 261.5V 266.4V 
5 248.3V 252.4V 257.8V 263.4V 268.4V 
 
Table 8.2: Feeder voltages at different time intervals – no control. 
 
 
 
The following evaluation scenarios attempt to illustrate the response of the developed 
MAS-based control system to various operational changes on the case study SSEZ. 
Assuming minimum loading conditions and a “zero generation” scenario, customer 
voltages in the case study SSEZ are already high, ranging from 248.3V to 248.9V. 
This suggests that all direct control agents are operating at their normal state, but also 
that the upper normal state customer voltage limit of 250V is close to being exceeded. 
At the remote ends of the network this occurs at a SSEG power output per customer 
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of approximately 0.3kW, while at a SSEG power output per customer of around 
0.45kW all direct control agents are under alert state (assuming a scenario where no 
corrective actions have been taken in order to reduce this voltage). 
 
All GAs operating under the alert state attempt to regulate the reactive power of their 
respective SSEGs in order to keep the local steady-state customer voltage below 
250V, without at the same time violating power factor regulation limits (0.95 leading 
to 0.95 lagging). During the alert state, SSEG reactive power control may or may not 
bring steady-state customer voltages back to their desired limits depending on the 
total SSEG active power output in the network, as well as on the available DSM and 
ESM schemes in the zone. Without any DSM or ESM schemes and assuming 0.95 
leading SSEG power factors, simulation results have shown that the upper alert state 
customer voltage limit of 253V is exceeded at the remote ends of the network at a 
SSEG power output per customer of about 0.65kW, while this figure rises to 1.4kW 
for all customer voltages in the zone. Employing DSM and ESM schemes, however, 
may significantly increase these figures as will later be demonstrated. 
 
• GA operation – Alert State: 
Under the developed MAS, all GAs that are operating under the alert state instruct 
their respective SSEG to regulate their power factor towards a 0.95 leading power 
factor (“reactivePowerInIncrease”), without changing their active power output. This 
takes place without any agent interactions, with GAs acting based on local voltage 
measurements only. 
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• ESA and CDA operation – Alert State: 
In addition to the reactive power control actions instructed by the relevant GAs within 
the developed MAS, ESM and DSM corrective schemes are also performed by the 
ESAs (“realPowerInIncrease”) and CDAs (“loadRescheduling” or 
“realPowerInIncrease”) that are operating under the alert state. These schemes are 
also performed based on local voltage measurements. Assuming that 10% of the 
customers uniformly distributed within the SSEZ have installed an ESU capable of a 
continuous power input/output of 5kW and that every customer has installed a 
controllable consumer demand attributing to 1kW, the SSEG volumes that may be 
accommodated before exceeding the upper alert state voltage limit have significantly 
increased as seen in Table 8.3.  
 
Customer 
Voltage [V] 
No 
control 
SSEG reactive 
power control 
ESM DSM Proposed MAS
Exceeding 
253V - 
Feeder 5 
 
0.55kW 
 
0.65kW 
 
0.55kW 
 
1.1kW 
 
2.1kW 
Exceeding 
253V - 
Feeder 1 
 
1.2kW  
 
1.4kW 
 
1.7kW 
 
2.2kW 
 
2.7kW 
 
Table 8.3: SSEG power output per customer at which the upper alert state voltage 
limit of 253V is exceeded on two different feeder locations. 
 
 
 
Through SSEG reactive power control coupled with ESM and DSM schemes, the 
developed MAS-based control system may prevent steady-state customer voltages 
from exceeding 253V until each SSEG is generating a real power output of 2.1kW. 
This is a significant increase compared to the 0.55kW per customer that may be 
accommodated under a passive control approach. For higher SSEG penetrations, 
however, steady-state customer voltages will increase resulting in the direct control 
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agents located at the remote ends of the SSEZ (Feeder 5) entering the emergency 
state, as described below. 
 
• GA operation – Emergency State: 
Under SSEG penetrations higher than 2.1kW per customer, active power generation 
curtailment (“realPowerOutReduction”) is necessary in order to ensure secure system 
operation. The following four schemes were considered for implementation inside the 
agent reasoning capabilities, as described in Section 6.4.3: 
1. Droop-control with no communications. 
2. Active power dispatch based on the “Last In First Off” (LIFO) policy. 
3. Active power dispatch based on proportionality sharing. 
4. Active power dispatch based on optimisation criteria. 
 
When selecting the most appropriate active power dispatch technique for overcoming 
steady-state customer voltage rise issues, the following two main criteria were taken 
into account:  
1. Performance, i.e. minimising the total SSEG active power output that needs to be 
curtailed before bringing system voltages back to their desired limits; 
2. Communications, i.e. minimising the need for data exchange both in terms of 
agent negotiations as well as exchanging measurement data. 
 
Active power dispatch based on optimisation criteria was deemed too 
“communications-heavy” as a global view of the SSEZ would be required before an 
agent makes a control decision. Meanwhile, LIFO and proportionality sharing would 
require communications between the utility agents (AMS, DF) and the related direct 
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control agents every time a customer voltage violation had occurred, which also 
significantly increases the amount of communications required. On the other hand, 
however, by using droop control, GAs within the MAS simply need to register their 
services once and this control approach could result in the following key advantages: 
(i) optimal performance may be achieved by curtailing generation locally; (ii) the 
need for communications is minimised; and (iii) the system is open and can easily be 
expanded [176-177]. 
 
Figure 8.5 shows the droop control that has been implemented inside the emergency 
state of the GAs within the developed MAS. Initially, at time t = 0 - 0.5sec, it is 
assumed that the real power output of each SSEG is 2.1kW and that all direct control 
agents are operating under the alert state, with SSEG reactive power control, DSM 
and ESM schemes responsible for keeping steady-state customer voltages within 
statutory limits. An additional increase in generation, however, or a reduction in load 
may cause the steady-state remote-end voltage to exceed 253V and therefore local 
GAs will enter the emergency state. This is illustrated during time t = 0.5 - 1sec, 
where it is assumed that the real power output of each SSEG has increased to 2.5kW. 
As seen from Table 8.4, emergency-state GAs are those located on Feeders 4 and 5 
and, according to the adopted droop control, only these SSEGs would have to curtail 
their real power output in order to bring customer voltages back to desired limits. This 
occurs at time t = 1 - 1.5sec where GAs at Feeder 5 reduce their real power output 
down to 2.2kW, for which the upper steady-state voltage limit of 253V is reached, 
while for GAs located on Feeder 4 this limit is reached for a real power output of 
2.35kW.         
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Figure 8.5: Feeder voltages at different time intervals – MAS control. 
 
 
In total, the amount of SSEG real power that is required to be curtailed in the SSEZ 
case study using a droop control with no communications is: (2.5kW - 2.2kW) x 8 + 
(2.5 kW -2.35 kW) x 8 = 3.6kW. Simulation results have shown that if an egalitarian 
approach had been implemented, where SSEG units on an SSEZ feeder equally 
curtailed their real power output in order to overcome steady-state customer voltage 
rise issues, the total amount of real power that would need to be curtailed would be 
significantly higher, approximately 12kW. In addition to requiring extensive 
communications, such an approach could also significantly decrease the total energy 
yield of these units. Therefore, even though SSEG units located at the remote-ends of 
the SSEZ feeders are most likely to be penalised assuming uniform SSEG penetration 
scenarios, total SSEG active power curtailment within the SSEZ is minimised.  
 
• ESA and CDA operation – Emergency State: 
The operation of ESAs and CDAs remains unchanged during the emergency state. 
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Feeder Voltage [Volts] 
@ t = 0-0.5sec 
Voltage [Volts] 
@ t = 0.5-1sec 
Voltage [Volts] 
@ t = 1-1.5sec 
1 249.8V 250V 250V 
2 251.1V 251.6V 251.5V 
3 251.8V 252.4V 252.2V 
4 252.5V 253.5V 253V 
5 252.9V 254.1V 253V 
 
Table 8.4: Feeder voltages at different time intervals – emergency state operation. 
 
 
 
A key concern towards the potential employment of the developed control system on 
an actual SSEZ is that the dynamic fluctuations caused by altering the electrical power 
input/output of large numbers of power system components must be within existing 
limits [42] in order to ensure that stability problems are minimised. The aim of this 
Thesis is to investigate the unbalanced steady-state operation of LV distribution 
networks and as such a detailed stability analysis of the operation of the developed 
control system on the case study SSEZ has not been performed. However, PSCAD™ 
is capable of simulating the time domain instantaneous responses of electrical power 
systems and hence may be used for analysing the dynamic operation and 
electromagnetic transients of the case study SSEZ. 
 
An initial investigation indicated that the dynamic operation of the developed control 
system causes some fluctuations to the SSEZ, but that these fluctuations are within 
tolerable range as shown in Figures 8.6 and 8.7. This view has been further supported 
by experimental results on a real power system, the Experimental SSEZ that will be 
described in Section 8.5. Figure 8.6 illustrates customer voltages at the SSEZ feeders 
during time t = 0.995 – 1.03 sec, where GAs at Feeder 4 and 5 have reduced their real 
power output down to 2.35kW and 2.2kW respectively in order to bring steady-state 
customer voltages within statutory limits. It can be seen that the resultant 
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perturbations to the power system from the operation of the direct control agents are 
tolerable, both in terms of the magnitude as well as the time period of the fluctuation. 
As evident from the graphs above, these fluctuations are more pronounced at the 
feeders where control actions have been taken.  
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Figure 8.6: Instantaneous customer voltages showing the dynamic operation of the 
MAS-based control system. 
 
 
 
Meanwhile, Figure 8.7 shows the instantaneous current of phase A at the remote ends 
of the detailed SSEZ feeder. As it can be seen, the current output of the SSEGs 
located on that feeder has been reduced at time t = 1.0sec, which originally causes 
some small fluctuations which are then eliminated.    
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Figure 8.7: Instantaneous current showing the dynamic operation of the MAS-based 
control system. 
 
 
 
     8.1.2.    Voltage Regulation 
The evaluation scenarios devised here focus on overcoming steady-state voltage 
regulation issues. According to Table 4.1, these are anticipated to require mitigating 
control actions only after high SSEG penetrations, namely 770kW assuming 
minimum loading conditions and unity SSEG and load power factors. The aim of the 
control system is to ensure that the steady-state voltage variation between the LV 
busbars of the MV/LV distribution transformer supplying the SSEZ and the remote 
ends of the SSEZ feeders are located within their statutory limits [161-163]. 
 
In order to achieve that, the following sequence of actions takes place within the 
developed MAS: 
1. Firstly, a VRA observes that steady-state voltage variation within an SSEZ feeder 
has exceeded the upper or lower voltage regulation limit. For illustrative purposes, 
the former is considered here. 
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2. The VRA sends a “query-ref” message with content “Voltage_regulation” to the 
DF. 
3. The DF replies with an “inform” message to allow the VRA to find out the ID of 
all direct control agents located on that particular feeder that are able to regulate 
this voltage deviation. 
4. The VRA then sends “proposal” ACL messages to these agents according to their 
network location: 
a. For direct control agents located close to the MV/LV distribution 
substation, the goal is to increase local steady-state voltage. 
b. For direct control agents located close to the SSEZ end-of-service, the 
goal is to reduce local steady-state voltage. 
5. Depending on their availability, these agents respond with an “accept-proposal” or 
“reject-proposal” message to inform the VRA that the submitted proposal has 
been accepted or rejected respectively. In the event of a failure (for example loss 
of communications between the direct control agent and the entity it controls) or if 
the message is for whatever reason not understood by the direct control agent, it 
will respond with a “failure” or “not-understood” message accordingly. 
6. Action execution is then performed by direct control agents that have responded 
with an “accept-proposal” ACL message. 
7. This process is repeated until satisfactory system operation is restored. 
 
In the event that the VRA observes that steady-state voltage variation within an SSEZ 
feeder has exceeded the lower voltage regulation limit, the sequence of actions is 
similar to the one described above, however the goal here is to: (i) reduce local 
steady-state voltage for direct control agents located close to the MV/LV distribution 
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substation; and (ii) increase local steady-state voltage for direct control agents located 
close to the SSEZ end-of-service. 
 
As evident from above, overcoming voltage regulation issues requires a more co-
ordinated approach compared to customer voltage rise. In order to simulate a violation 
of the upper voltage regulation limit at an SSEZ feeder, an increase in generation 
and/or a reduction in load on that feeder can be initiated. Table 8.1 defines the 
operating voltage regulation limits as: (i) +4% as the upper normal state voltage 
regulation limit; (ii) +4.5% as the upper alert state voltage regulation limit; and (iii) 
+5% as the upper emergency state voltage regulation limit. 
 
Table 8.5 illustrates steady-state voltage regulation in the case study SSEZ under a 
minimum load scenario (0.16kW per customer) where there are no agents deployed in 
the system and each SSEZ customer has installed a SSEG with a rating of 2.5kW. 
Initially, at time t = 0 - 0.5sec, it is assumed that the connected SSEGs are not 
producing any power. As it can be seen, the value for steady-state voltage regulation 
(-0.43%) is located within normal operating limits. At time t = 0.5 - 1sec, each SSEG 
is assumed to operate at 20% of its rated power output (i.e. 0.5kW), while at time t =1 
- 1.5sec this figure rises to 50% (i.e. 1.25kW), at time t = 1.5 - 2sec to 75% (i.e. 
1.875kW) and at time t = 2 - 2.5sec to 100% (2.5kW). The % steady-state voltage 
regulation limit of +5% has been found to be exceeded under a SSEG penetration 
scenario of around 1.9kW per customer, which under a passive control approach 
would result in SSEG disconnection in order to ensure secure system operation. 
Meanwhile the % steady-state voltage regulation limits of +4% and +4.5% would be 
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exceeded under SSEG penetration scenarios of approximately 1.6kW and 1.75kW per 
customer respectively. 
 
Simulation Time Period 
[sec] 
Steady-State Voltage 
Regulation [Volts] 
Percentage Steady-State 
Voltage Regulation [%] 
t = 0 – 0.5sec - 1.0V - 0.43% 
t = 0.5 – 1sec + 2.4V + 1% 
t = 1 – 1.5sec + 6.8V + 2.8% 
t = 1.5 – 2sec + 11.4V + 4.9% 
t = 2 – 2.5sec + 15.3V + 6.4% 
 
Table 8.5: Steady-state voltage regulation under the devised simulation scenarios. 
 
 
• VRA operation – Alert State: 
Under the devised scenarios, the VRA enters the alert state assuming a uniform SSEG 
penetration of approximately 1.6kW per customer. Having received from the DF the 
ID of all direct control agents that offer the “Voltage_Regulation” service on that 
feeder, the VRA sends the following control commands, which are to be executed 
depending on SSEG/ESU/load availability: 
1. For GAs located close to the MV/LV distribution substation: to regulate their 
power factor to 0.95 lagging (with the message content 
“reactivePowerOutIncrease”), without changing their active power output. 
2. For ESAs and CDAs located close to the MV/LV distribution substation: to 
reduce demand in the area by exporting active power through ESM 
(“realPowerOutIncrease”) and by curtailing consumer demands through DSM 
(“realPowerInReduction”). 
3. For GAs located close to the SSEZ end-of-service: to regulate their power factor 
to 0.95 leading (“reactivePowerInIncrease”), without changing their active power 
output. 
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4. For ESAs and CDAs located close to the SSEZ end-of-service: to increase 
demand in the area by importing active power through ESM 
(“realPowerInIncrease”) and by instructing consumer demands to switch on 
through DSM (“loadRescheduling” or “realPowerInIncrease”). 
 
• VRA operation – Emergency State: 
Under the devised scenarios, the VRA enters the emergency state assuming a uniform 
SSEG penetration of approximately 1.75kW per customer under a passive control 
approach, or 2.45kW per customer under the proposed MAS-based control approach 
(Table 8.6). Active power curtailment of the connected SSEGs may therefore be 
necessary in order to ensure secure system operation. Similarly to the alert state, the 
VRA receives from the DF the ID of all direct control agents that offer the 
“Voltage_Regulation” service on that feeder, and then dispatches the following 
control commands: 
1. For GAs located close to the MV/LV distribution substation: to increase their 
active power output by 10% (“realPowerOutIncrease”), for units that are not 
already exporting their maximum active power output. 
2. For GAs located close to the SSEZ end-of-service: to reduce their active power 
output by 10% (“realPowerOutReduction”). 
 
% Steady-State 
Voltage Regulation 
No 
Control 
SSEG Reactive 
Power Control 
ESM DSM Proposed 
MAS 
Exceeding upper alert 
state (+4.5%) 
 
1.75kW 
 
1.8kW 
 
1.8kW 
 
2.35kW 
 
2.45kW 
Exceeding upper 
emergency state (+5%) 
 
1.9kW 
 
1.95kW 
 
1.95kW 
 
2.5kW 
 
2.6kW 
 
Table 8.6: SSEG power output per customer for which the % steady-state voltage 
regulation limits are exceeded in the case study SSEZ. 
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Figure 8.8 shows the steady-state voltage regulation control that has been 
implemented inside the alert and emergency state of the 4 VRAs within the developed 
MAS. Initially, at time t = 0 - 0.5sec, it is assumed that the real power output of each 
SSEG in the case study SSEZ is 1.5kW and that the resultant % steady-state voltage 
regulation (+3.5%) is located within desired limits (+4%). An increase in generation, 
however, or a reduction in load may cause the % steady-state voltage variation to 
exceed +4% and therefore the VRA to enter the alert state. This is illustrated during 
time t = 0.5 - 1sec, where it is assumed that the real power output of each SSEG has 
increased to 1.85kW, thus resulting in a % steady-state voltage variation of 4.7%. The 
time period t = 1 -1.5sec illustrates the response of the control system, with the VRA 
instructing the relevant GAs, ESAs and CDAs to perform corrective actions in order 
to restore this voltage variation. For the case study SSEZ, these actions result in the % 
steady-state voltage variation to drop to 3.2%, which is well within the desired 
operating limit of +4%.  
 
An additional increase in generation or a load reduction may cause the % steady-state 
voltage variation to exceed +4.5% and therefore cause the VRA to enter the 
emergency state. Simulation results, however, have shown that under the developed 
MAS, the VRA would enter the emergency state only after SSEG penetrations of 
2.45kW per customer and hence SSEG active power curtailment is not likely to be 
required. During time t = 1.5 - 2sec it is assumed that the real power output of each 
SSEG has instantaneously increased to 2.5kW, thus resulting in a % steady-state 
voltage variation of 4.8%. The VRA then sends ACL messages to the 24 GAs that are 
located at the remote ends of that feeder with the content “realPowerOutReduction” 
and instructs them to reduce current active power output by 10%, i.e. down to 2.25kW 
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for each SSEG. This results in a % steady-state voltage variation of 4.47%, which is 
just below the upper alert state limit of 4.5%. If, however, variation continued to 
exceed statutory limits, additional SSEG active power generation curtailment (in 10% 
intervals) would have been required. 
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Figure 8.8: Voltage regulation under the devised simulation scenarios. 
 
 
In total, the amount of real power output that is required to be curtailed within the 
SSEZ using the proposed control approach is: (2.5kW - 2.25kW) x 24 = 6kW. 
Simulation results have shown that if a more egalitarian approach had been 
implemented, where all SSEG units on that feeder equally curtailed their real power 
output, the total amount of real power that would need to be curtailed would be 
approximately: (2.5kW - 2.35kW) x 96 = 14.4kW. Hence, although the proposed 
control approach penalises SSEG units located at the remote-ends of the SSEZ 
feeders, communication links are kept relatively low, while ensuring that the total 
SSEG active power curtailment within the SSEZ is minimised. 
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     8.1.3.    Voltage Unbalance 
The evaluation scenarios devised here focus on overcoming steady-state voltage 
unbalance which is anticipated to be a likely limiting constraint to the operation of 
SSEGs for two reasons: the first is the relatively low volumes of unbalanced single-
phase generation that may be accommodated before statutory limits are exceeded 
(Table 4.2); and the second is due to the “fit and inform” policy governing SSEG 
growth which means that DNOs will have no control over the phase of connection. 
The aim of the control system is to ensure that steady-state % VUFs of all SSEZ 
feeders are located within their operating statutory limits [166]. 
 
In order to achieve that, the following sequence of actions takes place within the MAS: 
1. Firstly, a UA observes that the steady-state % VUF within an SSEZ feeder has 
exceeded desired or allowable operating limits. 
2. The UA sends a “query-ref” message with content “Voltage_unbalance” to the 
DF. 
3. The DF replies with an “inform” message to allow the UA to find out the ID of all 
direct control agents located at the remote ends of that particular feeder. 
4. The UA then sends “proposal” ACL messages to these agents according to their 
phase location: 
a. For direct control agents located at the phase with the highest steady-state 
voltage, the goal is to increase local demand through DSM and ESM 
schemes and/or reduce local generation. 
b. For direct control agents located at the phase with the lowest steady-state 
voltage, the goal is to reduce local demand through DSM and ESM 
schemes and/or increase local generation. 
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5. Depending on their availability, these agents respond with an “accept-proposal” or 
“reject-proposal” message to inform the UA that the submitted proposal has been 
accepted or rejected respectively. In the event of a failure or if the message is not 
understood by the direct control agent, it will respond with a “failure” or “not-
understood” message accordingly. 
6. Action execution is then performed by direct control agents that have responded 
with an “accept-proposal” ACL message. 
7. This process is repeated until satisfactory system operation is restored. 
 
In order to overcome voltage unbalance issues within an SSEZ, the co-ordinated 
control of entities located on a specific phase of an SSEZ feeder is required. Hence, 
flexibility for control may be limited compared to a network constraint such as 
voltage regulation where entities from the overall zone may be asked to contribute. 
Control flexibility is additionally limited due to the fact that, under the developed 
UAs, control actions are delegated only to power system entities located at the remote 
ends of the SSEZ feeders, where the impacts of uniform penetrations of SSEGs are at 
their most adverse. In the possibility of SSEG clustering, however, additional control 
strategies would have to be devised in order to employ the services of entities which 
may not be located at the remote ends of the SSEZ.  
 
In order to simulate a steady-state voltage unbalance violation, an increase in single-
phase generation and/or a reduction in single-phase load on an SSEZ feeder can be 
initiated. Table 8.1 defines the operating steady-state voltage unbalance limits as: (i) 
0.8% as the upper normal state voltage unbalance limit; (ii) 1.0% as the upper alert 
 204
state voltage unbalance limit; and (iii) 1.3% as the upper emergency state voltage 
unbalance limit. 
 
Table 8.7 illustrates the resultant % VUF on a feeder of the case study SSEZ under a 
minimum load scenario (0.16kW per customer) where there are no agents deployed in 
the system and each customer on that feeder has installed a SSEG with a rating of 
2.5kW. Initially, at time t = 0-0.5sec, it is assumed that the connected SSEGs are not 
exporting any active power, with the resultant steady-state % VUF equalling zero. At 
time t = 0.5 - 1sec, each SSEG on phase A is assumed to increase its active power 
output to 20% of its rated power (i.e. 0.5kW), while at time t =1 - 1.5sec this figure 
rises to 50% (i.e. 1.25kW), at time t = 1.5 - 2sec to 75% (i.e. 1.875kW) and at time t = 
2 - 2.5sec to 100% (i.e. 2.5kW).  
 
If the power output of SSEGs located on phases B and C is assumed to remain 
constant at 0kW, the % steady-state VUF limit of 1.3% has been found to be exceeded 
under a SSEG penetration scenario of around 1.5kW for customers on phase A. For 
passive LV distribution networks, where corrective control actions are not employed 
for voltage unbalance, high % VUFs may result in adverse effects on power system 
equipment and on the electrical network as described in Section 4.1.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.7: Resultant % VUF under the devised simulation scenarios. 
Simulation Time Period 
[sec] 
% Steady-State VUF 
t = 0 – 0.5sec 0 % 
t = 0.5 – 1sec 0.4 % 
t = 1 – 1.5sec 1.1 % 
t = 1.5 – 2sec 1.6 % 
t = 2 – 2.5sec 2.1 % 
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Figure 8.9 shows the three unbalanced phasors Va, Vb and Vc taken from a typical 
simulation run in PSCAD™. As it can be seen, unbalance exists not only in the 
magnitude of the voltages but also in the phase angles as the three phasors are no 
longer separated by exactly 120°.  
 
Figure 8.9: Instantaneous voltage phasors at the remote ends of the case study SSEZ. 
 
 
• UA operation – Alert State: 
Under the devised scenarios, the UA enters the alert state assuming an unbalanced 
single-phase generation of approximately 1.0kW per customer. Having received from 
the DF the ID of all direct control agents that offer the “Voltage_Unbalance” service 
on that feeder, the UA dispatches the following control commands, which are to be 
executed depending on ESU/load availability: 
1. For ESAs and CDAs located at the phase with the highest steady-state voltage: to 
increase demand in the area by importing active power through ESM 
(“realPowerInIncrease”) and by instructing consumer demands to switch on 
through DSM (“loadRescheduling” or “realPowerInIncrease”). 
2. For ESAs and CDAs located at the phase with the lowest steady-state voltage: to 
reduce demand in the area by exporting active power through ESM 
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(“realPowerOutIncrease”) and by curtailing consumer demands through DSM 
(“realPowerInReduction”). 
SSEG reactive power control for voltage unbalance has not been considered, in 
accordance with simulation results (Table 4.2) that have shown that changing the 
SSEG power factor has a minor effect on the resultant % VUF. 
 
• VRA operation – Emergency State: 
Under the devised scenarios, the UA enters the emergency state assuming an 
unbalanced single-phase generation of 1.15kW per customer under a passive control 
approach, or 2.4kW per customer under the proposed MAS-based approach (Table 
8.8). Active power curtailment of the connected SSEGs may therefore be necessary in 
order to ensure secure system operation. Similarly to the alert state, the UA receives 
from the DF the ID of all direct control agents that offer the “Voltage_Unbalance” 
service on that feeder, and then dispatches the following control commands: 
1. For GAs located at the phase with the highest steady-state voltage: to reduce their 
active power output by 10% (“realPowerOutReduction”). 
2.  For GAs located at the phase with the highest steady-state voltage: to increase 
their active power output by 10% (“realPowerOutIncrease”), for units that are not 
exporting their maximum active power output. 
 
% Steady-State 
VUF 
No 
Control 
SSEG Reactive 
Power Control 
ESM DSM Proposed 
MAS 
Exceeding upper alert 
state (1.0%) 
 
1.15kW 
 
1.15kW 
 
1.4kW 
 
2.1kW 
 
2.4kW 
Exceeding upper 
emergency state (1.3%) 
 
1.5kW 
 
1.5kW 
 
1.8kW 
 
2.5kW 
 
2.8kW 
 
Table 8.8: SSEG power output per customer on phase A for which the % steady-state 
VUF limits are exceeded in the case study SSEZ. 
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Figure 8.10 shows the steady-state voltage unbalance control that has been 
implemented inside the alert and emergency state of the four UAs within the 
developed MAS. Initially, at time t = 0 - 0.5sec, a single-phase unbalanced generation 
of 0.75kW per customer is assumed, which results in a % VUF of 0.6% which is 
located within desired limits (0.8%). An additional increase in single-phase 
generation, however, or a demand reduction on that phase may cause the %VUF to 
exceed 0.8% and therefore the UA to enter the alert state. This is illustrated during 
time t = 0.5 - 1sec, where it is assumed that the single-phase unbalanced generation 
per customer has increased to 1.1kW, thus resulting in a steady-state % VUF of 
0.95%. The time period t = 1 - 1.5sec illustrates the response of the control system, 
with the UA instructing the relevant ESAs and CDAs to increase the load in order to 
restore this voltage unbalance. For the case study SSEZ, these actions result in the % 
VUF to drop to 0.7%, which is within the desired operating limit of 0.8%.  
 
An additional increase in single-phase generation, or a demand reduction on that 
phase may cause the %VUF to exceed 1.0% and therefore cause the UA to enter the 
emergency state. Simulation results, however, have shown that under the developed 
MAS, the UA would enter the emergency state only after unbalanced single-phase 
SSEG penetrations of 2.4kW per customer (Table 8.8) and hence SSEG active power 
curtailment is not likely to be required. During time t = 1.5 - 2sec it is assumed that 
the unbalanced single-phase generation has increased to 2.5kW per customer, thus 
resulting in a % VUF of approximately 1.1%. The UA then sends ACL messages to 
the 8 GAs that are located on the phase of interest and at the remote ends of that SSEZ 
feeder with the content “realPowerOutReduction” and instructs them to reduce current 
active power output by 10%, i.e. down to 2.25kW for each SSEG. The resultant 
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steady-state % VUF has been found to remain slightly higher than the upper alert state 
limit of 1.0% and therefore the UA re-instructs these units to reduce current active 
power output by 10%, i.e. down to approximately 2kW for each SSEG. This results in 
a steady-state % VUF of 0.95%, which is just below the upper alert state of 1.0%.  
 
In total, the amount of real power output that is required to be curtailed within the 
SSEZ using the proposed control approach is: (2.5kW - 2.025kW) x 8 = 3.8kW. 
Simulation results have shown that if a more egalitarian approach had been 
implemented, where all SSEG units on the phase of that feeder equally curtailed their 
real power output, the total amount of real power that would need to be curtailed 
would be approximately: (2.5kW - 2.35kW) x 32 = 4.8kW. This is a small difference 
compared to curtailing SSEG units located at the remote-ends of the SSEZ feeders 
only and therefore a different control strategy could also be effective, where active 
power reduction intervals are reduced (for example from 10% down to 5%), but the 
number of GAs controlled by the UA is increased (in this case from 8 to 32).  
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Figure 8.10: % VUF under the devised simulation scenarios. 
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     8.1.4.    Thermal Limits 
The evaluation scenarios devised here focus on overcoming issues associated with 
cable and transformer thermal limits. The aim of the control system is to ensure that 
current flows within SSEZ “hot-spots” and the apparent power flow through the PCC 
with the upstream distribution network have not exceeded their allowable continuous 
current (A) or apparent power flow (kVA) ratings. For this particular case study 
SSEZ, where uniform SSEG penetrations are considered, only three-phase current 
flows are monitored and controlled within the four “hot-spots” that exist in the zone 
(Section 6.1). In the event of SSEG clustering on the same phase, however, it may be 
necessary to monitor single-phase current flows as well by adding single-phase 
TLA(s) to the system. 
 
The following sequence of actions takes place within the developed MAS in order to 
overcome cable and transformer thermal overloads: 
1. Firstly, a TLA observes that the current flowing through a SSEZ network line or 
the apparent power flow through the PCC has exceeded desired or allowable 
operating limits.  
2. The TLA sends a “query-ref” message with content “Cable_Thermal_Limits” or 
“Transformer_Thermal_Limits” respectively to the DF. 
3. The DF replies with an “inform” message to allow the TLA to find out the ID of 
all direct control agents that offer the requested service. 
4. The TLA then sends “proposal” ACL messages to these agents in order to increase 
local demand through DSM and ESM schemes and/or reduce local generation. 
5. Depending on their availability, these agents respond with an “accept-proposal” or 
“reject-proposal” message to inform the TLA that the submitted proposal has been 
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accepted or rejected respectively. In the event of a failure or if the message is not 
understood by the direct control agent, it will respond with a “failure” or “not-
understood” message accordingly. 
6. Action execution is then performed by direct control agents that have responded 
with an “accept-proposal” ACL message. 
7. This process is repeated until satisfactory system operation is restored. 
 
In order to simulate a cable or transformer thermal limit violation, an increase in 
generation and/or a reduction in load can be initiated. Table 8.1 defines the operating 
current flow limits for the four known “hot-spots” within the SSEZ as: (i) 280A as the 
upper normal state current flow limit; (ii) 320A as the upper alert state current flow 
limit; and (iii) 355A as the upper emergency state current flow limit. Meanwhile, the 
apparent power flow limits for the distribution transformer supplying the SSEZ are: 
(i) 420kVA as the upper normal state apparent power flow limit; (ii) 460kVA as the 
upper alert state apparent power flow limit; and (iii) 500kVA as the upper emergency 
state apparent power flow limit. 
 
Table 8.9 illustrates the current and apparent power flows within the case study SSEZ 
under a minimum load scenario (0.16kW per customer) where there are no agents 
deployed in the system and each customer has installed a SSEG with a rating of 
2.5kW. Initially, at time t = 0 - 0.5sec, it is assumed that the connected SSEGs are not 
exporting any active power, with power flowing from the upstream distribution 
network to the SSEZ. At time t = 0.5 - 1sec, each SSEG is assumed to increase its 
active power output to 20% of its rated power (i.e. 0.5kW), while at time t = 1 - 1.5sec 
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this figure rises to 50% (i.e. 1.25kW), at time t = 1.5 - 2sec to 75% (i.e. 1.875kW) and 
at time t = 2 - 2.5sec to 100% (i.e. 2.5kW).  
 
The emergency state limits of 355A and 500kVA have been found to be exceeded 
under SSEG penetration scenarios of around 2.7kW and 1.6kW respectively, which 
under a passive control approach could result in SSEG or even customer load 
disconnection if the existing SSEZ overcurrent protection devices trip. The following 
simulation scenarios focus on overcoming transformer thermal limits, which are 
anticipated to be a more limiting network constraint compared to cable thermal limits.  
 
Simulation Time Period 
[sec] 
Current Flow at  
SSEZ “hot-spot” [A] 
Apparent Power Flow  
at PCC [kVA] 
t = 0 – 0.5sec 23A 60kVA 
t = 0.5 – 1sec 48.5A 120kVA 
t = 1 – 1.5sec 156A 380kVA 
t = 1.5 – 2sec 243A 600kVA 
t = 2 – 2.5sec 330A 790kVA 
 
Table 8.9: Current and apparent power flows under the devised simulation scenarios. 
 
 
 
• TLA operation – Alert State: 
The TLA enters the alert state assuming a uniform SSEG penetration of 1.4kW per 
customer. Having received from the DF the ID of direct control agents that offer the 
“Transformer_Thermal_Limits” service, which is likely to be all direct control agents 
within the SSEZ, the TLA dispatches the following control commands, which are to 
be executed depending on ESU/load availability: 
1. For ESAs: to increase demand in the area by importing active power through ESM 
(“realPowerInIncrease”). 
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2. For CDAs: to increase demand in the area by instructing consumer demands to 
switch on through DSM (“loadRescheduling” or “realPowerInIncrease”). 
SSEG reactive power control for reducing apparent power flows at the PCC has not 
been considered, in accordance with simulation results (Table 4.3) that have found it 
to have a minor effect on the additional SSEG volumes that may be accommodated. 
 
• TLA operation – Emergency State: 
The TLA enters the emergency state assuming a uniform SSEG penetration of 1.5kW 
per customer under a passive approach, or 3kW per customer under the proposed 
approach (Table 8.10). SSEG active power curtailment is therefore not anticipated to 
be required. In general, due to the high SSEG volumes that may be accommodated, 
cable and transformer thermal violations are not anticipated to present a limiting 
constraint to the operation of SSEGs in the case study SSEZ, as shown in Table 8.10. 
 
 No 
Control 
ESM DSM Proposed 
MAS 
Exceeding upper alert state apparent 
power flow limit (460kVA) 
 
1.5kW 
 
2kW 
 
2.5kW 
 
3kW 
Exceeding upper emergency state 
apparent power flow limit (500kVA) 
 
1.6kW 
 
2.1kW 
 
2.6kW 
 
3.1kW 
Exceeding upper alert state current 
flow limit (320A) 
 
4.2kW 
 
4.7kW 
 
5.2kW 
 
5.7kW 
Exceeding upper emergency state 
current flow limit (355A) 
 
4.6kW 
 
5.1kW 
 
5.6kW 
 
6.1kW 
 
Table 8.10: SSEG power output per customer for which the cable “hot-spot” and 
transformer thermal limits are exceeded in the case study SSEZ. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.11 shows the transformer thermal overload control that has been 
implemented inside the alert and emergency state of the TLA within the developed 
MAS. Initially, at time t = 0 - 0.5sec, it is assumed that the real power output of each 
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SSEG in the case study SSEZ is 1.2kW and that the apparent power flow at the SSEZ 
PCC with the upstream distribution network (380kVA) is located within desired limits 
(420kVA). An increase in generation, however, or a reduction in load may cause this 
value to exceed 420kVA and therefore cause the TLA to enter the alert state. This is 
illustrated during time t = 0.5 - 1sec, where it is assumed that the real power output of 
each SSEG has increased to 1.45kW, thus resulting in the apparent power flow at the 
SSEZ PCC to increase to 450kVA. 
 
Since all customer-owned power system entities within the SSEZ have an effect on 
the apparent power flow at the PCC, it is important that the TLA does not 
overestimate the required mitigating control actions in the event of thermal overloads. 
Therefore, state estimation is necessary in order to determine the extent of thermal 
violation, as well as to provide an approximation of the number of customer-owned 
power system entities that need to be controlled. A simple logic has been 
implemented inside the alert state of the TLA, which dynamically calculates the 
difference between apparent power flow at the SSEZ PCC and the upper normal state 
apparent power flow limit (in this case: 450kVA – 420kVA = 30kVA) and 
accordingly instructs ESAs (“realPowerInIncrease”) and CDAs (“loadRescheduling” 
or “realPowerInIncrease”) to increase the load in the zone. The response of the control 
system is illustrated during t = 1 - 1.5sec, where the total load in the zone is increased 
in order to reduce the apparent power flow at the PCC. 
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Figure 8.11: Apparent power flow at the PCC under the devised simulation scenarios. 
 
 
An additional increase in generation or a load reduction may cause the apparent power 
flow at the SSEZ PCC to exceed 460kVA and therefore cause the TLA to enter the 
emergency state. Simulation results, however, have shown that under the developed 
MAS, the TLA would enter the emergency state only after SSEG penetrations of 3kW 
per customer, which represent extreme SSEG penetration scenarios. Therefore, under 
the proposed MAS, SSEG active power curtailment will not be required for 
overcoming cable and transformer thermal overloads on the case study SSEZ.  
 
Finally, due to the large number of power system entities that are likely to be 
controlled, stability becomes increasingly important in order to overcome cable or 
transformer thermal overloads. An initial investigation, however, indicated that the 
resultant fluctuations from the dynamic operation of the control system are within 
tolerable range. Figure 8.12 illustrates the apparent power flow at the PCC with the 
upstream distribution network during time t = 0.5 – 0.6sec, where it is assumed that 
the real power output of each SSEG in the case study SSEZ is increased from 1.2kW 
 215
to 1.45kW, thus resulting in the apparent power flow at the SSEZ PCC to increase to 
450kVA. The steady-state value is reached after a considerable time period 
(approximately 0.1sec) due to the large number of components that are controlled.  
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Figure 8.12: Apparent power flow at the PCC – dynamic operation. 
 
 
 
Meanwhile, Figure 8.13 shows the instantaneous three phase currents at the SSEZ 
PCC during the same time period. As it can be seen, the value for each single-phase 
current has increased from approximately 720A peak to 810A peak, which originally 
causes some small fluctuations which are then eliminated.   
Sub11kV_1 : Graphs
 0.4900 0.4950 0.5000 0.5050 0.5100 0.5150 0.5200 
-1.00 
-0.80 
-0.60 
-0.40 
-0.20 
0.00 
0.20 
0.40 
0.60 
0.80 
1.00 
y 
(k
A)
I
 
 
Figure 8.13: Instantaneous three phase currents at the SSEZ PCC showing the 
dynamic operation of the MAS-based control system. 
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     9.1.5.    Network Losses 
In order to reduce active power losses within an electrical distribution network, active 
and reactive power flow reduction may be considered (Equation 4.17). The first is 
typically achieved by manipulating the total demand and generation within the 
network in order to achieve an overall balance and thus reduce the associated power 
flows. The second is typically achieved by means of power factor correction, and is 
the loss reduction type considered here. For reasons mentioned in Section 6.4, 
network losses are not taken into account when determining the operating states of 
system agents. Moreover, power factor correction is only considered during normal 
operating conditions because secure system operation is the priority for the developed 
control system.  
 
The developed “Direct_Control” service (Table 7.1) may allow controllable customer-
owned entities to perform similar functionalities as traditional power factor correction 
equipment [196] which automatically regulate the controller’s power factor to the 
target cosφ entered. In the examples devised here, reactive power control for power 
factor correction has only been considered for the GAs and SSEGs within the SSEZ 
control system, however it may also be considered for ESAs and CDAs if such 
controllability is available.  
 
Currently, SSEG units are typically operated at unity power factors in accordance 
with existing standards that do not provide any guidelines on their contribution to 
system operation [25-26]. The majority of customer loads in LV distribution networks 
are consuming reactive power (inductive loads), with typical aggregate power factors 
of residential or light commercial LV feeders in the range of 0.85 to 0.95 lagging [54-
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55]. Therefore, if these customers had SSEGs on their premises, operating these units 
at lagging power factors (i.e. by exporting VARs) would reduce reactive power flows 
on network feeders, thereby also reducing active power losses in the network. 
However, exporting reactive power at SSEG connection points could have important 
implications for customer voltage rise and voltage regulation that need to be taken 
into account as described in Sections 8.1.1 and 8.1.2. 
 
The “Direct_Control” service of direct control agents is responsible for reducing 
reactive power flows within the SSEZ. Similarly to customer voltage control, which 
also belongs to the “Direct_Control” service (Table 7.1), reactive power flow 
reduction is based on local measurements only, with no communication signals 
exchanged by direct control agents within the MAS. The reduction in active power 
losses that can be achieved from power factor correction on any case study SSEZ will 
depend mainly on: (i) the real and reactive power profiles of the installed power 
system entities, along with their network and phase location; and (ii) network line 
impedances, with greater active power loss reductions expected in LV distribution 
networks with high-impedance lines. 
 
Tables 8.11 and 8.12 illustrate the active power losses within the case study SSEZ for 
a range of different load power factors under both minimum (0.16kW per customer) 
and maximum loading scenarios (1.3kW per customer). Each customer in the SSEZ is 
assumed to have installed a SSEG with a rating of 1kW (Table 8.11) or 1.5kW (Table 
8.12) and in all the cases the operating SSEG power factor are modified such that 
reactive power flows in the network are reduced.  
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Load losses are proportional to the current squared, whereas the current is reduced in 
direct proportion to the power-factor improvement. Therefore, load losses are 
inversely proportional to the square of the power factor, which suggests that 
significant reductions in load losses of up to 30% (from 50kW down to 35kW) may be 
obtained by power factor correction through the co-ordinated control of SSEGs. 
 
In addition to active power loss reduction, power factor correction may relieve the 
unnecessary transmission of reactive power, resulting in feeder power factors that 
approach unity. With the anticipated increased penetration of DG and SSEG units on 
electrical distribution networks, preventing existing networks from reaching their 
thermal limits will become increasingly important. Even if power factor correction is 
in most cases unlikely to be able to replace expansion or reinforcement of the grid for 
large-scale SSEG/DG integration, the additional capacity that could be accommodated 
may in some cases reduce potential network bottlenecks. 
 
Loading Scenario No Control Proposed MAS 
Minimum Loading Conditions –  
Load Power Factor: 0.85 (inductive) 
30kW 22kW 
Minimum Loading Conditions –  
Load Power Factor: 0.95 (inductive) 
24kW 22kW 
Minimum Loading Conditions –  
Load Power Factor: Unity 
22kW 22kW 
Maximum Loading Conditions –  
Load Power Factor: 0.85 (inductive) 
12kW 7kW 
Maximum Loading Conditions –  
Load Power Factor: 0.95 (inductive) 
9kW 7kW 
Maximum Loading Conditions –  
Load Power Factor: Unity 
7kW 7kW 
 
Table 8.11: Active power losses under the devised simulation scenarios for a SSEG 
power output per customer of 1kW. 
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Loading Scenario No Control Proposed MAS 
Minimum Loading Conditions –  
Load Power Factor: 0.85 (inductive) 
50kW 35kW 
Minimum Loading Conditions –  
Load Power Factor: 0.95 (inductive) 
41kW 35kW 
Minimum Loading Conditions –  
Load Power Factor: Unity 
35kW 35kW 
Maximum Loading Conditions –  
Load Power Factor: 0.85 (inductive) 
13kW 8kW 
Maximum Loading Conditions –  
Load Power Factor: 0.95 (inductive) 
10kW 8kW 
Maximum Loading Conditions –  
Load Power Factor: Unity 
8kW 8kW 
 
Table 8.12: Active power losses under the devised simulation scenarios for a SSEG 
power output per customer of 1.5kW. 
 
 
 
     8.1.6.    Operational Goals 
The evaluation scenarios devised here focus on the case study SSEZ meeting the 
“zero power export” operational goal (Section 5.1.2) which may be selected for two 
reasons: (i) the first is due to economic considerations based on the fact that the 
electrical power used in the zone is commercially more valuable than the electrical 
power exported to the system; and (ii) the second is due to technical considerations, 
such as a congested 11kV feeder which dictates that power flows though that feeder 
must be minimised. For both cases, the aim of the control system is to ensure that the 
real power flow from the SSEZ to the upstream distribution network is zero. 
 
The following sequence of actions takes place within the developed MAS in order to 
ensure that the SSEZ meets an operational goal: 
1. Firstly, the OGA identifies an operational goal (in this case “zero power import”) 
either through data interpretation by observing the real power flow at the PCC 
with the upstream distribution network or though DNO request. 
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2. The OGA sends a “query-ref” message with content “Operational_Goals” to the 
DF. 
3. The DF replies with an “inform” message to allow the OGA to find out the ID of 
the direct control agents that offer the requested service. In the case of 
“Operational_Goals”, it is likely that this service is provided by all direct control 
agents within the zone.  
4. The OGA then sends “proposal” ACL messages to these agents in order to 
increase local demand through DSM and ESM schemes and/or reduce local 
generation. 
5. Depending on their availability, these agents respond with an “accept-proposal” or 
“reject-proposal” message to inform the OGA that the submitted proposal has 
been accepted or rejected respectively. In the event of a failure or if the message is 
not understood by the direct control agent, it will respond with a “failure” or “not-
understood” message accordingly. 
6. Action execution is then performed by direct control agents that have responded 
with an “accept-proposal” ACL message. 
7. This process is repeated until the “zero power import” operational goal has been 
achieved. If, however, one or more of the indirect control agents within the MAS 
enter their emergency state, the operational goal must be dropped in order to 
ensure secure system operation. This is achieved using the following two steps: (i) 
the respective indirect control agent(s) send an “inform” message to the OGA to 
ensure that the operational goal is dropped; (ii) the OGA then sends a “cancel” 
message to all direct control agents that had previously responded with “accept-
proposal” in order to inform them that their actions are no longer requested.  
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As previously mentioned, two scenarios are considered for the “zero power export” 
operational goal within the case study SSEZ: the first one is due to economic 
considerations, while the second one is due to technical considerations. Minimum 
loading conditions (0.16kW per customer) are assumed where each customer has 
installed a SSEG with a rating of 2.5kW. Initially, at time t = 0 - 0.5sec, it is assumed 
that the connected SSEGs are not exporting any active power, with power flowing 
from the upstream distribution network to the SSEZ. At time t = 0.5 - 1sec, each 
SSEG is assumed to increase its active power output to 20% of its rated power (i.e. 
0.5kW), while at time t = 1 - 1.5sec this figure rises to 50% (i.e. 1.25kW), at time t = 
1.5 - 2sec to 75% (i.e. 1.875kW) and at time t = 2 - 2.5sec to 100% (i.e. 2.5kW). 
Without any agents connected, the real power flows at the SSEZ PCC with the 
upstream distribution network under the devised simulation scenarios may be shown 
in Table 8.13. For the purposes of this research, the associated voltage and thermal 
violations as described in Sections 8.1.1 – 8.1.5 are ignored. This is done in order to 
illustrate the operation of the developed OGA. 
 
• OGA operation – Economic Considerations: 
Having received from the DF the ID of direct control agents that offer the 
“Operational_Goals” service, the OGA dispatches the following control commands, 
which are to be executed depending on ESU/load availability: 
1. For ESAs: to increase demand in the area by importing active power through ESM 
(“realPowerInIncrease”). 
2. For CDAs: to increase demand in the area by instructing consumer demands to 
switch on through DSM (“loadRescheduling” or “realPowerInIncrease”). 
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Similarly to the developed TLA, a simple logic has been implemented inside the OGA 
which dynamically calculates the difference between the real power flow from the 
SSEZ to the upstream distribution network and its desired value Pout,desired (in this case 
Pout,desired = 0) and accordingly instructs ESAs and CDAs to increase the load in the 
zone. If the difference can not be kept at zero through the application of DSM and 
ESM schemes, a small export of electrical power to the upstream distribution network 
is preferable compared to curtailing the active power output of the connected SSEGs.  
 
Hence, the aspiration of the OGA is to ensure that the real power export is zero but 
depending on the difference between the demand and generation within the zone, as 
well as the capacity of the DSM and ESM schemes available, this may not be always 
possible. Under the devised simulation scenarios, zero power export may be achieved 
during t = 0 – 1.5sec (Table 8.13), but during t = 1.5 – 2.5sec the difference between 
the generation and the demand in the SSEZ is too high to be offset by the available 
ESM and DSM schemes in the zone. Hence, for commercial reasons, exporting this 
difference to the upstream distribution network is preferable compared to curtailing 
the active power output of the connected SSEGs. 
 
• OGA operation – Technical Considerations: 
The operation of the OGA here is similar to before, with the OGA instructing ESAs 
(“realPowerInIncrease”) and CDAs (“loadRescheduling” or “realPowerInIncrease”) 
to increase electrical demand in the zone in order to balance the connected demand 
with generation. However, if balance can not be achieved through DSM and ESM 
schemes, SSEG active power curtailment is necessary in order to ensure that the real 
power flow export from the SSEZ remains at zero. This is achieved by the OGA 
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sending ACL messages to the connected GAs with the content 
“realPowerOutReduction” in order to instruct them to reduce their active power 
output. Due to active control signals being sent to all GAs within the MAS, the 
generation curtailment steps must be kept low, assuming that a fast communications 
medium is available for inter-agent communications. As an example, an active 
generation curtailment of 2.5% is instructed by the developed OGA, which means that 
the active power output of the connected SSEGs is down to 1.83kW during t = 1.5 – 
2sec and 2.44kW during t = 2 – 2.5sec. 
 
During the time period t = 1.5 – 2sec, the real power flow at the SSEZ PCC has been 
found to have dropped down to just 4kW and additional SSEG active power 
curtailment is not instructed by the OGA. During the time period t = 1.5 – 2sec, 
however, a much higher SSEG active power reduction than 2.5% is required in order 
to ensure that the “zero power export” operational goal is met. Simulation results have 
shown that it would require 13 commands from the OGA to instruct GAs to reduce 
their active power output down to 1.6875kW, which would then cause the real power 
flow at the SSEZ PCC to drop to as close to zero as possible (14kW).  
 
Such an implementation could therefore be problematic due to the time delays caused 
by the extensive inter-agent communications required. In practice, however, it would 
be unlikely that such a high instantaneous difference in generation (i.e. an increase of 
190kW according to Table 8.13) would be observed when the SSEZ is attempting to 
meet an operational goal. Moreover, the amount of inter-agent communications 
required could also be reduced by increasing the generation curtailment steps. 
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Simulation Time 
Period [sec] 
Real Power Flow 
at PCC [kW] – no 
agents 
Real Power Flow 
at PCC [kW] – 
OGA (economic) 
Real Power Flow
at PCC [kW] – 
OGA (technical) 
t = 0 – 0.5sec +60kW 0kW 0kW 
t = 0.5 – 1sec +120kW 0kW 0kW 
t = 1 – 1.5sec +380kW 0kW 0kW 
t = 1.5 – 2sec +600kW +24kW +4kW 
t = 2 – 2.5sec +790kW +220kW +14kW 
 
Table 8.13: Real power flows at the SSEZ PCC with the upstream distribution 
network under the devised simulation scenarios. 
 
 
 
    8.2.   SCALABILITY AND OPENNESS 
 
Given that the consumer-driven growth of SSEGs is dynamic and unforeseen, the 
control system for an SSEZ must be able to adapt to a changing environment. In 
addition, due to the potential number of controllable entities that may exist, the 
entities managed by the control system should be allowed to grow as quickly and 
easily as possible, i.e. with minimum requirements for modifying the original system. 
In terms of scalability and openness, a FIPA-compliant MAS approach can offer a 
means of managing the growth of entities, such as customers, SSEGs, storage devices 
and network infrastructure within an SSEZ. This can be achieved through the 
instantiation of the corresponding number and type of direct and indirect control 
agents that register their services as described in Section 7.1.2. In addition to the new 
agents to the system, their corresponding databases must also be instantiated.  
 
The use of FIPA agent services offers “plug and play” capabilities to the MAS by 
allowing new agents to automatically register themselves and announce to other 
agents the services they provide. Similarly, agents may be removed from the MAS at 
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all times according to the specific SSEZ environment. This way, it is possible to not 
only introduce new agents to the system, but also to introduce improved versions of 
existing agents and therefore provide increased functionality to the overall MAS. 
Scalability and openness are relevant not only within an SSEZ, but also between 
instances of SSEZs as for example the VPP concept [50-52]. 
 
Simulation results from Chapter 4 identified the order in which the LV distribution 
network constraints under investigation are likely to be encountered as SSEG 
penetrations are increased in the case study SSEZ. On the basis of these results, a 
basic MAS responsible for maintaining customer voltages within statutory limits 
would most likely be adopted first, as shown in Figure 8.14. This approach would 
originally comprise of direct control agents (GAs, ESAs and CDAs) only, reducing 
the need for extensive inter-agent communications, as well as the additional 
implementation costs of installing indirect control agents to the SSEZ.    
 
 
Figure 8.14: The case study SSEZ with direct control agents installed. 
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If SSEG penetration in the network is increased, or if regulatory reforms take place in 
the future which allow small-scale generators to provide ancillary services to the local 
DNO (for example through meeting a set of operational goals), increased functionality 
will be required by the MAS. The addition of indirect control agents to the system 
could then provide this functionality and this could take place in the “plug-and-play” 
manner described in Section 7.1.2. Similarly, introducing improved versions of 
existing agents is also possible, for example in order to improve their reasoning 
capabilities as will be described in Section 9.2.1. 
 
 
 
    8.3.   RESILIENCE AND RELIABILITY 
 
In order to evaluate the resilience and reliability of the developed control system, 
potential failures may be considered with respect to:  
1. SSEZ component failure, i.e. the failure of an SSEG, ESU or load to be controlled 
when instructed by the relevant direct control agent; 
2. Measurement and monitoring equipment failure, i.e. the failure of these devices to 
send measurement data back to system agents, or the provision of erroneous 
measurements. 
3. DBMS failure, which may occur either due to failure in one or more of the 
databases present in the SSEZ, or due to failure in the management of these 
databases. 
4. MAS failure, i.e. failure of the machine(s), operating system, system agents or the 
agent platform where the agents run. This includes failure in the control software 
as well as the hardware platform where the software is deployed. 
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The research described here only considers DBMS and MAS failure, as the other two 
types of failure are independent of the selected control approach. It has been argued 
[93, 97] that MAS technology has the potential of eliminating single points of failure. 
Although this may be achieved through proper design and implementation, 
eliminating single points of failure is not guaranteed simply by employing a MAS-
based control system. General MAS theory with regards resilience and reliability has 
been described in detail in [93] and [197]. The following characteristics must 
generally be taken into account: 
1. Individual agent architecture: Agents should be designed and developed with 
respect to potential internal or external failures.  
2. MAS platform: The failure of an agent residing on a particular platform should not 
affect the agent environment or the other agents within the MAS. 
3. Communications: Inter-agents communications must be as reliable as possible. If 
a message is not delivered, the sender must be notified along with the reason that 
caused this failure. 
4. Social knowledge: Knowledge within the MAS must be dynamically obtained in a 
reliable and resilient manner.  
5. Physical distribution: By physically distributing the agents within an MAS, fault 
tolerance may be improved in the event of hardware failure, software failure, 
power failure etc. 
 
During the software design (Chapter 6) and implementation (Chapter 7), the following 
steps ensured that these five characteristics were taken into account: 
1. Individual agent architecture: For direct control agents, communications failure 
with the indirect control or the utility agents within the MAS, or the individual 
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failure of other agents in the system may cause their performance to be degraded 
(for example by not allowing them to respond to control signals sent by indirect 
control agents), however they remain operational and continue to provide locally 
the “Direct_Control” service. Indirect control agents, however, rely on direct 
control agents in order to satisfy their design objectives, and therefore loss of 
communications is likely to have a more adverse effect to their performance. 
These agents remain operational in the event of system failures but their ability to 
effectively provide the services that they offer will depend on the type and 
severity of failure. Ideally, agent design is performed according to the concept of 
“graceful degradation” [123], where in the event of failures performance is 
gracefully degraded, fulfilling as many of the agent design objectives as possible 
without resulting in failure of the whole system. 
2. MAS Platform and Communications: The employment of JADE, one of the most 
robust MAS development toolkits currently available [102-103] can ensure that 
both of these points are met. This is one of the main reasons for selecting JADE as 
the ADK for the implementation of the MAS, as detailed in Section 8.1.1. 
3. Social knowledge: The presence of just one DF and one AMS that manage social 
knowledge within the MAS could present single points of failure within the 
system. In order to increase redundancy, providing a replication of these agents 
that would run on a separate container could increase system reliability (Figure 
8.15), however this would not protect the system from faults in the code within 
these agents.  
4. Physical distribution: Direct control agents within the MAS are physically 
distributed, with each agent running on a separate hardware platform. Indirect 
control agents and utility agents may or may not be physically distributed, 
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depending on the specific MAS implementation, which in turn will depend on the 
computing and communications resources available. If the MAS is running on 
only one container, failure of the Java virtual machine or the operating system on 
which the container is running could result in failure of the whole system. For this 
reason, two features of JADE could be employed in order to ensure that the MAS 
remains fully operational even in the event of a main container failure [103]: (i) 
the main container replication service, i.e. allowing the main container and the 
AMS to be replicated in order to keep all replicas fully synchronised and to ensure 
that another container takes over in the event of failure (Figure 8.15); and (ii) the 
DF persistence implementation, i.e. allowing the list of services of the DF to be 
recorded in a relational database, typically using the JDBC interface. In the event 
of main container failure, a new DF is automatically started on the new main 
container, which then retrieves this list from the database. 
 
Figure 8.15: A JADE platform without (left) and with (right) the main container 
replication service. 
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Failure in the DBMS may occur either due to an individual database failure, or due to 
failure in the management of these databases, such as a failure in the database server.  
1. Failure in an SSEG, ESU or load database will cause the direct control agent that 
is coupled to this database to lose communication with the power system entity it 
is controlling and will therefore result in the agent being unable to achieve its 
primary design objective, namely the “Direct_Control” service. In the absence of a 
local database, the power system entity may therefore need to be disconnected 
from the SSEZ in order to protect the equipment from potential damage. 
Additionally, in the event of such failure, direct control agents could attempt to 
receive measurement data directly from the power system entity that they are 
coupled with, if such functionality exists. In all the cases, however, failure in an 
SSEG, ESU or load database will not bring the system down and customer steady-
state voltages within the SSEZ will be kept inside statutory limits as a result of the 
distributed droop control paradigm described in Section 8.1.1. 
2. Failure in the indirect control database or the database server could result in a 
single point of failure, and therefore increased redundancy is required in order to 
gain fault tolerance. Since indirect control agents can not achieve their design 
objectives without receiving measurement data from the indirect control database, 
contingency plans such as replication or back-up servers should be employed in 
order to increase system resilience and reliability.    
 
 
 
    8.4.   COMMUNICATIONS EFFICIENCY 
 
The proposed MAS-based approach offers communication efficiency gains compared 
to traditional centralised approaches through: (i) the execution of local autonomous 
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control actions; and (ii) by ensuring that only relevant measurement data and control 
signals are sent for system control purposes. For the management of customer 
voltages and network losses within the SSEZ, all control actions are performed locally 
and autonomously by the relevant subset of the agent community, i.e. direct control 
agents, without the need for any inter-agent communications. Using a centralised 
approach, the level of communications required would be significantly more 
intensive, as measurement data would firstly need to be collected at a central point 
and then control signals would be dispatched to the relevant controllable entities 
within the SSEZ.  
 
Moreover, through the employment of indirect control agents that monitor strategic 
locations within the SSEZ, such as cable “hot-spots”, power flows at the PCC and 
voltage unbalance factors at the remote ends of the SSEZ feeders, the proposed MAS-
based control approach ensures that only relevant measurement data and control 
signals are exchanged. All agents within the developed MAS have a limited view of 
the system, which is based on the notion that they only receive measurement data that 
will allow them to achieve their particular design objectives. In addition, inter-agent 
communications are only performed between the relevant agents as explained in 
Section 6.3.4. This way, information exchange within the system is minimised, which 
is an important requirement for the selected control approach due to the potential 
number of monitoring and control points within the SSEZ. On the contrary, a 
centralised approach would require communication links between the measurement 
devices, the controllable power system entities within the SSEZ and the central point 
of the controller, which could potentially become a communication bottleneck.  
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Delays and data rates of some of the commonly available media employed in 
electrical power systems are shown in Tables 8.14 and 8.15 respectively. 
Communication medium Associated delay – One way 
(milliseconds) 
Fiber-optic cables 100 – 150 
Digital microwave links 100 – 150 
Power line carriers (PLC) 150 – 350 
Telephone lines 200 – 300 
Satellite link 500 – 700 
 
Table 8.14: Communication delays of popular communication media. 
 
 
 
Communication medium Data rate (bps) 
 
T1 
1 Mbps. Effective bandwidth,  
however, considering network  
traffic, data collision etc could be  
as low as 125 kbps 
Frame relay 280 kbps 
ISDN 140 kbps 
56k leased line 565 kbps. Effective bandwidth, 
however, will be lower than this. 
Internet Effective rate could be as low as 40 
kbps, depending on network traffic 
Radio frequency 9.6 kbps 
Power line carriers (PLC) 1.2 kbps 
 
Table 8.15: Data rates (bps) of popular communication media. 
 
 
 
The communication requirements of the SSEZ control system correspond to the 
different tasks that must be realised in order to control the zone under normal, alert or 
emergency state. The bandwidth needs for each measurement, control or 
communication task described in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 are different and with a 
required time response that depends on the nature of the task. In all the cases, 
monitoring of the system is critical for event detection. During alert or emergency 
state, the bandwidth requirements depend on the duration and disturbance nature of 
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the event. With the exception of voltage rise/drop and loss reduction, information 
must be shared between different components as previously described.  
 
Table 8.16 illustrates the bandwidth requirements and the response time requirements 
for different tasks of the SSEZ control system. In general, issues associated with 
voltage control require a faster response compared to thermal limits. This is because 
in most distribution systems, system equipment (cables, lines and transformers) will 
not be critically damaged if their maximum current rating capacity has been exceeded 
by a small margin and for a short period of time. For voltage control issues, however, 
common statutory regulations are employed in all UK LV distribution networks and 
adhering to these regulations often requires a faster response.  
 
Measurement, control 
or communication task 
Bandwidth requirement Response time 
requirement 
 
Transfer of power system 
data measurements 
- Low (for direct control 
agents) 
- Medium (for indirect 
control agents) 
 
Seconds 
Inter-agent 
communications (ACL) 
Medium Seconds 
Communication between 
a direct control agent and 
a SSEG/ESU/load 
 
Low 
 
Milliseconds to Seconds 
Agent-to-database 
communications (JDBC) 
Low Milliseconds 
Control of customer 
voltages based on local 
decisions 
 
Low 
 
Milliseconds to Seconds 
Control of load losses 
based on local decisions 
 
Low 
 
Milliseconds to Seconds 
Control of an SSEZ 
thermal “hot-spot” or a 
distribution transformer 
 
Low/Medium 
 
Seconds to minutes 
Control of voltage 
regulation statutory limits 
 
Low/Medium 
 
Seconds 
Control of voltage 
unbalance statutory limits 
 
Low/Medium 
 
Seconds 
 
Table 8.16: Bandwidth requirements and response time requirements for different 
tasks within the developed control system. 
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As it can be seen, the communication requirements for the control system of an SSEZ 
could be met through the employment of the communication architecture shown in 
Figure 6.8. This is because the majority of tasks within an SSEZ require a response 
time in the region of seconds, which can readily be provided by utilising existing 
peer-to-peer communication infrastructure such as residential broadband and the 
public Internet (Table 8.15). 
 
 
 
    8.5.   EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
 
In addition to the simulation work described previously, a laboratory-based 
Experimental SSEZ was developed at Durham University by another PhD student [32, 
198-199]. The Experimental SSEZ consists of one load emulator, one wind turbine 
generator emulator, one PV generation emulator, one dCHP emulator, one ESU and a 
network connection emulator as shown in Figure 8.16.  
 
Monitoring and control systems were developed using the LabVIEW™ [200] visual 
programming environment that enable the flexible, real-time measurement of system 
parameters (voltage, current, frequency etc) and also enable repeatable, controlled 
testing to be carried out. The aim of the Experimental SSEZ is to highlight the 
practical issues associated with implementing distributed control techniques on an 
existing LV distribution network, as well as to observe the actual dynamic responses 
of power system components such as power electronic converters and electrical 
machines. 
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Figure 8.16: View of the Experimental SSEZ at Durham University. 
 
 
A simple application of the proposed agent-based approach for voltage control in the 
Experimental SSEZ is presented based on work described in [32]. The following 
agents were implemented in the Experimental SSEZ using the LabVIEW™ visual 
programming environment, as shown in Figure 8.17: 
- Generator Agents (GAs) ~ one GA controlling the wind turbine generator 
emulator and one GA controlling the PV generator emulator. 
- Consumer Demand Agent (CDA) ~ one CDA controlling the load emulator. 
- Energy Storage Agent (ESA) ~ one ESA controlling the ESU emulator. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.17: Application of an agent-based approach to the Experimental SSEZ. 
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Under normal operating conditions, the Experimental SSEZ was operated such that 
steady-state voltages were maintained within the designated statutory limits. For the 
purposes of the test, the nominal voltage was defined as 225.5V, while the allowable 
voltage rise limit was defined as 232V. Initially, the prime mover of the wind turbine 
generator emulator was instructed to operate at a speed that results in a power output 
of 0.4kW to the system, the PV generator emulator was instructed to export 1.5kW 
and the load imports approximately 0.8kW.  
 
At time t = 230s the prime mover of the wind turbine generator emulator was 
instructed to accelerate to a speed that resulted in the export of 1.2kW to the system. 
The power import of the load emulator and the power export of the PV generator 
emulator initially remain constant. At time t = 320s and at 90s intervals thereafter the 
load is reduced by 0.2kW until the demand is reduced to zero. Figure 8.18(a) 
illustrates the effect of the operation of the wind turbine generator emulator and the 
changing load profile on the remote end network voltage, without any agents 
deployed in the system. It can be seen that the voltage in this case exceeds the defined 
voltage rise limit of 232V following the increase in wind generation and thereafter the 
decrease in demand. 
 
Figure 8.18(b) illustrates the operation of the initial Wind Generator Agent (WGA I) 
and the PV Generator Agent (PVGA I) operating individually to mitigate the steady-
state voltage rise. This was achieved through feedback control loops in WGA I and 
PVGA I instructing the grid interface inverters of the wind turbine and the PV 
generator emulator respectively to curtail their power outputs until satisfactory system 
operation is achieved.  
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Figure 8.18(c) illustrates the operation of WGA I and the PVGA 1 operating at the 
same time to overcome the steady-state voltage rise. In the trace titled WGA I & 
PVGA I (No Comms) there are no inter-agent communications however in the trace 
titled WGA II & PVGA II (Comms) inter-agent communication is part of the 
functionality of these agents who work as a team to solve the voltage rise problem. 
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Figure 8.18: Operation of over-voltage agents in the Experimental SSEZ. 
 
 
 
The deployment of agents without inter-agent communications was shown in [32] to 
result in lower energy yields for consumers at the remote end of the radial LV 
network than if inter-agent communications were implemented among the agents. The 
overall energy yield from the system, however, is likely to be higher if no inter-agent 
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communication is implemented. This is due to the fact that if large amounts of 
generation result in the voltage at the remote end exceeding statutory limits the 
reduction in generation output is likely to take place near the remote end of the 
network where the effect of the local controllers will be most pronounced, assuming 
that the feedback gains are equal. In addition, the extra cost of setting up a 
communications infrastructure between the agents is also a factor when considering 
the benefits of implementing inter-agent communications. 
 
 
 
    8.6.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
The principles described in the previous two Chapters were applied to the case study 
SSEZ model in PSCAD/EMTDC™ with the aim being to evaluate the suitability of 
the developed control system to provide the functionality required for an SSEZ. 
Various evaluation scenarios were outlined in order to: (i) overcome the identified LV 
distribution network constraints (Sections 8.1.1 – 8.1.5); and (ii) meet an operational 
goal (Section 8.1.6). In all the cases, the developed control system was found to 
satisfy the specific control requirements of the SSEZ, while at the same time: (i) 
avoiding unnecessary SSEG active power curtailment; and (ii) reducing active power 
losses within the SSEZ through reactive power flow minimisation. In addition, the 
proposed MAS-based control approach could provide significant benefits compared to 
traditional centralised control techniques in the following three areas: (i) scalability 
and openness; (ii) resilience and robustness; and (iii) communications efficiency. 
These findings suggest that MAS technology has the potential of being able to meet 
the requirements of the electricity industry for the distributed control of electrical 
distribution networks with high SSEG penetrations.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
 
Conclusions and Further Work 
 
 
 
 
 
This Thesis presented an investigation on the technical impacts caused by the steady-
state operation of Small-Scale Embedded Generators (SSEGs) and also introduced the 
Small Scale Energy Zone (SSEZ) concept which aims to remove the technical barriers 
associated with SSEG through intelligent coordination of large numbers of customer-
owned SSEGs, energy storage units and controllable loads. In addition, by grouping 
these entities into a controllable zone, increased economic and environmental benefits 
may be realised. This approach represents a move away from the conventional 
passive, “fit-and-forget” philosophy under which the majority of LV networks are 
currently operated and towards a higher degree of network operational management. 
The employment of a distributed management and control approach, realised through 
the Multi Agent Systems (MAS) technology, was proposed due to the advantages that 
can potentially be realised in the areas of: (i) scalability and openness, (ii) reliability 
and resilience and (iii) communications efficiency. These areas were shown to be 
particularly important when considering future high SSEG penetration scenarios. 
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    9.1.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main conclusions stemming from the research described in this Thesis are 
presented here. As stated in Section 1.3, the research objectives of this Thesis were: 
1. To evaluate the technical impacts caused by the steady-state operation of SSEGs 
and to quantify allowable SSEG penetration limits on suitable case study LV 
distribution networks.  
Three different LV distribution networks were modelled in the power systems 
simulation package PSCAD™/EMTDC™: (i) one generic urban UK LV distribution 
network; (ii) one existing urban UK LV distribution network; and (iii) one generic 
sub-urban European LV distribution network. Simulation results were obtained from 
the developed models in order to obtain allowable SSEG penetration limits and in 
order to analyse the key electrical characteristics that determine the response of LV 
distribution networks to the addition of high SSEG volumes.  
 
Significant differences were observed regarding both the SSEG volumes that may be 
accommodated on each network and the order in which the five constraints under 
consideration were encountered (voltage regulation, customer voltage rise, voltage 
unbalance, cable and transformer thermal limits and network losses). Customer 
voltage rise was shown to be the most limiting constraint for the UK generic and the 
UK existing case study network, while voltage regulation and cable thermal limits 
were found to be the most limiting constraints for the European generic network. In 
addition, voltage unbalance has been identified as having the potential to cause 
concern for DNOs in LV networks with high SSEG penetrations. This is both due to 
the relatively low unbalanced SSEG volumes that may be accommodated before 
voltage unbalance statutory limits are exceeded, as well as because SSEG growth is 
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consumer-driven (as governed by the “fit-and-inform” policy) and DNOs in most 
cases will have limited control over selecting the phase of SSEG connection. 
 
These differences illustrate that generic networks are often quite different from real 
networks and therefore the results of SSEG impact studies carried out on generic 
networks alone must be treated with caution. This emphasises the need for specific 
impact studies to be performed by DNOs on their LV distribution networks in order to 
investigate the technical impacts of SSEGs and to assess SSEG penetration limits 
within each LV distribution network. If SSEG proliferates as anticipated [5-7], the 
number of studies required could place a significant burden on DNOs and therefore a 
means of managing this might be needed in the future. 
 
2. To develop a methodology for predicting allowable SSEG volumes on any case 
study LV distribution network quickly and easily and without the need for 
developing detailed computer-based models.  
On the basis of the simulation results obtained from PSCAD™/EMTDC™, an 
analysis of the key electrical characteristics that determine the response of LV 
distribution networks to the addition of high SSEG volumes was performed. The key 
factors that have been identified through simulation as having an effect on the 
technical impacts of SSEGs under investigation are the following: (i) network 
symmetry; (ii) network topology; (iii) network length; (iv) distribution substation 
voltage; (v) network lines; (vi) distribution transformer; (vii) SSEG power factor; 
(viii) SSEG network location; (ix) SSEG phase location; and (x) loading conditions.  
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In order to develop a methodology for predicting allowable SSEG penetration limits 
on any case study LV distribution network, the concept of “overall network apparent 
impedance” was derived which calculates the value for the overall apparent 
impedance of any LV distribution network in three steps: (i) by determining the 
apparent impedance at a network location (single customer); (ii) by determining the 
apparent impedance at a network location (multiple customers); and (iii) by 
determining the overall network apparent impedance (all customers, all locations). 
 
The proposed methodology allows SSEG penetration limits to be predicted quickly 
and easily and without the need for developing detailed computer-based models. 
These may be quantified by comparing the overall network apparent impedance of the 
case study LV distribution network to the overall network apparent impedance of the 
UK or European generic network, depending on which of the two networks is deemed 
by the user to be the most similar. Estimated allowable SSEG volumes may then be 
obtained based on either statutory regulations (voltage regulation, voltage rise, voltage 
unbalance) or equipment ratings (cable and transformer thermal limits) by considering 
the excess SSEG power output that may be accommodated in the case study network 
in comparison to results obtained from the selected generic network. 
 
Having developed the proposed methodology, it was then applied on an existing 
public UK LV distribution network for evaluation purposes. There was reasonable 
agreement between the results obtained from simulations and the methodology 
predictions providing confidence that the methodology could in some cases be used 
instead of detailed modelling. In particular, the strength of the proposed methodology 
 243
is that although it is based on studies carried out on generic networks it contains 
adaptation steps designed to ensure it is applicable to real LV distribution networks.  
 
The methodology predictions were found to be accurate regarding voltage regulation 
as this impact can be assessed adequately by only considering the impedances and 
power flows between the distribution transformer and the end of each feeder. In the 
case of customer voltage rise, the methodology was found to be accurate for uniform 
distributions of SSEGs where the assumed distribution transformer voltage is 
accurate. For SSEGs clustered on only one feeder of the case study network, however, 
this assumption is not correct and this was reflected in the results obtained. 
 
Voltage unbalance predictions were found to be reasonably accurate but not exact as 
they were based on the assumption that the case study network impedances are 
exactly the same as those found in the UK generic network. For cases where the 
impedances are significantly different, the methodology contains an adaptation stage 
for obtaining an estimate on the allowable SSEG volumes that may be accommodated. 
In general, however, due to the non linear relationship between network impedances 
and voltage unbalance, a discrepancy between results from the methodology and 
simulation results is to be expected.  
 
Finally, for transformer and cable thermal limits, the methodology predictions were 
also found to be reasonably accurate, with some minor differences observed due to 
errors in losses predictions caused by differences in customer distribution and hence 
in power flows. A full load flow calculation would then be required in order to 
remove this error completely. 
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3. To identify the key control requirements of an SSEZ. 
Since SSEZs contain sections of public LV networks, they must be transformed from 
passive to active entities to facilitate the integration of SSEGs. The key control 
requirements of an SSEZ are: (i) to ensure secure system operation by complying with 
existing statutory regulations and equipment thermal ratings; and (ii) to meet a set of 
operational goals associated with providing the local DNO with controllable demand 
or generation, depending on the electrical power balance within the zone. 
  
The following technical constraints were taken into consideration: (i) customer 
voltage rise; (ii) voltage regulation; (iii) voltage unbalance; (iv) cable and transformer 
thermal limits; and (v) network losses. In order for the adopted control system to 
ensure that these constraints are overcome, three main stages are involved: (i) state 
assessment, where measurement data from specific measurement points within the 
SSEZ are collected and processed; (ii) action planning and decomposition, where 
potential control actions are identified; and (iii) action execution, where control 
actions are sent to customer-owned SSEZ power system entities (SSEGs, ESUs and/or 
controllable loads) and these actions also reviewed. 
 
Aside from the technically-driven goal of ensuring secure system operation, an SSEZ 
should also have the ability to provide the local DNO with predictable and 
controllable demand or generation. In turn, this could lead to increased economic 
benefits due to group interaction with energy markets and the potential provision of 
ancillary services to DNOs. Depending on network conditions, five different 
operational goals for an SSEZ were identified: (i) zero power export, (ii) zero power 
import, (iii) zero power import and export (self-sufficiency), (iv) constant power 
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import and (v) dispatchable power. In order for the adopted SSEZ control system to 
ensure that an operational goal has been met, the same three stages (state assessment, 
action planning and decomposition and action execution) are employed. 
 
4. To select and design a suitable control approach based on the specific control 
requirements of an SSEZ. The proposed approach must then be implemented using 
software development tools and evaluated on a case study SSEZ using a suitable 
power systems simulation package. 
Two different control approaches were considered over their suitability to satisfy the 
specific control requirements of an SSEZ. The first one would be the extension of 
traditional centralised control systems from their current operation to cover LV 
distribution networks as well. The second would be the development of a distributed 
control approach, where control decisions are made with a degree of autonomy. The 
employment of a distributed control approach, realised through the MAS technology, 
was proposed due to the advantages that can potentially be realised in the areas of: (i) 
scalability and openness, (ii) reliability and resilience and (iii) communications 
efficiency. These areas were shown to be particularly important when considering 
future high SSEG penetration scenarios. 
 
The MAS for the active control of an SSEZ was implemented using the JADE (Java 
Agent DEvelopment Framework) agent development toolkit ensuring full FIPA 
(Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents) compliance, and comprises of three types 
of agents: (i) direct control agents, (ii) indirect control agents and (iii) utility agents. 
The objective of the MAS is to provide a grid-interactive control strategy for all 
customer-owned controllable components installed within the SSEZ (SSEGs, ESUs 
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and controllable loads) by determining their real and reactive power set points based 
on the specific control requirements of the SSEZ. In order to achieve that, three 
operating states were implemented inside the functionality of the direct and indirect 
control agents: (i) normal state, where the aim is to maximise the total SSEG active 
power output and to reduce system load losses by reactive power flow minimisation; 
(ii) alert state, where the aim is to bring the system back to its normal state by 
employing DSM and ESM schemes as well as reactive power support for voltage 
control; and (iii) emergency state, where active power curtailment of SSEGs is 
necessary in order to ensure secure system operation.  
 
Central to the functionality of the developed MAS are the reasoning and 
communication capabilities implemented inside each agent, as well as the 
employment of a common ontology for sharing knowledge. These were designed and 
developed specifically for meeting the SSEZ control requirements. Protégé and the 
OntologyBeanGenerator plug-in were employed for the development of the 
application-specific common ontology. Meanwhile, agent decision-making is 
performed according to a set of rules based on the three operating states of system 
agents. The reasoning capabilities of system agents were kept as simple as possible, 
while at the same time ensuring that the SSEZ remains functional independent of the 
operating state. This was done in order to minimise the required processing time and 
power of the hardware entities where the agents are to be housed and thus also reduce 
the associated costs of employing a MAS-based control system. Finally, agent 
coordination is achieved through cooperation of system agents, where the overall goal 
is always a higher priority compared to individual goals (“good citizen” behaviour). 
 
 247
In addition to the proposed MAS, a relational database management system 
(RDBMS) was designed and implemented using MySQL. The aim of the RDBMS is 
to allow measurement data within the SSEZ to be stored and retrieved by the relevant 
system agents in order to provide information regarding the current status of the 
SSEZ, thereby enabling analyses of network events and network performance. Four 
types of databases were developed: (i) an indirect control database; (ii) a SSEG 
database; (iii) an ESU database; and (iv) a load database. These databases comprise 
all the necessary information and measurement data required by system agents in 
order to achieve their design objectives. Communications between the developed 
agents and their respective databases may be achieved using Java DataBase 
Connectivity (JDBC), which is the industry standard for interface between 
applications developed using the Java programming language and a wide range of 
databases. Finally, all data management functions within the SSEZ, i.e. data entry, 
access, update, storage, retrieval, etc, are performed through the RDBMS.  
 
Having designed and developed the MAS and RDBMS for satisfying the specific 
control requirements of an SSEZ, various evaluation scenarios were devised in order 
to assess the operation of the developed control system on a case study SSEZ. In 
general, the performance of the control system will depend on the capability for active 
and reactive power control within the overall SSEZ, which will depend on the 
availability and controllability of the installed customer-owned power system entities 
(SSEGs, ESUs and controllable loads). In all the cases, however, the developed 
control system was found to be able to overcome the identified LV distribution 
network constraints or to meet an SSEZ operational goal. At the same time, benefits 
compared to a passive control approach can be realised in the following two areas: 
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1. Maximising the total SSEG active power output in the SSEZ: Currently, SSEGs 
are treated as non-firm generation, whereby they must operate within statutory 
voltage and frequency limits and are tripped during contingency conditions. Under 
the proposed active management scheme, SSEGs are treated as regulated non-firm 
generation whereby they are subject to power factor adjustment or curtailment of 
real power output and are only tripped during emergency conditions.  
Maximising the total SSEG active power output in the SSEZ was achieved by 
ensuring that SSEGs were operating at their maximum power output and by 
avoiding SSEG active power output curtailment. This is because SSEG active 
power curtailment has important economic consequences as the SSEG owner 
loses part of its revenue which will have an impact on the SSEG payback time.  
2. Reducing active power losses within the SSEZ through reactive power flow 
minimisation. Power factor correction has only been considered for the GAs 
within the SSEZ control system, however it may also be considered for ESAs and 
CDAs if such controllability is available. This operation is in contrast to current 
typical SSEG operation, where SSEG units are operated at unity power factors 
because their owners are financially rewarded only for active power output.  
Load losses were found to be proportional to the current squared, whereas the 
current reduced due to SSEG reactive power control was in direct proportion to 
the power-factor improvement. Therefore, load losses were found to be inversely 
proportional to the square of the power factor, with significant reductions in load 
losses observed through adjusting the power factor of the connected SSEGs. 
Finally, in addition to active power loss reduction, power factor correction was 
also found to relieve the unnecessary transmission of reactive power, resulting in 
feeder power factors that approach unity. Hence, the additional capacity that may 
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be accommodated due to power factor correction may in some cases reduce 
potential network bottlenecks. 
 
In terms of scalability and openness of the control system, a FIPA-compliant MAS 
approach was found to offer a flexible means of managing the growth of entities, such 
as customers, SSEGs, storage devices and network infrastructure within an SSEZ. The 
use of FIPA agent services ensured “plug-and-play” capabilities to the MAS by 
allowing new agents to automatically register themselves and announcing to other 
agents the services they provide. Similarly, agents can be removed from the MAS at 
all times according to the specific SSEZ environment. This way, it is possible to not 
only introduce new agents to the system, but also to introduce improved versions of 
existing agents and therefore provide increased functionality to the overall MAS. At 
the same time, these changes may occur without any modifications to the basic 
communication and computing infrastructure and with minimal human supervision. 
 
Regarding resilience and reliability, the presence of just two utility agents that manage 
social knowledge within the MAS could present single points of failure within the 
system. In addition, if the MAS was running on only one container, failure of the Java 
Virtual Machine or the operating system on which the container was running could 
result in failure of the whole system. For this reason, the employment of the main 
container replication service and the directory facilitator persistence implementation 
was proposed as a means of ensuring that the MAS remains fully operational even in 
the event of a main container failure. Additionally, the individual failure of an indirect 
control agent may cause agent performance to be degraded (for example by not 
allowing the agent to respond to control signals sent by an indirect control agent), 
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however the agent remains operational and continues to provide locally the 
“Direct_Control” service. Failure of an indirect control agent, however, is likely to 
have a more adverse effect to agent performance. These agents remain operational in 
the event of system failures but their ability to effectively provide the services that 
they offer will depend on the type and severity of failure. 
 
Finally, the proposed MAS-based approach can offer communication efficiency gains 
compared to traditional centralised approaches through: (i) the execution of local 
autonomous control actions; and (ii) by ensuring that only relevant measurement data 
and control signals are sent for system control purposes. All agents within the 
developed MAS have a limited view of the system, which is based on the notion that 
they only receive measurement data that will allow them to achieve their particular 
design objectives. In addition, inter-agent communications are only performed 
between relevant agents in order to minimise information exchange within the system. 
In contrast to current practices at the LV customer level, where very little command, 
control and data acquisition is typically carried out, the communication requirements 
of the proposed MAS-based control system were found to be significant. An initial 
investigation, however, showed that these may be met by utilising existing peer-to-
peer communication infrastructure, such as for example residential broadband and the 
public Internet. This is because the majority of measurement, control or 
communication tasks within an SSEZ require a response time in the region of 
seconds, which can readily be provided by existing communication media used for 
Power Engineering applications. 
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    9.2.   FURTHER WORK 
 
The research described in this Thesis presents a MAS-based control approach for an 
SSEZ, but it is recognised that further work in a number of research areas could 
provide still more benefit. There are two possible directions for the continuation of the 
work described here. The first would be going deeper and extending some of the 
topics that were investigated in this Thesis, while the second would be the further 
evaluation of the MAS-based control approach that was presented. 
 
 
 
     9.2.1.    Extension of the Research 
There are a variety of research topics that could be explored as a means of improving 
the functionality of the developed MAS-based control system. Some specific 
examples are outlined below, along with the potential benefits that could be realised. 
1. Include economic scheduling in agent decision-making: Further value could be 
added to the SSEZ concept if agent decision-making was also based on economic 
scheduling, i.e. the participation of direct control agents to the electricity market 
through interaction with a market operator [125-127]. This operation, however, 
would also necessitate consideration of agents competing for resources and not 
just cooperation of agent activity according to the “good citizen” behaviour. 
2. Include heat management in agent decision-making: In general, since electrical 
power is more readily transported than heat, heat production close to the location 
of heat demand is more common than heat production close to electrical demand. 
The ability of some types of SSEGs to supply waste heat near the point of 
utilisation coupled with appropriate control strategies may allow more effective 
use of waste heat, thereby avoiding extensive thermal distribution networks. 
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3. Include forecasting techniques: Forecasting techniques may include both demand 
forecasting, as well as renewable power generation forecasting. As an example, 
such techniques may be implemented inside the functionality of the MAS as a 
means of simplifying the identification of a suitable operational goal.  
4. Ontology design based on the Common Information Model: The Common 
Information Model (CIM) [201-202] may be used in any domain where a common 
representation for an electrical power system is needed, such as for example an 
SSEZ. However, the CIM is not currently mature enough for adoption within an 
LV distribution network environment since description for LV distribution 
network components is not currently present. Hence, additional development of 
the CIM would be required in order to be able to adopt it for an SSEZ.  
5. Improved agent reasoning capabilities: The research described in this Thesis was 
concerned with responsive control, however pro-active techniques may also be 
investigated, whereby the location, period and possibility of an LV distribution 
network constraint to be encountered may be anticipated over a time period. In 
addition, learning techniques may be incorporated, where agents are able to act 
based on previous experiences and beliefs. This could allow direct and indirect 
control agents to store their control actions according to the identified network 
event and also to be able to determine the most suitable course of action for future 
events. Finally, a more flexible approach could be adopted in the occurrence of 
conflicting actions between system agents, where agent priorities change 
depending on technical, economic, or environmental considerations. For instance, 
reflection was applied in [94, 123] as a means of allowing an agent to reflect on 
the knowledge, abilities and goals of other agents and thus provide the appropriate 
solution from a set of competing actions.    
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     9.2.2.    Further Evaluation 
The second potential direction for the continuation of the work described in this 
Thesis would be the further evaluation of the proposed MAS-based control approach.  
1. Simulation tools could be employed to investigate the dynamic and transient 
response of the developed control system. An initial investigation in the dynamic 
behaviour of the case study SSEZ suggested that the proposed system would not 
cause significant stability problems. However, additional research is required in 
order to further support this view and to develop specific control actions for the 
dynamic behaviour of the direct and indirect control agents within the MAS. In 
addition, the evaluation scenarios described in this Thesis focused only on one 
case study SSEZ and only on one operational goal. Further evaluation on different 
types of case study SSEZs could provide different conclusions with regards the 
benefits that may be realised by employing MAS technology. 
2. An initial experimental investigation of the proposed MAS-based control 
approach was presented in Section 8.5. However, there are two main limitations 
with the presented approach: firstly, it is not FIPA-compliant and secondly, it does 
not include an RDBMS for data management purposes. Hence, a more 
comprehensive experimental investigation could provide still more benefit 
towards the evaluation of the MAS-based control approach presented in this 
Thesis. This could allow detailed communication issues, such as time delays 
between inter-agent communications, agent-to-database communications or 
between direct control agents and the customer-owned power system entities, to 
be taken into account. In addition, the dynamic behaviour of the developed control 
system could be investigated experimentally in order to determine whether the 
proposed system would cause stability problems to the operation of the SSEZ. 
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Appendix A 
 
Rec. Send.   CSA Length    Rph    Xph     Rn     R0     X0     IZ 
    1.1    1.2    300   78.6 0.1 0.073 0.164 0.593 0.042    465 
    1.2    1.3     70    36 0.443 0.076 0.443 1.772 0.052    205 
    1.2    1.4    185    85 0.164 0.074 0.164 0.656 0.05    355 
    2.1    2.2    300    32 0.1 0.073 0.164 0.593 0.042    465 
    2.2    2.3    120    73 0.253 0.071 0.253 1.012 0.046    280 
    2.2    2.4    300    90 0.1 0.073 0.164 0.593 0.042    465 
    2.4    2.5     70    67 0.443 0.076 0.443 1.772 0.052    205 
    2.5    2.6     70    24 0.443 0.076 0.443 1.772 0.052    205 
    2.5    2.7     70    52 0.443 0.076 0.443 1.772 0.052    205 
    2.4    2.8    300    41 0.1 0.073 0.164 0.593 0.042    465 
    2.8    2.9     70    93 0.443 0.076 0.443 1.772 0.052    205 
    2.8   2.10    300    35 0.1 0.073 0.164 0.593 0.042    465 
   2.10   2.11    120    70 0.253 0.071 0.253 1.012 0.046    280 
   2.11   2.12     70    53 0.443 0.076 0.443 1.772 0.052    205 
   2.11   2.13    120    12 0.253 0.071 0.253 1.012 0.046    280 
   2.13   2.14     70    32 0.443 0.076 0.443 1.772 0.052    205 
   2.13   2.15     70    41 0.443 0.076 0.443 1.772 0.052    205 
   2.10   2.16    300    33 0.1 0.073 0.164 0.593 0.042    465 
   2.16   2.17    120    68 0.253 0.071 0.253 1.012 0.046    280 
   2.16   2.18    300    17 0.1 0.073 0.164 0.593 0.042    465 
   2.18   2.19     70    40 0.443 0.076 0.443 1.772 0.052    205 
    3.1   3.2    185    15 0.164 0.074 0.164 0.656 0.05    355 
    3.2   3.3    120    80 0.253 0.071 0.253 1.012 0.046    280 
    3.3   3.4    120    85 0.253 0.071 0.253 1.012 0.046    280 
    4.1   4.2    185    27 0.164 0.074 0.164 0.656 0.05    355 
    4.2   4.3    185    82 0.164 0.074 0.164 0.656 0.05    355 
    4.3   4.4    120    40 0.253 0.071 0.253 1.012 0.046    280 
    4.3   4.5    120    17 0.253 0.071 0.253 1.012 0.046    280 
    4.2   4.6    120    26 0.253 0.071 0.253 1.012 0.046    280 
    4.6   4.7     70    90 0.443 0.076 0.443 1.772 0.052    205 
    4.6   4.8    120    53 0.253 0.071 0.253 1.012 0.046    280 
Public Lighting     25       -    1.18 0.043 0.9 4.72 0.03    100 
House Services     35      30 0.851 0.041 0.9 3.404 0.03    120 
 
Table A-1: Conductor Cross-Sectional Area (CSA) [mm2], Length [m], Impedance 
data [Ω/km] and maximum continuous current carrying capacity IZ per phase 
conductor [A] for the cables used in the case study UK network 
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Location Rlocation(ap Xlocation(ap Location Rlocation(ap Xlocation(ap Location Rlocation(ap Xlocation(ap
     L1 0.90792 0.16272    C1 0.19566 0.0576    L11 0.74007 0.14556
     L2 1.20312 0.29592    C2 0.32976 0.11208    L12 0.56796 0.15909
     L3 1.77912 0.43092    C3 0.16896 0.0372    L21 0.56639 0.10499
     L4 2.35512 0.56592    C4 0.29898 0.11052    L22 0.45276 0.12163
      C5 0.38976 0.09168     L23 1.0926 0.23873  
Feeder 6.24528 1.44558    C6 0.23142 0.05538    L24 0.81402 0.17262
      C7 0.5628 0.2496    L25 0.25098 0.07877
      C8 0.47376 0.21366    L26 0.99635 0.24236
         L27 0.77867 0.22214
      I1 0.1953 0.04899    L28 0.48151 0.14363
         L29 0.50543 0.14773
      R1 0.40356 0.05868   L210 0.79 0.27505
      R2 2.05321 0.39204   L211 0.61245 0.20137
      R3 0.90996 0.20346    L31 0.77168 0.12832
      R4 0.57066 0.07818    L32 1.04603 0.21083
      R5 1.17774 0.25744    L41 0.4804 0.10922
              L42 0.42803 0.09453
              L43 0.45755 0.07148
              L44 0.44951 0.07953
         
TOTAL 24.9811 5.82192 TOTAL 7.96153 1.96651 TOTAL 12.2824 2.94758
 
Table A-2: Apparent resistance (Rlocation(ap)) and reactance (Xlocation(ap))  for the customer 
locations of the generic UK network, the European generic network and the case study 
public UK network. 
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Appendix B 
 
SSEG Database Data Type Description 
Network location Static * The network location of the SSEG, as provided 
by the system operator (DNO). This value is 
not updated in the database in real-time, 
however, it may change in the event of future 
modifications to the LV distribution network. 
Phase location Static The phase location of the SSEG, as provided 
by the system operator (DNO). 
Primary energy 
source 
 
Static The primary energy source fuelling the SSEG 
unit. This information could be useful for cases 
where the aim is to maximise renewable-based 
generation within the SSEZ. It can either be: (i) 
renewable based; or (ii) non-renewable based. 
Grid-dependent 
operation 
Static * The option for grid-dependent operation of the 
SSEG can either be: (i) yes; or (ii) no. This is 
because some customers may not want to 
manage their SSEGs in accordance with overall 
distribution system operation. This value is not 
updated in real-time, however it may change in 
the future according to customer aspiration.  
Controllability Static The option for controllability can either be: (i) 
yes; or (ii) no. This depends on the capabilities 
of the SSEG unit for power flow and voltage 
control, as described in Section 3.4. 
Real power rating Static The real power rating of the SSEG in kW. 
Generator 
minimum output 
Dynamic The minimum active power output limitation of 
the SSEG unit in kW. 
Generator status Dynamic The current operating status of the SSEG. This 
can be: (i) ON, which means that the SSEG is 
active; or (ii) OFF, which means the SSEG is 
inactive. 
Real power Dynamic The value for the current real power output of 
the SSEG unit in kW. 
Reactive power Dynamic The value for the current reactive power input 
or output of the SSEG unit in kVAr. 
Operating power 
factor 
Dynamic The value for the current operating power 
factor of the SSEG unit. 
Date Dynamic The current date, as provided by a timer. 
Time Dynamic The current time, as provided by a timer. 
Lower normal state 
voltage limit 
Static * The lower normal state operating voltage limit 
in Volts, as defined by the system operator.  
Upper normal state 
voltage limit 
Static * The upper normal state operating voltage limit 
in Volts, as defined by the system operator. 
Lower alert state 
voltage limit 
Static * The lower alert state operating voltage limit in 
Volts, as defined by the system operator. 
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Upper alert state 
voltage limit 
Static * The upper alert state operating voltage limit in 
Volts, as defined by the system operator. 
Lower emergency 
state voltage limit 
Static The lower emergency state operating voltage 
limit, as defined by statutory regulations. This 
value may not change and equals 216.2 V. 
Upper emergency 
state voltage limit 
Static The upper emergency state operating voltage 
limit, as defined by statutory regulations. This 
value may not change and equals 253 V. 
Trip-off 
undervoltage limit 
Static The trip-off undervoltage operating limit, as 
defined by statutory regulations. This value 
may not change and equals 207 V. 
Trip-off 
overvoltage limit 
Static The trip-off overvoltage operating limit, as 
defined by statutory regulations. This value 
may not change and equals 264 V. 
Current steady-
state voltage 
Dynamic The current steady-state voltage of the SSEG 
unit in Volts. 
Current operating 
state 
Dynamic The current operating state of the SSEG unit. 
This value may be: (i) normal state, (ii) alert 
state, or (iii) emergency state. 
Lower frequency 
limit 
Static The lower operating frequency limit, as defined 
by statutory regulations. This value may not 
change and equals 49.5 Hz. 
Upper frequency 
limit 
Static The upper operating frequency limit, as defined 
by statutory regulations. This value may not 
change and equals 50.5 Hz. 
Current operating 
frequency 
Dynamic The current operating frequency of the SSEG 
unit in Hz. 
 
Table B-1: Database coupled to a SSEG unit and the GA that controls it. 
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Load Database Data Type Description 
Network location Static * The network location of the load, as provided 
by the system operator (DNO). This value is 
not updated in the database in real-time, 
however, it may change in the event of future 
modifications to the LV distribution network. 
Phase location Static The phase location of the load, as provided by 
the system operator (DNO). 
Load type Static The type of controllable load. This value can 
either be: (i) reshiftable; (ii) curtailable; or (iii) 
critical. 
Grid-dependent 
operation 
Static * The option for grid-dependent operation of the 
load can either be: (i) yes; or (ii) no. This value 
is not updated in real-time, however it may 
change in the future according to customer 
aspiration.  
Real power rating Static The real power rating of the load in kW. 
Real power  Dynamic The value for the current real power 
consumption of the load in kW. 
Reactive power Dynamic The value for the current reactive power input 
of the load in kVAr. 
Operating power 
factor 
Dynamic The value for the current operating power 
factor of the load. 
Control steps Static The number of steps for controlling the load. 
This value can either be: (i) 0 which means the 
load is either ON or OFF; or (ii) any positive 
integer, which means that the load is curtailable 
and can reduce its power consumption. 
Minimum outage 
time 
Static The minimum time that the load can reduce its 
power consumption, or can be rescheduled. 
Maximum outage 
time 
Static The maximum time that the load can reduce its 
power consumption, or can be rescheduled. 
Lead time Static The time needed before the load can reduce its 
power consumption, or before rescheduling can 
take effect. 
Activation signal Dynamic The signal received from the CDA that 
determines when the load is to be controlled. 
This value can either be (i) control, which 
means the load control actions must be 
activated; or (ii) no_control, which means that 
the load is not currently actively controlled. 
Date Dynamic The current date, as provided by a timer. 
Time Dynamic The current time, as provided by a timer. 
Start date of 
rescheduling 
Dynamic The date when rescheduling is set to take place. 
This value may or may not be specified by the 
customer or CDA depending on the load. 
Start time of 
rescheduling 
Dynamic The time when rescheduling is set to take 
place. Similarly, this value may or may not be 
specified by the customer or by the CDA. 
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Duration of 
rescheduling 
Dynamic The duration that the load is to be active after 
re-scheduling. This value may or may not be 
specified by the customer or CDA and must be 
within minimum/maximum outage time limits.  
Lower normal state 
voltage limit 
Static * The lower normal state operating voltage limit 
in Volts, as defined by the system operator.  
Upper normal state 
voltage limit 
Static * The upper normal state operating voltage limit 
in Volts, as defined by the system operator. 
Lower alert state 
voltage limit 
Static * The lower alert state operating voltage limit in 
Volts, as defined by the system operator. 
Upper alert state 
voltage limit 
Static * The upper alert state operating voltage limit in 
Volts, as defined by the system operator. 
Lower emergency 
state voltage limit 
Static The lower emergency state operating voltage 
limit, as defined by statutory regulations. This 
value may not change and equals 216.2 V. 
Upper emergency 
state voltage limit 
Static The upper emergency state operating voltage 
limit, as defined by statutory regulations. This 
value may not change and equals 253 V. 
Current steady-
state voltage 
Dynamic The current steady-state voltage in Volts. 
Current operating 
state 
Dynamic The current operating state of the load unit. 
This value may be: (i) normal state, (ii) alert 
state, or (iii) emergency state. 
Lower frequency 
limit 
Static The lower operating frequency limit, as defined 
by statutory regulations. This value may not 
change and equals 49.5 Hz. 
Upper frequency 
limit 
Static The upper operating frequency limit, as defined 
by statutory regulations. This value may not 
change and equals 50.5 Hz. 
Current operating 
frequency 
Dynamic The current operating frequency of the load 
unit in Hz. 
 
Table B-2: Database coupled to a controllable load and the CDA that controls it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 274
ESU Database Data Type Description 
Network location Static * The network location of the ESU, as provided 
by the system operator (DNO). This value is 
not updated in the database in real-time, 
however, it may change in the event of future 
modifications to the LV distribution network. 
Phase location Static The phase location of the ESU, as provided by 
the system operator (DNO). 
ESU technology Static The technology used inside the ESU. This can 
be: (i) lead-acid battery; (ii) fuel cell; (iii) 
flywheel; (iv) super-capacitor; or (v) other. 
Operating time Static The operating time of the ESU. This is used by 
the ESA to identify the type of application that 
best suits the installed ESU and its value can 
be: (i) slow; or (ii) fast. 
Grid-dependent 
operation 
Static * The option for grid-dependent operation of the 
load can either be: (i) yes; or (ii) no. This value 
is not updated in real-time, however it may 
change in the future according to customer 
aspiration.  
Real power rating Static The real power rating of the ESU in kW. 
ESU status  Dynamic The operating status of the ESU. This can be: 
(i) ON, which means that the ESU is active; or 
(ii) OFF, which means that the ESU is inactive. 
Real power  Dynamic The value for the current real power input or 
output of the ESU in kW. 
Reactive power  Dynamic The value for the current reactive power input 
or output of the ESU in kVAr. 
Operating power 
factor 
Dynamic The value for the current operating power 
factor of the ESU. 
Date Dynamic The current date, as provided by a timer. 
Time Dynamic The current time, as provided by a timer. 
Lower normal state 
voltage limit 
Static * The lower normal state operating voltage limit 
in Volts, as defined by the system operator.  
Upper normal state 
voltage limit 
Static * The upper normal state operating voltage limit 
in Volts, as defined by the system operator. 
Lower alert state 
voltage limit 
Static * The lower alert state operating voltage limit in 
Volts, as defined by the system operator. 
Upper alert state 
voltage limit 
Static * The upper alert state operating voltage limit in 
Volts, as defined by the system operator. 
Lower emergency 
state voltage limit 
Static The lower emergency state operating voltage 
limit, as defined by statutory regulations. This 
value may not change and equals 216.2 V. 
Upper emergency 
state voltage limit 
Static The upper emergency state operating voltage 
limit, as defined by statutory regulations. This 
value may not change and equals 253 V. 
Current steady-
state voltage 
Dynamic The current steady-state voltage in Volts. 
Current operating Dynamic The current operating state of the load unit. 
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state This value may be: (i) normal state, (ii) alert 
state, or (iii) emergency state. 
Lower frequency 
limit 
Static The lower operating frequency limit, as defined 
by statutory regulations. This value may not 
change and equals 49.5 Hz. 
Upper frequency 
limit 
Static The upper operating frequency limit, as defined 
by statutory regulations. This value may not 
change and equals 50.5 Hz. 
Current operating 
frequency 
Dynamic The current operating frequency of the load 
unit in Hz. 
 
Table B-3: Database coupled to an ESU and the ESA that controls it. 
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Indirect Control 
Database 
Data Type Description 
Date Dynamic The current date, as provided by a timer. 
Time Dynamic The current time, as provided by a timer. 
Current flow at 
SSEZ “hot spots”. 
Dynamic The values for single- or three-phase current 
flows at particular cable sections (“hot spots”) 
that are being monitored within the SSEZ.  
Upper normal state 
current flow limits 
Static * The upper normal state current flow limits, as 
defined by the system operator for each 
particular cable “hot spot”. This value is not 
updated in real-time, but may change according 
to the system operator. 
Upper alert state 
current flow limits 
Static * The upper alert state current flow limits, as 
defined by the system operator for each 
particular cable “hot spot”. 
Upper emergency 
state current flow 
limits 
Static * The upper emergency state current flow limits, 
as defined by the maximum permissible current 
rating of each particular cable “hot spot”. 
Trip-off 
overcurrent limits 
Static The trip-off overcurrent limit at which the 
existing network protection settings of that 
particular cable section will operate. 
Real power flow at 
the PCC 
Dynamic The value for the three-phase real power flow 
in kW at the PCC between the SSEZ and the 
upstream distribution network. 
Reactive power 
flow at the PCC 
Dynamic The value for the three-phase reactive power 
flow in kVAr at the PCC between the SSEZ 
and the upstream distribution network. 
Apparent power 
flow at the PCC 
Dynamic The value for the three-phase apparent power 
flow in kVA at the PCC between the SSEZ and 
the upstream distribution network. 
Upper normal state 
apparent power 
flow limit 
Static * The upper normal state apparent power flow 
limit from/to the distribution transformer, as 
defined by the system operator.  
Upper alert state 
apparent power 
flow limit 
Static * The upper alert state apparent power flow limit 
from/to the distribution transformer, as defined 
by the system operator.  
Upper emergency 
state apparent 
power flow limit 
Static The upper emergency state apparent power 
flow limit from/to the distribution transformer, 
as defined by the thermal rating of that 
particular distribution transformer.  
%VUFs at the 
SSEZ remote ends  
Dynamic The values for the %VUFs at the remote ends 
of the SSEZ feeders that are being monitored. 
Upper normal state 
%VUF limit 
Static * The upper normal state %VUF limit, as defined 
by the system operator.  
Upper alert state 
%VUF limit 
Static * The upper alert state %VUF limit, as defined 
by the system operator.  
Upper emergency 
state %VUF limit 
Static The upper emergency state %VUF limit, as 
defined by current statutory regulations. This 
value is 1.3% for UK LV distribution networks 
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and 2% for EU LV distribution networks.  
Voltage regulation Dynamic The values for the percentage voltage deviation 
between the LV distribution substation voltage 
and the remote ends of each of the SSEZ 
feeders that are being monitored. 
Lower normal state 
voltage regulation 
limit 
Static * The lower normal state voltage regulation limit, 
as defined by the system operator. 
Upper normal state 
voltage regulation 
limit 
Static * The upper normal state voltage regulation limit, 
as defined by the system operator. 
Lower alert state 
voltage regulation 
limit 
Static * The lower alert state voltage regulation limit, 
as defined by the system operator. 
Upper alert state 
voltage regulation 
limit 
Static * The upper alert state voltage regulation limit, 
as defined by the system operator. 
Lower emergency 
state voltage 
regulation limit 
Static * The lower emergency state voltage regulation 
limit. This is also defined by the system 
operator because common statutory voltage 
regulation limits for LV distribution networks 
do not currently exist. 
Upper emergency 
state voltage 
regulation limit 
Static * The upper emergency state voltage regulation 
limit, as defined by the system operator. 
Selected 
operational goal 
Dynamic The operational goal that has been selected 
either by the OGA or through a request from 
the local DNO. This can either be: (a) “zero_ 
import”; (b) “zero_export”; (c) “self-
sufficiency”; (d) “constant_power_import”; (e) 
“dispatchable_power_output”; or (f) “none”. 
Start date of the 
selected operatio-
nal goal  
Dynamic The date when the selected operational goal is 
set to take place. This is specified either by the 
OGA or through a request from the local DNO. 
Start time of the 
selected operatio-
nal goal  
Dynamic The time when the selected operational goal is 
set to start. This is specified either by the OGA 
or through a request from the local DNO. 
Duration of the 
selected operatio-
nal goal  
Dynamic The duration of the selected operational goal. 
In line with the current electricity market 
operation, this value is typically 30 minutes. 
Amount of real 
power requested  
Dynamic The amount of real power requested from the 
local DNO if the “dispatchable_power_output” 
operational goal has been selected. 
 
Table B-4: Database coupled to the indirect control agents within the SSEZ. 
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Appendix C 
 
Behaviour Description 
SimpleBehaviour This class models simple atomic behaviours, and may be 
extended accordingly by the MAS developer. 
OneShotBehaviour This class models atomic behaviours that must be executed 
only once and cannot be blocked. Its done ( ) method always 
returns true. 
WakerBehaviour This class executes a one-shot user-defined task only once 
after a given timeout is elapsed. 
ReceiverBehaviour This class triggers when a given type of message is received 
or a given timeout is elapsed. 
CyclicBehaviour This class stays active as long as its agent is alive and must 
always be executed. Its done ( ) method always returns false. 
TickerBehaviour This class implements a cyclic task that must be executed 
periodically. 
CompositeBehaviour This class models behaviours that are made up by composing 
a number of children behaviours. The tasks performed by this 
behaviour are defined inside its children, while the composite 
behaviour only takes care of children scheduling. 
SequentialBehaviour This class executes its children behaviours one after the other 
and terminates when all children behaviours have ended. 
ParallelBehaviour This class executes its children behaviours in parallel and 
terminates when a particular condition on its children 
behaviours is met. This may be specified to be when all 
children have ended, n children have ended, or any child. 
 
Table C-1: Behaviour classes provided by JADE 
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Parameter Description Category 
Performative Denotes the type of the communicative act 
of the ACL message. 
Required 
Sender Denotes the identity of the sender of the 
message. 
Participant 
Receiver Denotes the identity of the intended 
recipients of the message. 
Participant 
Reply-to Denotes that subsequent messages are to 
be directed to the agent named in the 
reply-to parameter. 
Participant 
Content Denotes the content of the message. Content 
Language Denotes the language in which the content 
parameter is expressed. 
Content Descriptor 
Encoding Denotes the specific encoding of the 
content language expression. 
Content Descriptor 
Ontology Denotes the ontology(s) used to give 
meaning to the symbols in the content 
expression. 
Content Descriptor 
Protocol Denotes the interaction protocol the 
sending agent is using with the message. 
Conversation Control 
Conversation-id Introduces an expression (a conversation 
identifier) which is used to identify the 
ongoing sequence of communicative acts 
that together form a conversation. 
Conversation Control 
Reply-with Introduces an expression that will be used 
by the responding agent to identify this 
message. 
Conversation Control 
In-reply-to Denotes an expression that references an 
earlier action to which this message is a 
reply. 
Conversation Control 
Reply-by Denotes a time and/or date expression 
which indicates the latest time by which 
the sending agent would like to receive a 
reply. 
Conversation Control 
 
Table C-2: FIPA ACL message parameters. 
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Performative Description 
Accept-proposal Accepting a previously submitted proposal to perform an action. 
Agree Agreeing to perform some action, usually in reply to a Request. 
Cancel Informing another agent than an action is no longer intended. 
Cfp Calling for proposals to perform a given action. 
Confirm Informing another agent that a given proposition is true. 
Failure Informing another agent that an action was attempted, but the 
attempt failed for a given reason 
Inform Informing another agent that a given proposition is true. 
Not-Understood Informing another agent that his action was perceived but not 
understood; e.g. a message was sent but was not understood by 
the receiving agent. 
Propose Submitting a proposal to perform a certain action, given certain 
preconditions. 
Query-if Asking another agent if a given proposition is true or not. 
Query-ref Asking another agent for the object referred to by a referential 
expression. 
Refuse Refusing to perform a given action, with an explanation for the 
refusal. 
Reject-proposal Rejecting a previously submitted proposal to perform an action. 
Request Requesting that another agent performs a given action. 
Subscribe Requesting persistent notification for the value of a reference 
and to notify again when the object identified by the reference 
changes. 
 
Table C-3: FIPA ACL message performatives. 
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public class TLA extends Agent { 
 
protected void setup() { 
 
addBehaviour(new TickerBehaviour(this, 15000)  { 
 protected void onTick() { 
 Connection con = null; 
 Connection connection = null; 
    Statement stmt = null; 
           Statement statement = null; 
    ResultSet rs = null;  
             
   try { 
 
      //Register the JDBC driver for MySQL. 
      Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver"); 
    
      //Get a connection to the INPUTS database for a 
      // user named "root" with the password "password" 
      con = DriverManager.getConnection("jdbc:mysql://localhost:3306/inputs",  
                "root", "password"); 
 
      //Take a value from the “inp” database table for the current flow of a 
      //particular line segment and for a particular time 
      stmt = con.createStatement ( ); 
      rs = stmt.executeQuery ("SELECT current_flow FROM inp WHERE  
             time = '22:56:00'"); 
 
while (rs.next()) { 
   double amps = rs.getDouble(1); 
 
if (amps < 50)  { 
   try { 
System.out.println("The current at the line segment of interest is less 
than 50 A, it is "+amps+" A"); 
System.out.println("No generators need to be controlled "); 
} 
      } 
 
else { 
      try { 
ACLMessage msg = new ACLMessage (ACLMessage.REQUEST); 
msg.addReceiver(new AID("GA-1", AID.ISLOCALNAME)); 
msg.addReceiver(new AID("GA-2", AID.ISLOCALNAME)); 
msg.addReceiver(new AID("GA-3", AID.ISLOCALNAME)); 
msg.setOntology("SSEZ-control "); 
msg.setContent("realPowerOutReduction "); 
send(msg); 
} 
 
 282
finally { 
System.out.println("Problem! The current at the line segment of interest 
is more than 50 A, it is "+amps+" A"); 
System.out.println("The connected generators' real power output must 
be curtailed!"); 
} 
       } 
} 
    } catch (Exception e) { 
      System.err.println("Exception: " + e.getMessage()); 
    } finally { 
      try { 
        if(rs != null) 
          rs.close(); 
        if(stmt != null) 
          stmt.close(); 
        if(con != null) 
          con.close(); 
      } catch (SQLException e) { 
          } 
        } 
      } 
   } ); 
  } 
} 
 
Figure C-1: An example of a TLA accessing a database through the use of JDBC. 
 
 
